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Most, if not all, human cultures consider dead human bodies to be deserving of moral respect. The 
same moral attitude is generally absent regarding dead animal bodies. In a trade-off situation 
involving the stark choice of driving over either a dead human or animal body, most would venture 
that it is more morally permissible to drive over the dead animal body than the human one. Some 
may even think that it is more morally permissible to drive over a living animal than over an 
already dead human body. The prevailing moral intuition seems to be that we owe dead human 
bodies some ineliminable moral respect.  
If the above claim concerning attitudes towards dead human bodies is true, then it suggests that 
our traditional and extant cultures tend to assume that dead human bodies have moral status. This 
research is motivated by the observation that this moral intuition has not been subjected to any 
extensive and expansive philosophical scrutiny directed at justifying or rejecting it. The research 
aims to speak to this theoretical gap and to investigate whether we have direct duties towards dead 
human bodies. To pursue this philosophical investigation, I rely on the idea of moral status. The 
term ‘moral status’ is a technical one used broadly in moral philosophy – specifically in bioethics 
and environmental ethics – to refer to the value of beings towards which we have direct moral 
duties. The task of this research is to investigate whether extant influential secular and religious 
moral theories such as Utilitarianism, Christian ethics, Confucian ethics, and so on, have the 
resources to account for this intuition. 
This study also reflects on the implication for bioethics or medical ethics of the question of the 
moral status of dead bodies. Medical schools, for example, tend to use unclaimed cadavers for 
research. This research investigates the moral permissibility of using unclaimed cadavers for 
medical training and research in medical institutions. Ultimately, I argue that dead bodies have no 
intrinsic value or dignity, and hence that we do not owe them any direct duties. This conclusion 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. The Research Question 
This dissertation investigates the question whether we should take ourselves to have any direct 
moral duties towards dead human bodies. The primary question revolves around their moral value 
– what is the moral status of cadavers? That is, are human corpses things which we should treat 
with respect or dignity? I undertake to investigate this research question in view of both its 
philosophical and practical considerations in medical contexts. In terms of the former, as Michael 
Rosen explains, (2012: 129): 
[I]n my opinion, the universally held belief that we have a duty to treat dead [human] bodies 
with respect represents a deep puzzle for moral philosophy. Why it is a puzzle and how 
that puzzle should be resolved will be the subject of this chapter. 
Some things stand out in this quotation. Firstly, Rosen observes that the belief that we have duties 
to corpses is a universal one. In other words, it is a moral intuition that is a feature of all people 
(and their cultures) in the world, hence he calls it ‘universal’. Secondly, he emphasises the view 
that it is a universally held belief, and not a universally held truth. The intentional use of the word 
‘belief’ could imply that the evidence to convert this belief to a truth may be lacking. Finally, it is 
important to consider that Rosen refers to the belief that we have a duty to treat dead bodies with 
respect as a puzzle of moral philosophy. This view confirms that the question of whether we owe 
duties to dead bodies is indeed a moral question. Hence, the theoretical aspect of this research 
revolves around providing an intervention in this moral puzzle. Can we offer a moral explanation 
that can justify this moral intuition?  
The second consideration is of a practical character. Due to the scarcity of voluntarily donated 
human bodies in Africa, many African medical universities tend to rely on unclaimed cadavers 
donated annually by hospitals and government mortuaries to do medical research. According to 
Jones and Whitaker (2012), the use of unclaimed bodies has been one of the distinguishing features 
of the profession of anatomy. The issue of using unclaimed cadavers immediately presents itself 
as an applied ethical (specifically, medico-ethical) one. The question is whether it is morally right 
to use unclaimed cadavers to conduct medical research. The answer to this question is important 
and it depends on the underlying moral question of whether we have direct duties to respect dead 
human bodies. The absence or presence of these direct duties to human corpses will have 
significant implications for the permissibility of using cadavers in medical training and in research 
at universities and laboratories. The aim of this dissertation is therefore to offer a philosophical 
response to the moral question of whether we have direct duties towards human corpses and a 
response to the practical question of whether it is permissible to use unclaimed cadavers in medical 




1.2. Research Method and Contribution 
In this research, I will use analytic philosophy to examine the questions outlined above. The 
analytic approach to philosophy comprises two elements – the linguistic (or conceptual) and the 
argumentative (Gyekye, 1997). Philosophical engagements rely on language and concepts. The 
first task of a philosopher in the pursuit of wisdom or truth is to ensure a clear and correct use 
concepts, so as to avoid confusion or ambiguity. The second part – argument – is related to how 
philosophers think of evidence. Arguments are important ways to provide evidence for our views. 
Evidence is understood in terms of the quality or strength of reasons that support a particular claim. 
Only views that are well clarified conceptually and properly justified by reasons are worthy of 
serious consideration or acceptance. In relation to the case that is under investigation, we need to 
be clear about how we use the concepts of moral status and dignity, for example. Furthermore, we 
can only accept a theory of moral status and/or human dignity as plausible if it offers sound reasons 
for or against the position that dead bodies have moral status.  
The study is important insofar as it aims to philosophically reflect on the under-explored moral 
puzzle occasioned by our attitudes towards dead bodies. Some scholars have approximated this 
study but their focus has differed from mine. For example, Rosen (2012) looks at whether we can 
justify owing respectful treatment to beings that cannot be benefitted by such conduct. Other 
scholars, such as Joel Feinberg (1977), have investigated whether we should respect the wishes of 
dead people or whether we can harm the interests of dead human beings. Most recently, Thaddeus 
Metz (2012) merely endorses the intuition that dead bodies have moral status without providing 
evidence to support this view. This research focuses specifically on the dead body as an object of 
moral scrutiny. The question is whether the dead body is an object of intrinsic value, or, expressed 
technically, whether it has moral status or not. 
The study aims to make two moral contributions. Firstly, it aims to respond to the moral puzzle 
posed by our attitudes towards dead bodies by ascertaining whether cadavers have value in and of 
themselves. Secondly, this study is important because an answer to this moral question will have 
implications for bioethics and medical ethics. Whether or not dead human bodies have intrinsic 
moral value will have a direct bearing on how we relate to unclaimed or donated cadavers. This 
study could have an influence on our treatment of human remains in terms, for example, of the 
global practice of exhuming corpses to then provide them a decent burial. It could also influence 
practical issues such as what to do when land in which to bury dead human bodies is scarce.  
1.3. Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 1 introduces the research and sets out some of the important concepts entailed in it: the 
history and status of, and legal issues related to the use of unclaimed cadavers. I will also explore 
other non-philosophical material to demonstrate the point that almost all cultures have systems of 
belief accounting for why we must respect human corpses; I point out, however, that these are not 
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(usually) grounded on rational evidence. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the concept 
of moral status. 
 
A consideration of influential religious ethical theories about the moral status of the dead is 
provided in Chapter 2. I will consider Christianity and Islam, as well as African and Oriental 
religious theories of moral status, focusing in the latter case on Confucian ethics. 
Chapter 3 explores major Western theories of moral status and the properties that govern it in this 
tradition. The chapter provides a critical analysis of each moral theory as it pertains to the moral 
status of dead bodies. What emerges is that these theories fail to accord moral status to cadavers. 
In Chapter 4, I draw on African theories of moral status written largely in the context of 
environmental ethics. Many of these theories reflect current thinking in African philosophy. I will 
rely predominantly on the theories of Thaddeus Metz (modal relationalism), Kevin Behrens 
(environmental relationalism) and Munamato Chemhuru (environmental consequentialism). The 
aim will be to assess whether these three theories can accommodate the intuition that dead bodies 
have moral status. 
Chapter 5 discusses the under-explored field of Oriental philosophy and its implications for the 
moral status of the dead. I will largely draw from Chinese Philosophy, especially from Confucian 
ethics. 
In Chapter 6, I examine phenomenological theories of moral status derived from scholars such as 
Husserl and Heidegger and apply them to our topic. To make a case for phenomenological ethics 
in relation to the standing of human corpses, I will draw largely from Levinas’ moral philosophy. 
Chapter 7 involves a consideration of the question of dead bodies in the light of feminist moral 
thought. For the sake of focus, I will draw from the philosophical works of two scholars of the 
ethics of care – Sarah Clarke Miller and Eva Feder Kittay. I draw from these thinkers because their 
philosophical works make a substantial contribution to the concept(ion) of dignity in light of care 
ethics. I will explain how they invoke a relational ontology associated with care ethics to rethink 
the idea of dignity. 
The study concludes with Chapter 8, in which I identify to what extent the approaches discussed 
help clarify the moral intuition being investigated. I consider what the conclusion to be drawn 
implies for medical research on cadavers – whether it is morally permissible to use unclaimed 
cadavers for scientific research and learning, or not.  
1.4. A Brief History of the Use of Unclaimed Cadavers 
Historically, the first legal step towards the use of unclaimed cadavers in the 18th century was the 
passing of the Murder Act, in 1752, in England. The act legalised the dissection of the bodies of 
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executed murderers for anatomical research and education (Fielding, 2008; Jones 2011). It served 
a dual purpose: to prevent the horrid crime of murder by its association with hanging and further 
being dissected if found guilty, and to ensure a legal supply of fresh cadavers for anatomical studies 
(Richardson, 1987). During this period, anatomical dissection was associated with great dishonour 
and the practice of dissecting the human body stemmed from the desire to punish hardened 
criminals (Hildebrandt, 2008; Halperin, 2007). Punishment by death alone was believed to be 
insufficient – being sentenced to execution and dissection was viewed as punishment far worse 
than simple execution (Halperin, 2007). Because people strongly believed in the widely held 
Judeo-Christian view of literal resurrection, dissecting a criminal’s body was considered the best 
punishment, being an assault on one’s soul (Hildebrandt, 2008). Desecration of the corpse was 
believed to ensure that the dead criminals would not be resurrected, preventing them from 
receiving eternal salvation (Halperin, 2007). Punishing criminals in this way thus benefited the 
anatomists, who were permitted to dissect the bodies of criminals after execution. 
As medical science began to advance and the number of medical students increased, a more 
constant supply of dead bodies was needed for experimental purposes. This demand led to years 
of body snatching from graves, a practice supported by anatomists to the extent that students were 
encouraged to raid graveyards and provide bodies for their own classes (Garment et al., 2007; 
Halperin, 2007). These actions caused civilians to panic as their dead relatives’ bodies were being 
exhumed, and it was only after civilian unrest and protests that, in 1828, the British Parliament 
passed the “Dead Body Bill”. The bill officially permitted the use of corpses for scientific purposes 
when death occurred in a poorhouse, hospital or charitable institution maintained at public 
expense, and the body was not claimed within a specified time by the next of kin (Halperin, 2007). 
This was followed by the “Anatomy Act” passed in 1832, whereby unclaimed bodies from 
workhouses could be sent for dissection after forty-eight hours1. The act allowed a person to 
request in writing that his/her body not be used for dissection, but the majority of people, 
particularly the poor, had no knowledge of this caveat (Hildebrandt, 2008; Halperin, 2007).  
It is not surprising that unclaimed cadavers usually belong to the poor and disadvantaged. They 
are easily exploited and are the source of cadaveric material in most medical schools, especially 
here in Africa. According to Satyapal (2012), during Apartheid South Africa, cadavers were kept 
in hospital mortuaries for only three to five days. Thereafter, those bodies classified as unclaimed 
were bound for burial as paupers or would be donated to the regional anatomy department, with 
authorisation and permission from the hospital superintendent and the Inspector of Anatomy 
(Satyapal, 2012). During that period, communication infrastructure was poor and given the 
apartheid scenario, there was little willingness by the hospital authorities of the time to go the extra 
mile in informing the families of the deceased of the fate of the cadaver. This resulted in some 
dead, migrant black people being buried as paupers, with many others ending up on the dissection 
                                                 
1 In my view, this is the legislation that has laid a foundation for subsequent legislation in different parts of the world 
on the question of claimed and unclaimed cadavers. See also Jones (2011: 18).  
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tables of medical schools as unclaimed bodies (Satyapal, 2012). Health sciences departments may 
claim to have had proper legal authority from the apartheid state, but such a claim is morally 
questionable considering the now established view that Apartheid was a crime against humanity.  
It is important to understand the legal position regarding dead human bodies in order to understand 
the widespread legal acceptance of the use of unclaimed cadavers. In law, a natural person (human 
being) has a legal persona that terminates after death (Pienaar, 2018: 49–51)). In other words, 
legally speaking, at death the human being has expired; what is left is his/her physical remains in 
the form of the dead body awaiting decomposition. This means that the deceased has no legal 
standing and, by extension, no rights or obligations. The dead have no control over the fate of their 
dead bodies. Legal obligations towards the human cadaver seem essentially to be motivated by our 
moral obligation towards ourselves. This implies that rules made for the dead are not directly for 
the dead themselves but usually for the next of kin, friends, or state. Legal rules relating to a dead 
human body are primarily concerned with who controls the disposal of the body, and with the 
proper treatment of the corpse. The truth is – apart from the potential psychological harm – if we 
do not dispose of dead bodies properly, it may lead to life-threatening conditions. The right to 
possession of a dead human body for the purpose of disposal, under ordinary circumstances, vests 
in the spouse or relatives of the deceased (McQuoid-Mason & Dada, 2011: 129). Where the 
relatives or friends do not come forward to claim the body of the deceased, the state takes over.  
John Troyer (2014) explains that in law, the human body after death essentially becomes an object 
– a property of the living or of the state. The phrase “claiming the dead body, or unclaimed body” 
linguistically gives a sense of the objectification of the dead human body, which was once a 
breathing, thinking and feeling entity. If a dead human body is able to be claimed by the family or 
a friend, is it some kind of property – a thing? ‘Property’ refers to things that are owned, and the 
word ‘claim’ may refer to the idea of a demand of ownership made for something, usually referring 
to items such as a piece of land or a car. The idea of ownership itself is intrinsically linked to a 
sense of property. But, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), the British Human 
Tissue Act, and similar laws in various countries, nobody can claim a right over a dead body and 
own it or its parts in the same way one might a house or piece of land. An unrestricted property 
right does not exist in relation to a corpse. This is because dead bodies are subject to control by 
the law rather than being subject to the desires, whims or caprice of individuals (Hammack, 2014). 
In terms of Principle 5 of the WHO Report on Human Organ Transplantation, the human body and 
its parts cannot be the subject of commercial transactions. Thus, although cadavers and organs 
have commercial value, a human body or its parts – dead or alive – are never to be sold or bought 
(World Health Organization, 1991: 8). Organs or bodies can only be used for skilled work 
involving research, transplantation or teaching and learning, and this is done only in cases of 
donation or when there is no one to claim the dead body. 
Although the law (Chapter 8 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 of South Africa included) 
regulates the disposal of dead bodies without mention of respect or dignity per se, treating the 
deceased with dignity is generally perceived as the right thing to do; it reflects the bone mores of 
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the society (Pienaar, 2018). In terms of the convictions of many cultural communities, the dead 
should be respected and treated with dignity. We are often shocked and emotionally upset if bad 
things are done to dead bodies because we recognise and appreciate that the dead body is 
someone’s loved one. Besides, even in death, the human dead body is the material carrier of events 
that persist in our memory (Morar et al., 2008: 77). Even in death, the human body maintains a 
recognisable form that inspires respect for the person’s identity (2008: 77). Apart from this 
personal or moral preference, cultural and religious beliefs play a major role. But in law, the dead 
are simply dead and have no rights of their own. Therefore, following the law will not help us, as 
it is clear that the legal status of a person ceases with death, leaving the dead and their bodies with 
no legal rights.  
While the use of unclaimed cadavers for teaching and research purposes is legally acceptable, it 
raises ethical questions from a moral point of view (Jones and Whitaker, 2012). Morally speaking, 
the most accepted cadaver source for dissection would be a voluntary donation of someone’s own 
body during his/her lifetime (Morar et al., 2008: 80). In this way, the fundamental principle of 
respect for autonomy or respect for persons is observed.  
The principle of autonomy is rooted in the liberal moral and political tradition of the importance 
of individual freedom and choice. In moral philosophy, personal autonomy refers to personal self-
governance. Autonomy refers to the personal rule of the self with adequate understanding, while 
remaining free from interference by others and from unnecessary limitations that prevent choice 
(Beauchamp & Walters, 2003). In other words, autonomy means freedom from external constraint 
and the presence of critical mental capacities like understanding, intention, and voluntary decision-
making capacity. It is important to acknowledge that to respect an autonomous agent is to recognise 
another person’s capacity and perspective, including his/her right to hold views, to make certain 
choices, and to take certain actions based on personal values and beliefs. Thus, to respect the 
autonomy of self-determining agents is to recognise them as entitled to determine their own 
destiny, with due respect for their considered evaluations and views of the world. As expressed in 
Kantian ethics, autonomous persons are ends in themselves, they determine their own destiny, and 
are not to be treated as means to the ends of others (Rachels, 2007). They must be accorded the 
moral right to have their own opinions and to act upon them, as long as those actions produce no 
moral violation. On this view, human beings, including the poor and the homeless, are 
autonomous, rational, self-conscious and capable of valuing their own life, and should be entitled 
to liberty and the right to choose for themselves (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
The principle of autonomy is operationalised in the concept of (informed) consent. This instrument 
in contemporary bioethical discourse can be traced back to the Nuremberg tribunals, where the 
abusive, horrible human experiments conducted on vulnerable Jews by Nazi doctors were revealed 
(McQuoid-Mason & Dhai, 2011). Following the Nuremberg Code of 1947, other guidelines such 
as the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report were adopted with the aim of putting 
emphasis on informed consent. It was hoped that doing so would ensure that living persons would 
not be subjected to medical research against their will while alive, and indeed, after their death. 
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The WHO provides a regulatory context for the use of cadavers for organ donation and research. 
Guiding Principle 1 of the WHO guidelines stipulates the following: 
Organs may be removed from the bodies of deceased persons for the purpose of 
transplantation if: a) any consents required by law are obtained, and b) there is no reason 
to believe that the deceased person objected to such removal, in the absence of any formal 
consent given during the person’s lifetime. 
In its Guiding Principle 3, the WHO continues to aver that “organs for transplantation should be 
removed preferably from the bodies of deceased persons” (World Health Organization, 1991: 8). 
While the WHO provides a basis for the general use of the body of deceased persons, the actual 
requirements will flow from the jurisprudential instruments of a country, which will specify 
obligations and limitations concerning how to use cadavers. For example, in South Africa, 
cadaveric donations are regulated by section 62 of the National Health Act (Act 61 of 2003) and 
its regulations. This section of the act makes provision for persons over the age of 16 to donate 
their body or tissue in a will, or in a document signed by the donor and two competent witnesses, 
or in an oral statement made in the presence of two competent witnesses (McQuoid-Mason & 
Dada, 2011: 129). In cases where a donation of tissue or body has not been made, or where the 
deceased has not before dying prohibited a donation, certain relatives in a specific hierarchy 
(spouse, partner, major child, parent, guardian, major brother or major sister of the deceased), may 
consent to a donation (McQuoid-Mason & Dada, 2011: 129). Where such persons cannot be 
located after the death of the deceased, the Director-General of Health may donate any specific 
tissue of the deceased or whole body to an institution such as a medical school, provided that all 
the steps have been taken to locate the deceased’s next of kin authorised to give consent (McQuoid-
Mason & Dada, 2011: 129). This is in line with the first guiding principle of the WHO quoted 
above (1a). 
It should be noticed that the second regulating feature (1b) of this principle is an ethical one, which 
invokes the idea of consent. In this light, permissible use of cadavers is regulated by the prior 
consent of the deceased or, in the absence of prior consent, the consent of the family members. 
The principle proceeds to make further provisions for the use of cadavers, specifically for 
unclaimed cadavers. We can use unclaimed cadavers provided we have no reason to believe that 
they would have objected to such practices. This prescription on the use of unclaimed cadavers is 
therefore informed by the value of consent. The question is how far the ethical principle of 
autonomy and its operationalisation through consent can get us. What happens in the case of 
unclaimed cadavers whose positions (in life) are unknown and whose family or friends are 
unreachable? Very often, unclaimed corpses do not have identity documents, have no known 
names and are of unknown religions. This means that their personal beliefs are not known to those 
dissecting them, and this practice may be a violation of someone’s long held belief system and 
religion. It may also be against the beliefs and values of the living communities to which the dead 
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body once belonged (Jones, 2016; Martin et al., 2013). As Andrea Winkelmann (2016: 75) 
observes: 
Even if there are no direct relatives, the mere awareness within the community that those 
who die without relatives may ‘end up on the anatomist’s table’ can be disturbing and may 
endanger the trust a community has in its anatomists. 
Is there a moral question about dead human bodies that is prior to and more important than the 
principle of autonomy and its application through consent? That is, while consent may be a vital 
component of ethical decision-making, if it turns out also to be the case that dead people have no 
moral status (for example, no autonomy or dignity), it would logically follow that the issue of 
consent would be rendered almost insignificant. The challenge raised by this study is that the issue 
of consent is important, but not ultimately decisive. The primary and decisive ethical question 
pertains to the question of whether we have direct moral obligations to dead human bodies on the 
basis of their moral status. This question thus shifts the focus from the issue of consent to 
theoretical investigations pertaining directly to the moral status of the dead. 
In Western moral theorisation, abundant literature exists on the concept of moral status. The idea 
of moral status is frequently appealed to in debates around abortion, marginal cases, animal rights, 
environmental ethics, and so on (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2013). What is however a largely 
under-explored area of moral philosophy is the application of this concept to the evaluation of the 
moral standing of dead bodies. This is surprising and concerning because issues related to death 
are important in bioethics. It is intellectually important to intervene in the issue of whether we have 
direct duties to dead human bodies because it has direct theoretical and practical implication for 
the WHO principles of organ donation, as well as for medical research concerning the use of 
cadavers to advance medical knowledge. Therefore, we need to clarify our definition of moral 
status to proceed. 
1.5. What is Moral Status? 
According to Metz (2012: 389) moral status refers to “the idea of something being the object of a 
‘direct’ duty, i.e., owed a duty in its own right, or [moral status refers to] the idea of something 
that can be wronged”. On this definition, to have moral status is to invite some kind of moral 
attention or response from moral agents. Metz is specific about the kind of moral response that is 
required by a being with moral status – a thing that has moral status is owed moral duties of respect 
or even rights based on facts derived from and dependant on it. Hence, Metz talks of direct duties. 
In other words, the duties we owe towards a thing with moral status arise because of it and are 
owed to it for its own sake. This implies that this being has value in and of itself; hence the duty 
that accrues to it is direct rather than indirect. For example, if I break your chair, I have done 




One of the leading scholars of the moral idea of personhood, particularly on the abortion debate, 
Mary-Ann Warren (1997), comments that for an entity to be morally considerable, it must be 
capable of making some kind of morally significant claim against a moral agent. It is for this 
reason, therefore, that moral agents must be said to have some kind of moral obligation to such an 
entity and can be held accountable for flouting those obligations. Moral agents are those 
individuals, for example, that count as fully-fledged human beings capable of rational decision 
making, understanding, acting upon moral principles, and who are responsible for what they do 
(Pluhar, 1987). Thus, a moral agent is capable of reasoning and of acting based on reason and is 
not restricted to acting on the basis of instinct, desire or emotion. Only moral agents have moral 
responsibilities and have duties towards other beings that can make them responsible for their 
actions or omissions. It is important to appreciate that the duties invited by the idea of moral status 
arise for moral agents, but the idea of moral status is an idea of ‘moral patiency’ (as opposed to 
agency). In other words, it identifies moral objects – those things towards which we have duties 
of respect. 
To claim that some being has moral status is to identify it as a moral patient. To say of some entity 
that it is a moral patient is to recognise that certain ways of acting towards it are impermissible 
and can harm it. To say actions are impermissible is to appreciate the fact that those ways of 
relating to a subject violate some objective moral principle, which is specified by a theory of moral 
status (Molefe, 2017). On the other hand, certain ways of treating an entity do not just violate some 
abstract moral principle, they harm the entity itself – that is, they undermine its well-being or 
violate its rights (Feinberg, 1984). It is therefore not surprising that Manuel Toscano (2011: 15–
16) argues that the idea of moral status “is a normative condition that determines how [an] entity 
should be treated”; and he continues to observe that this notion must be “spelled out in deontic 
terms as permissions, prohibitions and obligations”. In other words, this means that the idea of 
moral status sets constraints around how we may or may not relate to a being of value 
(MacNaughton & Rawling, 2006). Moral status, understood as a constraint, sets parameters that 
explain what is permissible to do to a being (like aiding it), sets restrictions that specify what may 
not be done to a being (like unnecessarily harming it), and serves as a guide that specifies what 
obligations or duties we have towards a being (like treating it fairly or as it deserves) (Jaworska & 
Tannenbaum, 2013). 
Furthermore, the idea of moral status is generally believed to be one that admits of degrees. In 
other words, as captured by DeGrazia (2008: 181–198), moral status does not take the form of an 
all-or-nothing position. Some people contend that foetuses have moral status, but a status less than 
that of a paradigm or fully-fledged person, or that although sentient non-human animals deserve 
moral consideration because of their interests or welfare, their moral status is not equal to that of 
human persons (2008: 181–198). Thus, moral status can vary between the poles of being fully 
present or absent, with human beings believed to have greater moral status than other non-human 
sentient animals (Toscano, 2011). Metz (2012) also agrees that moral status comes in degrees as 
he argues that human beings, even those who are severely mentally incapacitated, have greater 
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moral status than animals with identical internal properties. We might wish to say that some human 
being – such as those in a coma, those with severe mental disabilities, young children, infants and 
foetuses – have moral status. But many philosophers, like Kant, Tooley and Warren insist that only 
normal adults have full moral status (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2013). That is why DeGrazia 
(2008) argues that most people believe that it is generally worse to kill a person than to kill a 
mouse; this is because persons are due full moral consideration whereas mice are due considerably 
less. 
Warren (1991: 310) also endorses the view that moral status comes in degrees. She cites this “fact” 
to argue that killing a person is harder to justify than killing a rabbit. The reason for subscribing to 
this kind of a view is that most animal liberationists believe that people have moral status not based 
upon sentience alone, but also on other capacities like rationality (Warren, 1991). Warren proffers 
a multi-criterial conception of moral status that invokes five properties, including rationality and 
the ability to communicate. This grading of moral status ascribes the highest status to human 
beings, not because they are humans but because they are moral agents or moral persons (Wetlesen, 
1999). Other living beings, therefore, are ascribed a lower degree of moral status depending on 
their degree of relevant similarity to moral persons or the possession of the relevant moral features 
(Wetlesen, 1999). It is then presumed that animals with self-consciousness or consciousness and 
sentience have a higher moral status than non-conscious or non-sentient organisms (Wetlesen, 
1999; Warren, 1991). However, the organisms with a lesser moral status are not devoid of it, and 
for this reason we do have a prima facie duty not to cause avoidable harm to them (Wetlesen, 
1999). If we cannot avoid harming them in order to survive, then we have at least a subsidiary duty 
to cause the least harm to them possible (Wetlesen, 1999). 
To think of moral status as existing in degrees provides a very interesting way to account for the 
idea of human dignity. For example, Toscano (2011: 4) defends the view that captures dignity in 
terms of the highest possession of moral status. Since moral status comes in degrees, it makes 
sense to speak of partial and full moral status among the spectrum of beings that have value. The 
idea of full moral status is equivalent to the notion of human dignity (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 
2013). The Romans conceptualised dignity (dignitas) as a selective property of nobility or of 
individuals that occupied high positions or rank in social strata (Rosen, 2012). In modern accounts 
of dignity, to speak of dignity as full or high moral status signifies that this idea has been 
revolutionised in the sense that it is used to elevate all human beings to a high rank where all 
human beings are equal on that rank. This insight is explained by Waldrow (2009: 210): 
If our modern conception of human dignity retains any scintilla of its ancient and historical 
connection with rank – and I think it does; I think it expresses the idea of the high and equal 
rank of every human person…  
In the same lecture series, he makes the following point – 
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I argued that we should consider ways in which the idea of human dignity keeps faith with 
the old hierarchical system of dignity as noble or official rank, and we should view it in its 
modern form as an equalization of high status rather than as something that eschews talk 
of status altogether. (2009: 223) 
The historical use and meaning of dignity – understood as aristocratic – is inverted in modern times 
to disrupt the distinction between the ordinary (the commoner) and the noble. On the modern 
understanding of dignity, everyone is elevated to the high rank of the social strata. Everyone is 
equal and deserves to be treated with the highest moral respect, which is expressed in terms of 
human rights. 
It is important to disambiguate senses associated with the concept of dignity in the literature. There 
is a great deal of literature that attempts this (see Waldrow, 2009; Sulmasy, 2008; Rosen, 2012). 
For the purposes of this study, I will use the framework proposed by Sulmasy (2008), where he 
distinguishes between three distinct senses of dignity: intrinsic, attributed, and inflorescent dignity.  
Sulmasy avers that: 
By intrinsic dignity, I mean that worth or value that people have simply because they are 
human, not by virtue of any social standing, ability to evoke admiration, or any particular 
set of talents, skills, or powers. Intrinsic dignity is the value that human beings have simply 
by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. (2008: 473) 
Concerning attributed dignity, he states that: 
By attributed dignity, I mean that worth or value that human beings confer upon others by 
acts of attribution. The act of conferring this worth or value may be accomplished 
individually or communally, but it always involves a choice. Attributed dignity is, in a 
sense, created. (2008: 473) 
Finally, he defines inflorescent dignity in this fashion: 
By inflorescent dignity, I mean the way people use the word to describe the value of a 
process that is conducive to human excellence or the value of a state of affairs by which an 
individual expresses human excellence. In other words, inflorescent dignity is used to refer 
to individuals who are flourishing as human beings – living lives that are consistent with 
and expressive of the intrinsic dignity of the human. (2008: 473) 
Attributed and inflorescent dignity are in some sense created. Attributed dignity depends on the 
valuer and inflorescent depends on the conduct of the agent. Intrinsic dignity is a function of the 
kind of a thing the entity is or the property it possesses. It is associated with the inherent value of 
the thing in question. Sulmasy then makes an important observation in relation to intrinsic dignity: 
“I will argue that, while all three senses have moral relevance, the intrinsic sense of dignity is the 
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most fundamental from a moral perspective” (2008: 470). It is this concept of dignity that features 
in bioethical or medical ethics. It is the idea of intrinsic dignity that is important in this research 
project.  
In discussing moral status in this work, we will see that it can take three possible forms, discussed 
under the rubrics of: individualism, holism, and relationalism. 
‘Individualism’ conceives of moral status in terms of some property intrinsic to an individual by 
basing it on properties like reason, pleasure, sentience, rationality, or consciousness (Behrens, 
2011: 18). Theories of moral status such as utilitarianism and Kantian deontology are individualist 
in nature as they interpret moral status in the light of some individual capacity like reason. ‘Holism’ 
ascribes moral status relative to membership of some groups such as ecosystems or species (2011: 
18.). Holists accord no moral status to an individual per se but assign it only to groups to which an 
individual belongs (Behrens, 2011). ‘Relationalism’ grounds moral status in relational properties 
(Metz, 2012: 388)2.  
In the chapters that follow, I will also look at supernatural theories of moral status to show that 
these do not provide fertile terrain for grounding it. I will then examine Western, African, and 
Chinese theories of moral status to see if they can offer anything in this regard. In order to assess 
the intuition from as diverse a perspective as possible, I also examine the contributions of 
phenomenological ethics, the ethics of care and feminist ethics. I am aware that there are many 
other views such as those found in Indian ethics, Buddhism and so forth that I have omitted but I 
hope that the theories I have selected can be taken to be representative and sufficient to give us a 
concrete sense of whether the intuition that human dead bodies have moral status can be secured 
philosophically, a view this research will contest and reject.  
                                                 
2  A theory of moral status could take an individualist, holist or even a relational frame. It could be argued that my 
argument is strongest or would have been strong had it focused its criticism towards individualistic theories of moral 
status. It could also be advanced or believed that there are many versions of holism and relationalism that might 
accommodate corpses in the moral community - the claim that is not advanced or disputed in this dissertation. There 
might be other promising versions of relationalism/holism, which I might explore in a different context. In the context 
of this dissertation, however, the relational/holistic versions that were considered, I believe I argued satisfactorily, that 
they are inadequate to capture the intuition that dead human bodies do have moral status.  
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Chapter 2: Supernatural Theories of Moral Status and Dead Human Bodies 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will be considering the moral status of dead human bodies in the light of salient 
supernatural theories of moral status. ‘Supernaturalism’ is the metaphysical view that beyond the 
natural or physical world (where things that can be accessed by use of scientific means), there are 
invisible or spiritual entities that form part of worldly reality. Mogobe Ramose (1999: 64) in his 
discussion of ubuntu as a moral theory, refers to this supernatural aspect of thought as “the 
ontology of invisible beings”. God, the living dead (ancestors), spirits, and the not-yet-born belong 
to this category of invisible beings (Shutte 2001; Bujo 2005: 424-425). In other chapters of this 
work, for the most part, I will be considering theories that can be understood in terms of ethical-
naturalism – that is, they account for morality entirely in terms of some physical or social property 
like harmony, welfare or dignity (see Wiredu, 1992; Gyekye, 1995; Metz, 2007a). The aim of this 
chapter is to ground morality on supernatural considerations: ethical supernaturalism. The central 
task of this chapter then is to evaluate whether we can find spiritual moral resources that could be 
invoked in order to help us resolve the question of the moral status of dead human bodies. 
In the final analysis, I will argue that the ethical supernatural theories of moral status to be 
considered (namely, African, Oriental, and Western accounts) fail to secure the view that a cadaver 
has moral status. To pursue the argument that human corpses do not have moral status in the light 
of ethical supernaturalism, I will consider only spiritual moral theories that are salient in the 
traditions just listed. In the African tradition, I will ground a theory of moral status on the 
metaphysical property of vitality or life force (Okra, in the Akan tradition). In the Oriental 
tradition, I will ground it on the metaphysical system of Daoism. In the Western tradition, I will 
consider theories of moral status associated with the Judeo-Christian perspective that tends to 
ground it on the imago dei (Donnelly, 2009). I will further consider the Islamic perspective that 
also grounds moral status on the idea of the image of God (Al-Dawoody, 2017). The insight that 
will emerge from this chapter is that insofar as a property grounds dignity, in the four ethical 
systems to be considered here, it is based on some divine property that is dissociated from the 
human body when it dies. Therefore, morally speaking, it is safe to say that moral status is a 
function purely of those human beings that are still alive. 
Before I discuss these four ethical systems, I will start by making the following clarifications. 
Firstly, in this chapter, I will limit myself predominantly to three of the traditions – the African, 
Western and Islamic – because Chapter 5: Chinese Philosophy and the Moral Status of Dead  will 
be entirely devoted to the Oriental moral tradition. I devote an entire chapter to this tradition 
because it is largely under-explored and requires careful exposition. Secondly, the ethical systems 
discussed here are based on a dense fabric of metaphysical beliefs such as the assumption of the 
existence of God, the existence of ancestors, the belief that there is such a thing as the image of 
God which is a feature of human nature, or that there is a spiritual energy present in living human 
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beings. For the sake of articulating and evaluating spiritual theories of moral status, I assume the 
truth of the underlying metaphysical systems. It is beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation 
to resolve metaphysical and meta-ethical questions occasioned by supernatural moral theories – 
my focus remains on their ethical implications. 
The aim of this chapter is not to convince the reader to believe that such metaphysical properties 
exist. Rather, it is a moderate one: to extract theories of moral status that can be associated with 
these metaphysical positions. I consider supernatural theories of moral status for two reasons. 
Firstly, there is no denying that there are many people whose moral motivations are grounded on 
religious considerations, and such people may suppose that their religious beliefs might have 
consequences for respecting dead human bodies. Secondly, and related to the first consideration, 
various cultures embody different metaphysical systems that inform religious-ethical traditions. It 
will be of interest to determine whether such religiously grounded moral accounts can account for 
the moral intuition that dead bodies have moral status.  
2.2. The African Metaphysical System of Vitalism 
It was Father Placide Tempels (1959), in his philosophical research among the Baluba people of 
Congo, who first brought the idea of vitality or life force to the attention of scholars, including 
African philosophers. It is important that we be clear about what credit is due to Tempels – he 
should be rightly credited for being the first one to give this idea of vitality its philosophical 
pedigree. That said, this idea of vitality was present and operational among the Bantu. In terms of 
Godfrey Tangwa’s (2000) distinction between forensic and latent philosophies, the idea of 
personhood was a latent philosophy among the Baluba people and most African cultures. It was 
Tempels that made it a forensic philosophical view. In Tempels’ exposition of the philosophical 
system characteristic of the Baluba people, the idea of vitality plays metaphysical and moral roles. 
As a metaphysical concept, it offers a descriptive account of what constitutes the essence of reality. 
It accounts for all reality (‘being’) or reduces it to force. He captures this view as “force is being 
and being is force” (Tempels, 1959: 50). 
By ‘being’, Tempels is referring to metaphysics – the very structure and nature of reality. In the 
final analysis, reality is best understood in terms of force; and to talk of force just is to talk of 
being. Being and force are inseparable. To make better sense of this metaphysical system, it is 
important to unfold its overall vision. Scholars of African thought take ‘vitality’ to refer to a 
spiritual property (energy) that is an offshoot of God (Tempels, 1959; Magesa, 1997; Shutte, 2001; 
Bujo, 2001). Vitality, in African metaphysical thought, refers to the invisible and spiritual energy 
that is considered to originate from God, who distributes it to all aspects of reality, animate and 
inanimate alike (Shutte, 2001: 10). All objects or entities in the world possess this divine energy, 
albeit in varying degrees (Shutte, 2001; Magesa, 1997; Mkhize, 2008). In other words, vitality/life 
force is a divine property because it originates in God, and is distributed by him to all existence. 
This property is essential in this conception of reality since it is a feature that characterises every 
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existing thing. “The concept of energy or vital force is central in African ontology” (Bikopo & 
Van Bogaert, 2009: 42). In some sense, in the African tradition, everything is understood to be a 
possessor of ‘life’; all things possess life insofar as they have the life-giving property of vitality. It 
is important to notice that vitality is simultaneously an individuating and collectivising 
metaphysical property. In other words, the property of vitality is one possessed by an individual 
qua individual, but it is also one that connects every ‘living’ thing together. Verhoef and Michel 
(1997: 395) observe that “everything – God, ancestors, humans, animals, plants and inanimate 
objects – is connected, interdependent and interrelated”. On this view, no object or entity is 
independent and self-sufficient: they are all held together in these relations of connectedness and 
dependency by the divine force of vitality. 
The interconnectedness of all existing things can only be accounted for by appeal to the idea of 
vitality. This collectivising structure entailed by the idea of vitality can be imagined in two related 
ways. Firstly, the metaphysical system is holistic. That is, this conception of reality emphasises 
how things hold and work together, rather than the individual existence of things. A holistic 
approach can be contrasted against the analytic and scientific approach to studying reality. In the 
latter case, individual existence is primary and takes central stage in social and scientific analysis 
(Nisbett et al., 2001). In the former, the human individual is understood within the broader 
framework of social relationships that are human-to-human, human-to-divine and the rest of nature 
(Bujo, 2005). African scholars tend to incorporate these relationships into even the form they take 
regarding the furniture of the world. They usually conceive the structural relationships between 
the different facets of the furniture to take a hierarchical form. This view is represented by Laurenti 
Magesa (1997: 39) as follows:  
In the conception of African religion, the universe is a composite of divine, spirit, human, 
animate and inanimate elements, hierarchically perceived, but directly related, and always 
interacting with one another. 
On this conception of the structure and order of reality, divine reality takes the highest position, 
followed by the human community, then the animal kingdom, plants and inanimate objects. This 
structure and order of reality is best explained in terms of the idea of vitality. According to Metz 
(2011: 24): 
Everything in the universe, even inanimate things such as a rock, is thought to be good by 
virtue of having some degree of life force, with animate beings having a greater share of it 
than inanimate ones, human beings having more than plants and animals, ancestors, whose 
physical bodies have died but who live on in a spiritual realm, having even more than 
human beings, and God, the source of all life force, having the most. 
Molefe (2015: 99–100) makes the following comment about the role of vitality: “This hierarchy 
is usually informed by how the elements or entities in question are closer to God’s nature, 
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depending on the degree of their possession of vital force”. God in this metaphysical view has the 
infinite possession of vital force, then, in descending order follow ancestors, human beings, 
animals, plants and inanimate elements. Firstly, it is critical to recognise that the more vital force 
an entity possesses the closer it is to God. In other words, the position of some entity in the 
hierarchy – be it an animal or ancestor – is determined by the quantity of vital force it possesses. 
Since vitality is the essence of divinity, it makes sense that God is at the top of the hierarchy. The 
closer a being is to God, in terms of possessing vitality, the higher it will be in the hierarchy. 
Another important consideration that can be read off this hierarchy is the special place occupied 
by human beings in it. The position of human beings is central since they are the only beings in 
the natural realm that can connect with both the spiritual and natural realms of existence3. In other 
words, human beings participate in both the natural and spiritual domain. In the natural domain, 
human beings occupy the highest role, that is, in the natural plain they possess the highest quantity 
of vital force. Since human beings occupy a central position between the natural and supernatural 
domains of existence, they also play the role of linking the natural and supernatural spheres (Bujo, 
1998; 2005). 
The second facet related to the discourse of vitality in African philosophy is of a moral nature. 
Vitality is not only the most pervasive metaphysical property; it is also the most important moral 
category in African cultures. Appreciate the following examples that posit life force as the basis 
of African moral theory.  
Tempels makes the following moral claim: 
… [T]heir purpose is to acquire life, strength or vital force…  Each being has been endowed 
by God with a certain force, capable of strengthening the vital energy of the strongest being 
of all creation: man… the only kind of blessing, is, to the Bantu, to possess the greatest 
vital force (1959: 30–32). 
Similarly, Onah explains: 
At the centre of traditional African morality is human life. Africans have a sacred reverence 
for life… To protect and nurture their lives, all human beings are inserted within a given 
community… The promotion of life is therefore the determinant principle of African 
traditional morality and this promotion is guaranteed only in the community. Living 
harmoniously within a community is therefore a moral obligation ordained by God for the 
promotion of life (cited in Metz, 2007a: 329). 
                                                 
3 Scholars of African cultures and metaphysical thought take human beings to hold a central place since, unlike any 
other natural entity, say animals, they possess higher forms of vitality and agential abilities that gives more power to 
influence or even manipulate matters in the natural and spiritual realm. For example, if there is a famine, human beings 
can appeal or appease the supernatural realm, which animals and plants (so far as we know) cannot do.  
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Another influential scholar of African ethics, Iroegbu (2005: 448) comments: 
This brings to focus the positive value of life. Because it is divine in resemblance, it must 
be taken loftily and with highest respect. It must be seen for what it is: of high value. 
This can be confusing: the idea of vitality is often used in a sense where it is tantamount to the idea 
of life or life force. From the above, it is clear that African scholars take the idea of vitality to be 
the highest good – it is intrinsically valuable. It must be clear that this goodness is of a vertical 
nature since it is entirely derived from and connected with God (Pojman, 2002). This idea of 
vitality might inform a normative theory, be it perfectionist, consequentialist or deontological (see 
Metz, 2012; Molefe, 2018). This idea might also inform a meta-ethical theory on the nature of 
moral properties (right or wrong) – that they are entirely definable in terms of the property of 
vitality (Imafidon, 2013; Molefe, 2015; 2018). The focus of this chapter, however, is on the theory 
of moral status. The idea of vitality seems to promise such a theory. This view of moral status or 
dignity is captured thus: 
… [T]hey say that a human being is special in virtue of being able to exhibit a superlative 
degree of health, strength, growth, reproduction, creativity, vibrancy, activity, self-motion, 
courage and confidence, with a lack of life force being constituted by the presence of 
disease, weakness, decay, barrenness, destruction, lethargy, passivity, submission, 
insecurity and depression. (Metz, 2012: 25). 
In this particular quotation, Metz is considering two salient theories of dignity in the African 
tradition. The one theory grounds dignity on the natural (human) capacity for love (see Metz, 
2011). The other, under consideration in the above quote, grounds dignity on the divine property 
of vitality. So, when Metz mentions that “a human being is special in virtue of being able to exhibit 
a superlative degree of life”, he is offering a physicalist interpretation of dignity based on the idea 
of vitality. What makes human beings special, in terms of the metaphysical system of vitality, is 
the mere possession of the divine energy of vitality. What Metz refers to as a superlative degree of 
health, strength, growth, reproduction, creativity and so on are consequences of being an entity of 
dignity. Or, more accurately, these are features of a dignified life. Hence, on the idea of dignity 
understood in terms of vitality, we have dignity merely because we possess the spiritual energy of 
vitality. In other words, even if we do not have health, strength, growth or maturation, we still do 
have dignity because we possess vitality. These properties that Metz associates with dignity – 
health, strength, growth, maturation and so on – signify a dignified form of human existence. 
On this view, human beings have moral status insofar as they have the spiritual property of vital 
force. They have dignity because they have the highest moral status in the natural domain. In other 
words, since human beings have greater moral status than animals, plants and inanimate objects, 
they have greater moral status. This apex moral status is tantamount to dignity (Toscano, 2011: 4–
25; Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2014). 
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In the light of the above exposition of the metaphysical and moral views associated with vitality, 
we are in a position to reflect on our primary question concerning the moral status of dead bodies. 
On this view, it is obvious that a living human body has moral status. But what about a dead human 
body? Whether a cadaver has moral status or not will be a function of whether it still possesses 
vitality.  
Tempels comments: 
Man can come to an end in the complete annihilation of his very essence, the paralysis of 
his vital force, which takes from him the power to be an active force (1959: 66). 
Once the vital force is lost, either gradually or suddenly, we speak of death. In the African tradition, 
death is conceived of in two related ways. Scholars talk of processual and ultimate death (Bujo, 
2005). ‘Processual’ death refers to a process of loss of vital force as a consequence of inferior 
moral conduct. The increase and intensification of personal vitality is a function of moral conduct 
that promotes harmony and the common good. Deviation from sound moral conduct leads to a loss 
of vital force, which means that an individual has entered into the process of death. Death is 
ultimate when the individual actually dies – the dissipation of all vital force. At the point of 
ultimate death, the individual has lost all vitality. Thus, the process of dying is not static as it goes 
through progressive stages of energy loss until one is completely dead – that is, when the level of 
life force/vital force falls to zero (Bikopo & Van Bogaert, 2009: 45). 
Scholars of African moral thought distinguish between a moral and immoral ultimate death 
(Bikopo & Van Bogaert 2009; Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 1992). When death comes at the fullness of 
age and maturity, it is taken to be a good death – one which ushers the individual to the afterlife 
(Menkiti, 1984; Gyekye, 1992). The individual, though they have lost all vitality, has crossed the 
river to join their ancestors; they have crossed beyond the natural realm (Wiredu, 1992). Immoral 
death happens when the individual loses all vital force, and they cannot therefore cross the river 
and are lost in the wilderness (Wiredu, 1992). I will sidestep the moral and metaphysical 
complications of this view; what is relevant for our consideration is that at death, the physical body 
has reached what we might call ‘stage zero’ in terms of vitality, and the individual has no vitality 
at all. 
If the above analysis is true, it should follow that dead human bodies do not have moral status. The 
reason for this is that at death, be it moral or immoral, vitality leaves the body. The one that 
experiences a good death takes a new form of life as an ancestor that does not require the body. 
Immoral death is also characterised by a loss of vital force and the body remains without vitality. 
What emerges is that human existence is possible and requires vitality. At death, the body goes to 
the ground and ceases to have the status associated with a being of value since such value is a 
function of being imbued with vitality, present in living bodies. If death, on this view, is accounted 
for in terms of loss of vital force, it follows that dead human bodies have no moral status.  
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2.3. The Metaphysical System of Daoism and Confucianism 
Most commentators tend to focus on the non-spiritual renditions of Confucian ethics (Taylor & 
Arbuckle, 1995). They tend to distance themselves from the metaphysical, religious and spiritual 
facets of Confucian thought. This move is understandable given that Confucian moral thought 
tends to be pre-theoretical, situational and practical in its orientation. But the fact that Confucian 
moral thought is practical should not be read to suggest that it has no metaphysical underpinnings 
or influences that would shed light on some of its moral moorings and preoccupations. 
The metaphysical system associated with Confucianism is derived from Daoism (Loewe, 1982; 
McMullen, 1988). Lao-Tzu articulated the metaphysical system of Daoism. Lao-Tzu was a royal 
archivist but abandoned this life and went to devote himself to the study of society and government. 
His metaphysical and socio-political views developed in this context. 
At the heart of the metaphysical system of Daoism is the idea of dao. Dao is generally understood 
to mean the way (Graham, 1989). The idea of the way may be associated with the spiritual 
dimensions of existence (Heaven) and/or “nature” (Fingarette, 1972). Dao refers to an all-
encompassing value that is the source of all being, in a metaphysical sense, which is responsible 
for life and death in all its modes and permutations (Lau, 1963). The underlying logic of Dao is its 
orientation to order and harmony. It is because of dao, among other things, that the ideal and idea 
of harmony is central in this metaphysical system. The aim of rulers and citizens is to live in 
accordance with dao, which will lead to intra- and interpersonal harmony. For an individual to live 
in harmony they must have dao and must live according to dao (Qing-Ju, 2014). 
Another facet of Daoism that is important to appreciate for our understanding of Confucianism is 
the idea Qi. This is an essential component of everything in the natural world. Qi instantiates itself 
through two distinct but mutually functioning forces of Yin and Yang (Littlejohn, 2010; Miller, 
2003). The former is characterised by passivity, heaviness, darkness and is drawn downwards, and 
the latter is active, light and tends upwards. One can conceptualise the two in terms of the yin 
being negative and the yang positive. These two components oppose each other. The essence of a 
moral life expressed through the negative and positive dimensions is to find a balance or harmony 
between the two (Chan, 1991). 
Another important element of Daoism teaches that human nature has two types of soul, namely: 
the hun and p’o (Augustyn et al., 2008). Every human being possesses both of these souls. The 
hun is associated with the yang (which is positive), and when a person dies, it goes to heaven. The 
p’o is associated with the yin (which is negative); it relates to the body and its heaviness, and when 
a person dies, it goes to the ground. While a person is still alive, they are required to keep the 
balance between the yin and yang, and thus maintain the integration of the souls. This metaphysical 
picture informs the Chinese approach to health, which puts emphasis on the internal harmony of 
the yin and yang, as that has implications for the two souls. The harmony between the two souls 
is believed to have implications for health and longevity (Cartwright, 2018). 
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This two-soul concept might have implications for the status of the body in Chinese metaphysical 
thought. The body is associated with the yin and p’o, which is heavy and tends downwards and, 
hence, when a person dies their negative soul qua p’o goes down to the ground as well. This state 
of disintegration, I believe, might have implications for our question of the moral status of dead 
bodies. It suggests that the soul associated with the body – the p’o – is inferior in position and 
possibly in quality to the hun. This might be an indication that the value of the body and p’o is 
functionalised through the activity and intellect associated with the yang and hun. When these two 
depart to heaven, the heavy, moist, earthly body goes down to ground where it belongs, since it is 
no longer of any use. One can reasonably suppose that the body apart from and without the yang 
and hun has no value in and of itself. This way of reading matters concerning the body lacking 
moral value is suggested by Henry Rosemont (2007: 14) when he comments: 
I will argue that one’s concept of immortality, in an important sense of the term, should 
not be construed simply as becoming one of the ‘ghosts’ or ‘spirits’ after death, but rather, 
from a Confucian standpoint, as a disciplined coming to see, feel, and understand oneself 
as living in the ancestors and living on in succeeding generations, and that this coming to 
see, feel, and understand is the culmination of a rigorous and lifelong aesthetic, moral, and 
spiritual cultivation centred in filial piety, love, friendship, responsibility and the li, or ritual 
propriety. 
This passage refers to the afterlife of a person that has lived a truly moral life. Such an individual 
is elevated to immortality. That individual becomes an ancestor, which is a state where the hun 
and yang, in my view, come to their fulfilment in the spiritual realm, where they are separated 
from the body, which material served merely as the location for moral and spiritual training. 
I need to be clear that I do not suggest that this is a Daoist or Confucian view of the status of the 
body. I believe however that this is one possible interpretation of the body available from this 
metaphysical standpoint. This conclusion regarding the status of the dead human body is sustained 
by the fact that the moral – I will elaborate this point later – is possible because of the yang and 
hun. We should not forget that the yang and hun are associated with activity and intellect. This 
might plausibly be construed to also include moral agency. Hence, on this reading, the body could 
be understood in a very instrumental sense. It could be understood as a conduit through which we 
can attempt to apply the panoply of morality to our mortal, material existence. At death, therefore, 
the body loses the metaphysical dimensions that are necessary for morality to be possible – the 
yang and hun. In this state, the body exits the domain of morality; in and of itself it has no moral 
significance deserving ethical recognition. 
If the above view is correct, then the body is the shell through which the spiritual and moral 
elements find expression. When the body dies these elements depart to the spiritual dimensions, 
making it safe to conclude that a dead human body has no moral status at all. 
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2.4. The Image of God and Theory of Moral Status in Judeo-Christian Thought 
One influential theory of dignity can be found in the creation story of the book of Genesis. Jack 
Donnelly (2009: 18), a leading scholar of dignity and human rights, informs us that the book of 
“Genesis, however, is the source of another understanding of dignity that dominated the 
Western/Christian world for over a millennium and continues to be a powerful presence in 
contemporary discussions”. 
This view of dignity is encapsulated in these words in the Bible: 
And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion 
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the 
earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So, God created man in 
his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And 
God blessed them, and God said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the 
earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the 
air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth (Genesis 1: 26-28). 
The creation account posits a developmental trajectory from nothing (ex nihilo) to something, 
unfolding over the six days of creation. The progression of creation seems to embody a hierarchy, 
where the unfolding of creation begins from the inanimate and progresses to the animate. The 
progression also seems to be a movement from the amoral to the moral. God creates the skies, 
separates the waters from land, creates the sun, moon, stars, and plants. The climax of creation 
seems to be the creation of human beings. Like animals, humanity is created from the dust of earth 
but the creation of human beings is totally different from that of animals. Though both are 
‘extracted’ from the earth, the creation of human being gains significance because of two facts. 
The creation of human beings is attended by a voice or conversation – supposedly among members 
of the triune Godhead (God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit), whereas the creation of all other things 
is attended by a loaded silence (Donnelly, 2009). The second fact involves the specification of the 
ontological feature that is to be a part of human nature – the image of God. In other words, human 
nature, though it does share some facets with other animals (like nutritive and reproductive 
abilities) is distinct and even superior to them because it also bears the divine nature. It is this 
divine nature – this image of God – that accounts for the special place occupied by human beings 
in creation. The special situation of human beings does not end in creation, it extends beyond the 
biblical narrative and utopia (Donnelly, 2009). In creation, a human being is grand and noble, 
because he is created in the image of God. In the fall, the nobility and honour of human beings is 
significantly compromised, but it is not entirely obliterated (White, 1903: 17). Why this is so can 
be extracted from the redemption story of the Bible. If divine nature was completely obliterated 
from human beings, it would be otiose for the plan of redemption to be rolled out for the salvation 
of humanity. Hence, from a biblical perspective, human beings are special, noble and above all of 
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the natural kingdoms – animal and vegetable – because they share the image of God. It is in virtue 
of possessing this feature that they are considered beings of dignity. 
Several issues are important to consider on this way of conceiving dignity. Firstly, dignity is 
universal in the truest sense. In other words, any human being, irrespective of his/her physical or 
psychological condition, is a possessor of dignity. On this view, even the so-called marginal cases 
are possessors of dignity because they are created in God’s image. The consequence of this view 
is that it embodies a conception of dignity that is too inclusive when compared, for example, with 
Kant’s view. On Kant’s view, marginal cases such as infants lack the required cognitive abilities 
to qualify for moral status (Kant, 1785/1996). On the Christian view, these cases do possess moral 
status because they are created in God’s image. Secondly, this view of dignity, in some sense, is 
anthropocentric since it is only human beings – to the exclusion of animals, for example – that 
have moral status. As a point of contrast, Kant’s view can be said to be logocentric insofar as it 
bases moral status on rationality (Wood & O’Neill, 1998). In other words, if aliens have reason, 
they have moral status. On the Christian view, we have dignity merely because it is a God-given 
attribute; hence, there is no social structure or process that can take it away from us. Dignity is not 
something that we earn or can lose; we have it simply as a God-given property (Pannenberg, 1991).  
We might want to consider the implications of this theory of moral status for our question on dead 
human bodies. The important question, then, to consider is – does a dead human body have or 
possess the image of God? I think the answer to this question will largely depend on what we take 
to be constitutive of the image of God. Some scholars associate the image of God with “the ability 
to think and to do” that we share with God, albeit to a much lesser extent (White, 1903: 18). This 
offers a much more ‘rational’ view of the image of God. Another view captures the concept of 
imago dei in spiritual terms – accounting for it in terms of a soul. This view can be elaborated in 
as follows. First, at creation, we are told that:  
And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the 
breath of life; and man became a living soul (Genesis 2: 7).  
The breath which God infused into the human body is usually referred to as the soul. The moral 
significance associated with soul is expressed by Christ when he remarks: 
For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? 
(Mark 8: 36). 
The implication could be that the possession of a soul makes all the moral difference. It strikes me 
that, in both ways of conceiving of what it means to be created in the image of God, upon death a 
human body loses or does not have this property. This is the case because upon death, if rational 
powers account for the image of God, it is clear that these powers are lost. On the view that 
imagines the image of God in terms of the soul, the same conclusion also seems to hold. In fact, 
the common biblical view is that upon death the soul returns to God, its giver, and a dead human 
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being, the cadaver, returns to the ground from which it was hewn. Consequently, without a soul a 
dead human body no longer possess moral status.  
The conclusion is clear, the image of God, at least as interpreted here, is a kind of property that we 
lose when we die. Hence, dead human bodies do not have moral status or dignity at all since their 
death implies the loss of the very property that constitutes their dignity. It could be argued that we 
should treat the dead human body with dignity because through such treatment we show reverence 
to God, who has created human beings. But, according to Liosi (2018: 32), treating the body with 
dignity as a means of showing reverence to God has nothing to do with the dead human body itself, 
it is instead a purely symbolic act4.  
2.5 Islamic Views on the Moral Status of the Dead 
Islam views human beings as vicegerents or representatives of God (Allah) on earth. This is 
confirmed in the Holy Qur’an which says: “Behold, Allah said to Angels; I will create a vicegerent 
on earth” (Holy Qur’an 2: 30). It continues: “He then fashioned a human being in due proportion 
and breathed into him the soul” (Holy Qur’an 3: 9), and “conferred on them [human beings] special 
favours above all other creations” (Holy Qur’an 17: 70). 
Al-Dawoody explains: 
In Islam, human dignity is a right given by God to all people, who are referred to in the 
Qur’an as God’s vicegerents on earth. Whether they are dead or alive, the dignity and 
respect required includes that of the human body, created by God in the perfect shape 
(2017: 764). 
This suggests that dignity is something that is given. In this manner, dignity is not a matter of 
certain properties such as rationality and autonomy. All humans have it as a gift from God because 
they are created by God in his own image. Even a dead human body is not to be treated with 
disrespect just as a living human being is not to be treated with disrespect. Although dead, it is 
believed that the dead have the same level of dignity and sanctity as they had when alive (Al-
                                                 
4 It could be argued that we should take dead human bodies on the African view and Christian view to have moral 
status for relational reasons rather than merely possession of some intrinsic features. The possession of vitality, on the 
African view, and, the possession of a soul, on the Christian view, secure moral status insofar as these properties point 
precisely to the relationship with the deity. I remain unconvinced by this kind of objection because what seems to be 
the essence that holds the relationship between the deity and human beings is precisely these intrinsic properties. At 
the point of death, the property that is essential for the connection between the human and the divine is terminated, 
and there is no basis to meaningfully speak of a relationship. The reason I believe this is because both views can 
plausibly be construed to require agents to enhance or realize these distinctive properties so that they come as close 
as possible to leading a virtue (spiritual life), but at the point of death this requirement does not apply to dead corpses. 
In this light, to insist on granting moral status even without possession of these attributes seems otiose because dead 
human beings are now outside of the realm of morality – they do not possess vitality or soul, they cannot enhance or 
realize their vitality or soul. If my analysis is true, it follows that the relationship is instrumental and the possession of 
the internal property is primary to account for the value of the being in question.  
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Dawoody, 2017). Thus, the human body, whether living or dead, should be venerated. Whether 
dead or alive, the human body created by God in the perfect shape, must be treated with dignity 
and respect (Holy Qur’an 5: 31). Two notions are emphasised here, that of dignity and that of the 
sacredness of the body, dead or alive. I will attend to these later in the chapter. 
Islam also teaches that “Breaking the bones of a dead person is similar to breaking the bones of a 
living person” or put differently, “the sin of breaking the bones of the dead man is equal to the sin 
of breaking the bones of a living man” (Albar, 2012; Al-Dawoody, 2017). 
On this religious view, keeping the shape of the dead body in its original form or intact is 
emphasized. Cremation of dead bodies is not allowed. Cremating a dead body may be viewed as 
desecration, and a violation of its sanctity (Rispler- Chaim, 1993). However, autopsy and 
dissection of cadavers is not contested; the principle of saving a human life, which is core in 
Islamic views, allows that harm done to dead bodies, if any, should be weighed against the benefit 
obtained (Albar, 2012; Rispler- Chaim, 1993). This principle takes precedence over whatever is 
assumed to harm or dishonour the corpse if it is believed that in dissecting the dead body for 
research, autopsy, or learning, the lives of many others will be saved (Albar, 2012). 
The embalming of dead bodies in Islam is not permissible (Rispler- Chaim, 1993). Once dead, the 
human body ought to be buried as soon as possible, because it begins decaying, which threatens 
its perfect shape. We have noted above that human dignity in Islam, is something that is given by 
God to all humans, because they are created in God’s perfect shape (Al- Dawoody, 2017). This 
view on dignity is similar to that raised in Genesis (1: 26- 28). As explained earlier in this chapter, 
the aesthetic quality of the body (its perfect shape) cannot outlast its decomposition, and therefore 
the perfection of its shape (the image of God) cannot last long after death.  
Death is viewed in Islam as the separation of the soul (spirit) from the body, whereby the body 
remains on earth for burial while the soul is transferred to the afterlife (Butrovic, 2016: 34). These 
views are also similar to the Christian views on moral status discussed above, and the conclusion 
here will be the same: that, dead human bodies do not have dignity or moral status due to the 
absence of the soul. It was concluded above that the image of God is a kind of property that we 
lose when we die. Hence, dead human bodies do not have moral status or dignity at all since their 
death implies the loss of this very same property that constitutes their dignity.  
I will now proceed to another aspect of Islam and its stance to cadavers, the claim that human 
bodies are sacred. According to this doctrine, a human body, whether dead or alive, is sacred and 
its sanctity is not diminished by the departure of the soul and the declaration of death (Albar, 2012). 
Al-Dawoody (2017) agrees with this view, saying that the dead have the same level of dignity and 
sanctity as they had when alive. But, appealing to the sanctity of the human body is a way of using 
our attitudes and feelings towards human bodies to determine how we should treat them when they 




Bonnie Steinbock has this to say about the sanctity of things: 
The Koran is sacred to the Muslims, but not to the Christians, therefore, it is wrong for the 
Christians to treat the Koran with disrespect, not because the Koran has or ought to have 
symbolic value to the Christians, but because their handling of the Koran is deeply 
offensive to the Muslims. But, reference solely to the feelings of members of the group that 
are affected is not adequate explanation of why it is wrong to flush the Koran down the 
toilet (Steinbock, 2007: 434). 
John Robertson also says that: 
The flag, the Torah, certain works of arts, religious relics and human remains are examples 
of other objects that are revered and respected because of their symbolic import, even 
though they are not themselves moral subjects or rights-bearers (Robertson, 1990: 447). 
On these views, to say that a dead human body is disrespectfully treated cannot be supported by 
reasons that directly defend the body itself, because treating the dead body with disrespect does 
not matter to it, it only matters to those living human beings who are offended by such treatment. 
Thus, to dissect dead human bodies for medical research, autopsy or learning may only offend 
those within a particular group or culture or religion such as Islam – where dead bodies have 
symbolic value. We can see then that dissecting the bodies would only be considered a violation 
by those who believe in the sacredness of those bodies, and not universally. 
It therefore cannot be correct to award the dead body moral status due to its sanctity; to do so is to 
consider the body for its own sake in making our moral evaluation. At its best, sacredness promotes 
the indirect obligation to respect dead human bodies only because of people’s attitudes and beliefs 
venerating the once-living body. Thus, the dead have some relational property with a group of 
people who assign a symbolic value to them. Without these people, the dead body is simply dead 
organic decaying material which cannot command our respected. Thus, without the living who 
care, the human body is not sacred. It is therefore safe to say, even on Islamic views, that human 
cadavers do not have the intrinsic properties required for possessing moral status. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered the moral status of dead human bodies in the light of supernatural 
theories, particularly salient ones in the African, Oriental, Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions. 
I clarified that I do not take the metaphysical assumptions and beliefs informing these theories to 
be true or self-evident; I merely take them for granted for the sake of theorising about them.  
I articulated four theories of moral status. From the African tradition, I relied on the metaphysical 
idea of vitality – divine energy – to ground a theory of moral status. On this view, human beings 
have moral status because they possess this property. We noted that upon death human bodies lose 
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their vitality. In the light of this, I concluded that dead human bodies have no moral status on the 
vitality-based view. I also explored the question of the value of a dead human body in the Chinese 
tradition. I relied on the metaphysical idea of Daoism that informs Confucian moral thought. I 
observed that the metaphysical properties associated with the body are not important for ancestral 
life or immortality. I argued that yang and hun ascend to heaven upon death, and that yin and p’o 
descend with the body to the earth upon death. This brought me to the conclusion that the human 
body, at death, loses the metaphysical dimensions necessary for morality to be possible – the yang 
and hun. On this view, the body is the shell through which the spiritual and moral elements find 
expression. When the body dies, these elements depart to the spiritual dimensions, leaving the 
human corpse empty, with no moral status at all. 
The same conclusion was reached regarding the idea of the image of God in the Christian tradition. 
In both interpretations of the image of God – (1) as rational nature; or (2) as soul – we noted that 
at death the body loses these properties, leading to the conclusion that a dead human body has no 
moral status at all. It was noted that the image of God as an idea is also the pillar of Islam, and this 
led to the same conclusion – that upon death, the human body loses this property, and with it its 
moral status. It was noted that Islam views the human body, whether dead or alive, as sacred. But 
it was argued that the respect given to the dead human body is based on indirect duties alone and 
not for the sake of the body itself. In conclusion, the human corpse has no intrinsic moral properties 
or moral status on any of these views, and can therefore be dissected for medical research and 
learning purposes. 







Chapter 3: Western Theories of Moral Status and Dead Human Bodies 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate the question of the moral status of dead bodies in the context of 
Western moral thought. I limit my investigation in several ways, however. Firstly, I will draw 
entirely from the English-speaking moral philosophy literature, putting aside, for example, French 
philosophy literature. Secondly, I will focus on secular moral theories of moral status in the 
Western (English-speaking) tradition of philosophy as I have considered religious views of moral 
status in the preceding chapter. Thirdly, my focus will be on those secular theories that I consider 
salient in the Western moral tradition. Finally, the purview of the moral theories that will be 
considered is limited to those that can roughly be described as modern, namely: utilitarianism, 
Kantian ethics, and the capabilities approach. 
The above-mentioned theories deal with meta-ethical, normative and applied ethical questions, 
among others (Singer, 1972 Kant, 1785/1996; Nussbaum, 2011). For the purpose of this chapter 
and study, I will only focus on them only insofar as they embody accounts of moral status, which 
will help us to reflect on the pressing research topic. Put differently, I seek to investigate whether 
these theories can account for the intuition that dead bodies have moral status. In the final analysis, 
I will argue that extant Western theories of moral status do not have the resources to secure the 
idea that dead bodies do indeed have moral status. 
Regarding utilitarianism, I will show that what it posits as a basic metaphysical consideration for 
some beings to be considered part of the moral community excludes human corpses. In discussing 
Kantian ethics, I will demonstrate that locating morality in autonomy/rationality – that is, the 
ability to self-govern – patently excludes the dead. And regarding the capabilities approach – if 
certain (basic) capabilities necessary for the achievement of certain functions (‘functionings’ in 
Nussbaum’s vocabular) are deemed valuable for human existence, then the dead have no ability to 
achieve these functions at all, and, therefore, have no moral value. 
This chapter does not assume that the theories under consideration take themselves to defend the 
intuition that dead bodies have moral status. The idea is to pursue the question of whether dead 
bodies have moral status by assessing whether these influential theories can accommodate this 
prominent cultural intuition instead. To point out that these theories cannot accommodate the 
intuition that dead bodies have moral status does not mean they are objectionable since these 
theories tend to be focused on questions of justice for living human beings, and not for the dead. 
The chapter is structured as follows: each section will be dedicated to the consideration of a 
specific moral theory and to the evaluation of whether it can accommodate the intuition that the 




3.2. Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of the Dead 
Utilitarianism, as a moral theory, can be said to have been instigated by David Hume. It was given 
a definite theoretical formulation as a robust moral theory by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill (Rachels, 2007: 90). Two considerations explain the theoretical appeal of utilitarianism as a 
moral theory. Firstly, utilitarianism divorces morality from all controversial metaphysical 
underpinnings. In other words, it refuses to base morality on thick metaphysical or religious views. 
It does not ground morality, for example, on God or even on divine properties like a soul or imago 
dei. The major benefit of this is that it is not parsimonious to ground morality or conceptions of 
justice on a comprehensive doctrine that requires a justification (Nussbaum, 2011). 
Secondly, utilitarianism’s strong appeal is related to the fact that it locates morality entirely in 
happiness. The idea that morality is concerned with human happiness is less controversial than the 
idea that morality relates to God or some other metaphysical consideration. Happiness seems to be 
one of those values that matter most in human existence. Even the most ascetic of religious zealots 
has the happiness of the afterlife as the target of their actions. Even the martyrdom of people like 
Steve Biko aims at the liberation and freedom of his own people, which is associated with their 
welfare, freedom and happiness. Hence, following this logic, morality is about promoting 
consequences that maximise happiness for society at large (Kymlicka, 1990). For example, 
according to one of the leading scholars of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, morality is about 
making the world as happy a place as possible. Bentham posited that there is one ultimate moral 
principle, namely, the principle of utility. This principle, he argued, requires us always to choose 
a course of action or social policy that leads to the best (happiest) possible consequences for 
everyone concerned. Rachels (2007: 90) tells us that historically: 
Bentham was a leader of a group of philosophical radicals whose aim was to reform the 
laws and institutions of England along utilitarian lines. One of his followers was James 
Mill, a Scottish philosopher, whose son John Stuart Mill would become a leading advocate 
of the utilitarian moral theory for the next generation after Bentham’s death. John Stuart 
Mill’s advocacy was even more elegant and persuasive than that of his predecessors. 
My interest, however, in this chapter is in the theory of value relating to the idea of moral status, 
in the light of utilitarianism. To offer a philosophical analysis and discussion of the contribution 
of utilitarianism in relation to a conception of moral status, I will rely largely on Peter Singer who 
is arguably one of the leading proponents of utilitarianism. I hasten to accept that there may be 
differences among different scholars of utilitarianism pertaining to how they account for moral 
status, but at core they share the basic moral assumptions that will be explained below. One useful 
way to get to Singer’s theory of moral status is by considering how he tackles the question of 
animals and marginal cases (those with severe mental disabilities) in his moral philosophy. I 
consider his treatment of animals and marginal cases for heuristic purposes to approximate an 
answer to the standing of dead human bodies. 
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To get to his theory of moral status, Singer begins by revealing some basic assumptions that 
undergird modern moral philosophy, specifically: (1) That all human beings have more or less the 
same moral status; and (2) That the moral status (enjoyed by all human beings) is greater than that 
of animals (Singer, 1987). Singer is not convinced by the evidence presented to defend the claim 
that all human beings have equal moral status. This claim is usually supported by appeal to the 
religious, to higher cognitive abilities, or through speciesism arguments (Singer, 2009). He finds 
appeal to the religious argument to be unsuitable to ground a public/secular morality. The reason 
for this is that one must first believe that God exists, which is itself a serious philosophical problem 
that raises controversies given the difficulty of demonstrating a proof (Singer, 2009). Singer 
believes that modern multi-cultural, secular, democratic and scientific culture ought not to ground 
public moral policy on religious grounds. 
Singer objects to grounding moral status on higher cognitive abilities given the evidence of animals 
with higher cognitive abilities than severely mentally retarded human beings. Another reason that 
informs the rejection of higher cognitive abilities as a ground for moral status is that it excludes 
foetuses and infants. Singer also objects to grounding moral status on the fact that one is a member 
of our species since it is characterised by an unjustified discrimination based on an arbitrary fact 
of belonging to a certain species. Singer refers to this kind of discrimination as speciesism. He 
believes that speciesism is objectionable because it is analogous to moral evils of racism (‘she is 
superior to black people because she is a member of the white race’) or sexism (‘he is superior to 
females because he is male’). There is nothing about the fact or property of being male, white or 
human, in and of itself, which morally justifies differential treatment. 
Further, Singer argues that extant accounts of moral status have given animals a raw deal. In fact, 
he finds the anthropocentrism that characterises much of dominant Western moral philosophy to 
be similar to oppressions that were extended to people of colour or to women. These groups were 
oppressed because of some arbitrary consideration or another – be it race, place of origin, gender 
etc. Anthropocentrism locates all morality in some human facet or interest (Grey, 1998). Singer 
points out that anthropocentrism leads to concretely oppressive attitudes and behaviour towards 
animals, be it through what we eat or the entertainment we enjoy (such as is the case in circuses). 
The problem, Singer thinks, can largely be placed at the door of our prejudices, which are, in part, 
sponsored by our prevalent theories of moral status. These theories are captured by our dominant 
moral cultures and packaged as religious claims, claims about the value of our cognitive abilities 
or of membership in a morally favoured species. 
A morally progressive view, according to Singer (1987: 152; 2009: 575) – a view he quotes from 
Jeremy Bentham – would be that: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which 
never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have 
already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should 
be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be 
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recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the 
os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same 
fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or 
perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a 
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or 
even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is 
not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? 
In line with Singer’s concern about the galling yoke of oppression carried by animals, Bentham 
asks a fundamental question that seeks to proffer an account of moral status. He asks the all-
important question that seeks to establish the criterion for determining moral status – “what else is 
it that should trace the insuperable line?” He begins by giving us a clue of where he is going to 
locate moral status that will secure the “rights” of animals by insisting that we may not just leave 
“sensitive beings” to the “caprice of the tormentor” – i.e., the sensitivity of animals (to suffering) 
should count for something, morally speaking (Singer, 2009: 575). Then, unequivocally, Bentham 
informs us that the fundamental property that determines moral status is whether the being under 
consideration can suffer or not. It is the capacity to enjoy pleasure and suffer pain that grounds an 
account of moral status on the utilitarian moral scheme. 
The remarks Singer makes in relation to the comment by Bentham are worth noting. Singer 
comments that: “In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital 
characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration” (Singer, 1987: 152, emphasis 
mine). Singer proceeds to point to the view that “If a being suffers, there can be no moral 
justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration” (Singer, 1987: 153). Thus, on 
the utilitarian moral scheme, it is the capacity for suffering or enjoyment that serves as the moral 
basis of whether some entity is a member of the moral community, and nothing else. Singer aims 
to be more precise about his account by indicating that “if all humans have rights, it would have 
to be because of some much more minimal characteristics, such as being living creatures. Any 
such minimal characteristics would, of course, be possessed by humans as well as by non-human 
animals” (Singer, 1987; emphasis mine). 
As far as Singer is concerned, living creatures characteristically have some interests and 
preferences, and different conditions affect their welfare. The living creatures that morally matter 
are those that can suffer or enjoy things, and these tend to have interests related to their not wanting 
to suffer or wanting to enjoy things in life. These interests (preferences), accounted for in terms of 
enjoyment or lack of suffering, appear to be central to the utilitarian moral account as they enhance 
the quality of life of the moral patient, which makes being alive or being a living creature matter 
morally. Therefore, to be a living creature is important in Singer’s view because living beings have 
preferences and they have welfare. Their welfare matters and no defensible moral theory can 
ignore or discount the interests of living creatures because this speaks to their preference to enjoy 
and not to suffer. On the utilitarian moral scheme, living creatures have inherent moral value in 
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virtue of their capacity to suffer or to enjoy the goods of life. Singer (1989) emphasises that living 
beings are not things, they are not like lumps of coal which have an instrumental value because 
they keep us warm but have no intrinsic value of their own. The implication here is that non-living 
things have no moral status.  
Commenting in a bioethical context on utilitarianism, George and Lee (2008: 413; emphasis mine), 
make this observation: 
All and only beings that have interests have moral status; but all and only beings that can 
(now) experience suffering or enjoyment have interests; therefore, all and only beings that 
can (now) experience suffering or enjoyment have moral status. 
Hence, it is important to underscore the fact that the things that morally matter are those that can 
now experience suffering or enjoyment. Thus, this moral principle makes moral status depend on 
certain considerations such as being alive, conscious and susceptible to suffering and enjoyment. 
Singer, however, goes further in adding an important dimension to these considerations of moral 
status. He suggests that beings that are aware of their future and plans relating to their interests in 
that future matter more, morally, than those that can merely experience enjoyment or suffering. 
The reason for this is that these beings have a sense of what it means to lose out in the future. 
Therefore, moral status, at the minimum, requires a being to be living – to be conscious and 
susceptible to suffering. However, the moral status of those beings that have a grasp of their future 
is greater still. 
The above elaboration of a conception of moral status as per utilitarianism is, I believe, sufficient 
to allow us to evaluate the moral standing of dead human bodies. Before we do so, we should keep 
the following in mind. Firstly, moral status is based on the characteristics of the individual, which 
renders this approach to moral status an individualistic one. Secondly, the key characteristic that 
captures moral status is sentience. Also, the idea of sentience, at the very least, requires 
consciousness, which means it requires at least that the entity in question be alive. 
In the light of the above adumbration on Singer’s theory of moral status, we are able to answer our 
question, namely: do we have direct duties to dead human bodies? To get to the core of the 
argument whether dead human bodies have intrinsic value or interests, let us first look at some 
things that we are strongly confident do not have life, such as cars and stones. Cars and stones are 
not alive, and this means that they are not in a position to be made better or worse off. For example, 
if I decide to smash the windows of my friend’s car, I am in no way setting back or thwarting the 
interests of the car since it has none. Thus, it is generally accepted that cars have no lives that can 
be benefited or made worse-off since they do not have enjoyment- or suffering-related interests. 
Since cars lack the capacity to suffer, the implication is that we do not have moral obligations 
towards them. As Feinberg (1984: 33-34) puts it: 
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[I]nterests… are distinguishable components of a person’s well-being; he flourishes or 
languishes as they flourish or languish. What promotes them is to his advantage or to his 
interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or against his interests. 
Thus, an entity has an interest in something when that something will affect that individual’s well-
being. Therefore, to ascertain whether an entity has moral status or not, the deciding factor is 
whether a state of affairs makes its life better or worse off. If an entity has no capacity for its life 
to be benefited or made worse off for its own sake, then it is not morally considerable in its own 
right, and it is not considered to have moral status. 
We cannot wrong or benefit entities like cars; they are just instruments or machinery we use to 
carry us around. Thus, although I have the obligation not to smash and damage my friend’s car, 
the obligation is not to the car itself but to the owner. If she gives me permission to smash the car 
for whatever reason, it would not be wrong for me to smash it, as my obligation in relation to 
smashing or not is only owed to her. Thus, because cars do not have the capacity for welfare, and 
they do not have interests of their own, they then cannot be considered to be entities that have 
moral status. However, our attitudes play a crucial role in deciding how to treat an entity. We do 
strongly believe that we have an obligation not to destroy things such as cars, irrespective of 
whether they are just the property of some people, but this obligation is based on our attitudes 
towards other persons, not on the moral status of the cars themselves. 
So, if we are to follow Singer’s (1987) argument above, it follows that cadavers, since they are not 
living things, are not conscious, cannot suffer harm or experience joy and have no sense of the 
future; therefore, they do not belong to the moral community. Hence, they have no value in and of 
themselves, which conclusively points to the position that we have no direct duties to dead human 
bodies. In other words, human corpses have no interests in the morally relevant sense, which is 
why we cannot make them better or worse off. That is not to say that we cannot damage dead 
bodies (say by dissecting them), but in damaging the bodies we cannot claim to have harmed them. 
They are beyond the reach of harm, in the moral sense, since they have lost the property to suffer 
or enjoy, which would account for their interests and welfare. Thus, in losing life, dead bodies 
have lost sensation – they are no longer sentient. Dead bodies have no preferences that would 
constitute their well-being, hence, in a crucial sense, they are amoral. 
One might wonder whether the fact that cadavers once possessed sentience matters in relation to 
how we treat them. I think how we treat dead people matters in general, but not for the dead people 
themselves. Given that dead human bodies are now beyond the reach of morality – which requires 
that they have interests that can be harmed, requiring life – how we treat them does not occasion 
any moral issues to the bodies themselves from the utilitarian point of view. But, if we do not treat 
the dead bodies according to the surviving relatives’ beliefs and experiences about how the dead 
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should be treated, nor in accordance with the sensitivity of the grieving process, indirect harm 
(psychological or emotional) can be done to those relatives (Tomasini, 2008)5.  
However, all these considerations are not necessarily relevant when we think of unknown and 
unclaimed cadavers. In this light, it seems most reasonable then to follow the principles provided 
by the WHO for medical research on cadavers – especially the principle of consent. If the cadaver 
is unclaimed then the prescriptions of the WHO and the specific legal requirements governing the 
handling of unclaimed cadavers in a country will be the guiding considerations and will specify 
the obligations and limitations on how to use the unclaimed corpses in such a country – the dead 
body itself has no moral implications for our actions towards it. Based on utilitarian grounds, it 
could be argued that the dissection of an unclaimed body has a potential benefit to many people as 
it advances medical science. If we can benefit someone, without harming anyone else, we ought 
to do so. If the benefits outweigh the harm, then an action must be performed. Dissecting the 
unclaimed body benefits the sick and the medical science community without harming the dead 
body itself, its relatives or friends. Bentham would accept the dissection of unclaimed cadavers 
because his ethical approach sees the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people as the 
overarching moral criterion (Attfield, 2012). 
3.3 Kantian Ethics on the Moral Status of the Dead 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was one of the leading Enlightenment and German philosophers. His 
philosophy was diametrically opposite to that of Bentham because his conception of ethics was 
not based on consequences, and for him, pain, suffering, pleasure and enjoyment were irrelevant 
considerations in morality. Kant’s thinking greatly influenced moral philosophy, and he can be 
credited as the founder of the deontological approaches to morality (duty-based ethics). His moral 
theory is an obligation-based one, where the good action is a function of intention, duty or 
obligation to do the right thing, even if the outcome does not result in good consequences. 
According to Kant, a moral principle must apply to all people, and human beings are special 
                                                 
5 One could argue that utilitarianism generally values actions insofar as they have particular kinds of positive 
outcomes. It could then be pointed out that some utilitarians will not put emphasis on the intrinsic property of sentience 
as I do, but rather focus on consequences. I think the correct way to read utilitarians involves appreciating that morality 
in the first is occasioned by some fact associated with moral patients and agents – they are beings that have interests. 
These interests are a function of our ability to enjoy and suffer, an ability we share with other non-human species like 
animals. This fact that is associated with morality, that we are beings that have interests since we possess certain 
valuable features, also explains why and for whom we value certain consequences. We want to maximize welfare 
because it is good for beings that have the kinds of abilities definitive of their participation in morality. It is for this 
reason in my exposition of utilitarianism, I limited myself to Singer’s exposition of it because it properly grounds it 
on the morally relevant capacity. Moreover, I did not pay attention to utilitarianism as a theory of right action since 
that is not the focus of this research, the focus is on the theory of moral status. A question could be raised – “If some 
versions of Utilitarianism need not appeal to intrinsic properties, might there not be a case for a consequentialist 
grounding of moral status? Something the candidate does not envisage.” This is a possibility I am willing to consider 
in my future research. For now, in light of reliance on Singer’s version of moral status, it does not appear to have 
resources to accommodate corpses in the moral community.  
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because they have the capacity to reason. This then makes them rational beings who have dignity 
and universal duties to one another based on the absolute duty to respect the humanity of others. 
In this section, I will consider the Kantian theory of value in relation to the idea of moral status. 
Specifically, my interest is to determine whether this theory of moral status can assign intrinsic 
value to bodies of dead humans. In the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” (1785/1996), 
Kant articulates three moral principles that he believes equivalently capture the essence of 
morality: (1) The formulation of the universal law of nature; (2) The humanity formulation; and 
(3) The kingdom of ends formulation (Johnson & Adam, 2018). It is controversial to say that the 
three ways of capturing morality are equivalent and this is disputed by many moral scholars (for 
example, by Heubel & Biller-Adorno, 2005). However, we need not resolve this controversy to 
get our answer regarding the moral status of human corpses. 
For the sake of doing so, we need to focus on Kant’s theory of moral status. The moral principle 
that best captures Kant’s moral philosophy is the humanity formulation, which is particularly 
relevant to our question. In fact, some commentators opine that “Most philosophers who find 
Kant’s views attractive find them so because of the Humanity Formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative” (Johnson & Adam, 2018: 48). The humanity formulation accounts for morality as 
follows: 
Act so to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in another, in every case as an end 
and never merely as a means (Rachels, 2007: 131). 
Central to this principle is the prescription of the value of respect for things that belong to the 
moral community. For some entity to belong to the morality community, that is, for it to have 
moral status, is what informs Kant’s requirement that we respect it. Things in the moral community 
(citizens in the ‘Kingdom of Ends’) are those towards which we owe direct duties, the duty of 
respect (Korsgaard, 1983). It is important to observe that my point is to single out recognition 
respect as relevant, rather than appraisal respect (Darwall, 1977). Appraisal respect is concerned 
with the respect that emerges in response to the quality of conduct or character of the moral agent. 
Recognition respect refers to the kind of respect that emerges in the light of certain ontological 
features of the patient in question. That is, the fact that some entity possesses certain ontological 
features is sufficient ground to account for our duties of respect towards it, without consideration 
of our conduct. It is the recognition kind of respect that is operational in Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Kant specifies ‘humanity’ as the basis for determining the value of things or the things towards 
which we owe recognition respect. Stated differently, it is because ‘humanity’ is characterised by 
morally relevant ontological properties that it attracts duties of respect. Thus, to appreciate Kant’s 
account of moral status, we need to elucidate his concept of humanity or moral personhood. 
Most scholars interpret Kant’s call to respect humanity to amount to a theory of dignity (Rachels, 
2007: 130-133;). The idea of dignity captures the highest value usually associated with human 
40 
 
beings merely because they possess the relevant ontological property (Toscano, 2011). Andrew 
Brennan and Norva Yeuk Sze Lo (2007: 47) comments on this idea of dignity thus: 
The modern notion of dignity drops the hierarchical elements implicit in the meaning of 
dignitas, and uses the term so that all human beings must have equal dignity, regardless of 
their virtues, merits, social and political status, or any other contingent features. 
It is important to take cognisance that the modern notion of dignity drops the hierarchical elements 
of dignitas, a claim that signifies an egalitarian structure of this moral term. We should appreciate 
that dignity is thought to be possessed by all human beings without consideration of virtue, merit, 
social or political standing. By merely being human, one has dignity equal to all others. To reveal 
more clearly what assigns the status of dignity to human beings, Glen Hughes (2011: 3) comments 
in this fashion: 
The drafters [of the universal declaration of human rights] solved this problem by 
indicating that human beings have rights because of their intrinsic dignity – because human 
beings, due to qualities they possess, have a special value or distinctive worth that in each 
case and without exception should be respected and nourished. 
Thus, the idea of dignity refers to this special value or distinctive worth that (almost) all human 
beings have merely because they possess certain ontological qualities/properties. This implies then 
that to get the answer to the question of what things we owe moral duties to, we need to be clear 
about the content of what Kant has in mind when he deploys the idea of ‘humanity’ in his moral 
philosophy. Before getting into these details, it is important that I diffuse a possible confusion. On 
the one hand, I say that Kant is after a theory of dignity, and yet my project is focused on the idea 
of moral status. What, then, is the relationship between dignity and moral status? This is an 
important question that requires immediate clarification.  
There are scholars like Singer (2009), in the utilitarian tradition of moral thought, who believe in 
the idea of moral status but not dignity. Singer thinks the idea of dignity was invented to replace 
the idea of God, since without God there would be no absolute basis to assign value to human 
beings (Singer, 2009). I subscribe to the view, as highlighted in the introduction, that takes the idea 
of moral status to be one that admits of degrees. That is, some things have no moral value at all, 
some beings have some value/status and some have more (DeGrazia, 2008). On this way of 
thinking about moral status, dignity is tantamount to the highest degree of moral status, which is 
sometimes captured in the literature in terms of full moral status (Toscano, 2011; Jaworska & 
Tannenbaum, 2013). I do not mean to suggest that Kant thinks of dignity in these terms, but these 
innovations need not harm his basic moral theory of respecting ‘humanity’. The point I am making 
is that to talk of dignity is not to veer from considerations of moral status. Now, we can revert to 
the details of Kant’s theory of moral status. 
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The principle under consideration requires that we treat humanity in particular ways. On the one 
hand, it forbids that we treat humanity merely as a means; and, on the other, it requires that we 
treat humanity always as an end. This implies that there are two ways of valuing things, or there 
are two ways things can be possessors of value. Things can have value as means or things can have 
value as ends in themselves. The essence of what assigns value to humanity is that it is an end in 
itself. It is important at this stage that we distinguish the language of means and ends, and 
Korsgaard’s insights are useful here. To talk of means is to talk of resources we need or use to 
achieve some goal (Korsgaard, 1983). The perfect example of something which is a means is a 
hammer. A hammer has value only insofar as it is useful to fix doors and the like. The value of the 
hammer is limited to its instrumentality in bringing about certain desirable outcomes, and nothing 
more. Hence, Kant’s principle forbids that humanity should be instrumentalised or should be 
reduced to an instrument (Donnelly, 2009). 
To be opposed to the instrumentalization or objectification of human beings is not the same as to 
deny that to achieve some goal we require using people in one way or another. What the position 
forbids is treating another human being’s life as merely functional in the achievement of one’s 
own goals. This example in section 6 of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy on Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy, captures the insight in Kant’s assertion that we should never treat humanity merely as 
a means: 
Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi driver is not that we may use one but not 
the other as a means of transportation. Unlike a horse, the taxi driver’s humanity must at 
the same time be treated as an end in itself (Johnson & Cureton, 2018: n: p).  
The point is that we may use both as a means of transport, but the driver must not be reduced 
merely to this function as she transcends it in a way that the horse does not, through the possession 
of her humanity. To clarify: we may use the taxi driver to take us to our destination at a fare. This 
does not mean, however, that it is correct to coerce the driver to drive us to our destination even if 
we are going to pay him for the trip. This is the case because by doing so we would have reduced 
her to a mere thing in the service of our transportation needs. This example also raises the question 
what the difference between a horse and the taxi driver is. The difference, Kant believes, is 
contained in the prescription that we treat the humanity of the driver as an end in itself. But what 
does it mean to treat the humanity of the driver as an end in itself? 
Something which is an end in itself is a thing that has final value, or, more precisely, value in itself 
(Korsgaard, 1983). This calls to mind Kant’s distinction between things and persons. Things are 
means merely because the best value we can assign to them is that of a price, which varies relative 
to their instrumental value and depends on external factors like the market. A person, on the other 
hand, has intrinsic moral worth or dignity, which is incomparably/superlatively valuable (Metz, 
2011; Rosen, 2012). Thus, to be a person implies that one has a high value, which has implications 
for how we must treat that person – as an end. The literature distinguishes three senses in which a 
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thing can be treated as an end and two of these are relevant to what Kant has in mind (Johnson & 
Cureton, 2018). 
To talk of an end, in the first sense, involves pursuing a particular goal. This sense of pursuing an 
end is positive insofar as it involves the agent doing something to produce some desired outcome. 
Take for example the goal of building a house. The agent must get involved in the plan to bring 
about a house. Kant is not interest in this sense of an end. He is interested in a negative sense of 
end, which may best be illustrated by how the value of self-preservation guides behaviour. Self-
preservation as an end does not refer to something we want to bring about, but something we want 
to protect or keep intact. In this sense, it refers to a value that constrains our behaviour. Thus, if 
we genuinely want to preserve ourselves, we will not be drinking poisonous substances or starting 
fights with known murderers because this will be against the end of self-preservation. In an 
important sense, then, to treat oneself as an end denotes a value that limits or constrains certain 
actions or behaviours because they undermine the worth of a person. There is another, positive, 
sense that Kant has in mind when he talks about treating persons as ends. Because one, as the 
patient, has value through the possession of autonomy, one has a duty to enhance or realise their 
personhood. That is, one must behave in ways that will allow one to be more of a person, or to be 
more autonomous. 
From the above, we realise that to respect the absolute worth of a person, on the one hand, imposes 
a constraint over a range of choices and actions since they would be undermining or inconsistent 
with the high value of being an autonomous being. In other words, we must never treat ourselves 
in ways that undermine our capacity to be autonomous. This implies that habits like being addicted 
to drugs or the action of suicide are wrong precisely because they undermine our capacity for 
autonomy. On the other hand, we need to enhance our autonomous nature, which involves the duty 
to develop ourselves. Thus, going to school or engaging in recreational activities is important as it 
enhances our value as persons. The idea of autonomy captures the idea of a being that is an end 
itself – that is, one that has the capacity to govern itself. Such a being is “a rational being that has 
a will that legislates universal law” (Kant, 1785/1996: 432). Put simply, on Kant’s account, beings 
have moral status and are deserving of respect insofar as they have the capacity for autonomy (self-
governance). 
According to this interpretation of Kant, moral status is a function of our autonomous and rational 
nature. Thus, the idea of ‘humanity’ is a moral one referring to beings that have the capacity to 
govern themselves. By implication, on this moral account, animals do not have moral status 
because they are not autonomous beings. By thinking about the stance that this theory would take 
towards animals, we can begin to approach our primary question. 




The fact that man can have the idea “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings 
living on earth. By this he is a “person”; and by virtue of the unity of his consciousness, 
through all the changes he may undergo, he is one and the same person – that is, a being 
altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, which we 
can dispose of as we please (Kant, cited in Korsgaard, 1983: 33; emphasis my own). 
Here Kant clarifies that the notion of dignity assigns a higher rank to persons than to animals. They 
gain this rank, of dignity, because of the unity of their consciousness; they are beings that have a 
concept of the self, which they capture in terms of an “I”. This makes persons altogether different 
and superior to animals. Precisely because animals lack this robust self-conception, they are 
counted merely as things (as amoral). The upshot of animals lacking rationality (a prerequisite for 
being treated as an end) is that they are not owed any direct duties. This is so strongly the case that 
Kant would go on to say that because they are irrational, we may treat them as we please without 
occasioning moral censure. This is so because animals fall outside of the moral community. 
With this picture of Kant’s theory of value in place, we can reflect on our question of the moral 
standing of dead human bodies. In other words, how do we value cadavers in accordance with 
Kant’s theory of value? Biologically, dead bodies are not persons anymore; they are things, pieces 
of decaying organic material that have lost rationality and autonomy, hence they are no longer 
governed by the Humanity Formulation of the Categorical Imperative (CI). It is important to 
recognise that on utilitarian grounds, what is required at the very least is that a being must be alive 
and susceptible to pain to be an object of moral consideration. On Kant’s view, things like pain or 
enjoyment are morally irrelevant; what is important instead is the capacity for rationality. If a being 
does not have this capacity, it is altogether inferior in rank and outside of the moral community. 
We do not owe such a being any direct duties; any duties or obligations we owe to such entities, 
or any value assigned to them are indirect and do not yield moral status. On this view, as 
represented here, it should follow quite naturally that since being dead involves the loss of 
rationality, that the bodies of the dead have no moral status. Just as we may dispose of animal 
bodies as we please, so may we dispose of human corpses. This may include using them purely as 
a means by dissecting them for scientific knowledge and research, for example. What is important 
to underscore here is the fact that the body of a dead person has no direct value itself, at least 
according to Kant’s theory. 
I read Rosen (2012) as invoking an interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy to argue for the 
dignity of dead human bodies. He notes that: 
[I]t is not only living human beings that deserve to be treated with respect: we are required 
to dispose of human remains according to prescribed rituals. The precise content of such 
rituals varies widely – should corpses be buried, burned, or left to be eaten by vultures? – 
but their existence and, as it seems, symbolic force, is strikingly general. At the end of the 
previous chapter I said that, in my opinion, the universally held belief that we have a duty 
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to treat dead bodies with respect represents a deep puzzle for moral philosophy (Rosen, 
2012: 129). 
Rosen seeks to argue for the view that dead human bodies should be treated with respect. This 
respect must be consistent with the various rituals of different cultures and societies. I hope the 
careful reader will appreciate that Rosen is urging us to treat dead human bodies with respect, 
which is not the same as the claim that dead human bodies have dignity. In the same chapter, Rosen 
uses more or less the same expression when he states that “we have a duty to treat a corpse with 
dignity” (2012: 131) or the claim that “corpses are to be treated with dignity” (2012: 132). I think 
it is wrong to assume that thinking of something to require treatment with respect or dignity 
necessarily amounts to the view that it has dignity. Take, for example, the general conviction that 
we have a duty to respect church buildings or a parliament or some historically significant site. 
The fact that we are required to treat such places with dignity does signal the fact that we attach 
some (intrinsic) value to them, but it does not follow that the respect we attach to them is due to 
their intrinsic value or dignity. 
In my reading of Rosen, it seems that the force of his argument is not that dead bodies have dignity 
in their own right. In fact, in the passage he does not suggest or even state that dead bodies have 
value – he does not touch that point at all. His argument that we should treat cadavers with respect 
is pursued in two ways. He begins by explaining why most theories tend to dismiss the view. The 
major reason is that most theories take a humanistic stance, which understands morality essentially 
as about benefitting someone, be it the moral agent or the moral patient. Since the corpse cannot 
benefit in any way, humanist accounts fail to secure the view that we ought to treat them with 
respect. 
For his part, Rosen argues that we need to abandon a humanist orientation and understand Kant in 
a particular way. He (2012: 140) states his argument in this fashion: 
The position that I am proposing is far more radical: that we have a duty to treat a corpse 
with dignity just because one of the ways in which we have a duty is that we should perform 
acts that are expressive of our respect. This is not a duty that we owe either to any particular 
being or agent who will be benefitted… 
The essence of the argument being marshalled here is that we can imagine a moral system that is 
not grounded on benefitting anyone, not even the agent. It is a moral system that requires us to act 
in ways that express respect. On the Kantian view, at least as represented by Rosen, we have a 
duty to express respect for the sake of our “transcendental value – humanity of our personhood – 
and this requires that we act in ways that are respectful of that value” with no consideration of 
benefit at all. We have a duty to act respectfully for the sake of our humanity. To this end, the 
essence of Rosen’s argument is to point to the view that Kant’s moral system is not predicated on 
benefitting anyone. Rosen concludes – 
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That we might have such a duty toward things – corpses or foetuses, for example – that are 
not themselves human and will not benefit from our behaviour toward them seems to me 
persuasive even if we do not think of humanity in Kant’s transcendental terms (2012: 157). 
My response is to recognise that Rosen seeks to secure our duties towards things that cannot be 
benefitted or harmed by our actions – like dead foetuses or corpses. He argues that we can secure 
such a view by realising that the essence of Kant’s moral philosophy requires that we act in ways 
that are expressive of respect in our conduct without concern for the consequences of such actions. 
This approach, interesting as it might be, although it explains why we must act respectfully as 
moral agents, does not explain why we should take ourselves to have direct duties towards corpses. 
Alternatively, we can say that Rosen’s project is not to demonstrate that dead human bodies have 
moral status. Furthermore, his argument at most secures that we have duties towards things we 
cannot benefit. But it falls short of explaining why dead human beings form part of these things. 
It does not even explain what the scope of this respectful treatment should be. That is, if we can 
extend our respect to human corpses, why can we not do the same with dead animal bodies, rivers, 
fallen trees and so on? According to Stamatina Liosi (2018: 32), concerning Rosen’s thesis, it is 
not legitimate to identify the moral duties to oneself with moral duties to cadavers. These are two 
distinct categories of duties, especially as it is difficult to argue in a Kantian way that the dead are 
persons in their own right.  
Rosen’s argument is interesting but inadequate in providing an account for why we owe duties of 
respect to dead human bodies6. As far as I am concerned, Kantianism has no resource to account 
for the moral status of corpses. On Kant’s view, at best, cadavers are things, which explains why 
they are outside of the moral community. If, before they died, they voluntarily donated their bodies, 
or their family members did so posthumously, then we may dissect them or use their organs to 
help the sick precisely because the dead body does not occasion moral questions at all. Kant’s 
theory is most in line with the prescriptions of the WHO. 
 
 
                                                 
6  It could be argued that: “human remains are part of a broader understanding of humanity and so should be treated 
with respect. In other words, there is something about dead bodies––perhaps their place among the range of things 
that count as human––that deserves being treated in a certain way, e.g., to be disposed properly. This cadaver - and 
not that cadaver - is human” (implying that they feature as ends within human ritual practices). Well, on my part, I 
relied on the dominant interpretation of Kant’s conception of ‘humanity’ that tends to pick out our rational powers or 
our autonomous nature as a feature that captures our worth. If this dominant interpretation is true then Kant and 
Kantian ethics fails to accommodate the dead. The reading of Rosen to include corpses as part of what counts as 
humanity is neither sustained by Rosen or departs from a standard interpretation of Kant. The pressing question 
remains – why must we believe that corpses are part of what counts as humanity and what is the basis for holding this 
view? For what it’s worth, I am grateful for the critical commentary and interpretation, it provides for issues I will 
consider in my post-doctoral research.   
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3.4 The Capabilities Approach to the Moral Status of the Dead 
The capabilities approach was pioneered by Amartya Sen and was subsequently defended by 
Martha Nussbaum (Sen, 1992; 2001; Nussbaum, 2006). In what follows, I will focus largely on 
Nussbaum’s version of this moral approach. This is by no means to suggest that one is better than 
the other. We should bear in mind that the aim is not to get into the sophistries and subtleties of 
this moral approach. The aim is rather to understand how the capabilities approach accounts for 
moral status for the sake of establishing whether it can accommodate the intuition about dead 
human bodies carried by the moral community. 
The starting point in thinking about this theory of value is considering the question: “What is each 
person able to do and to be” (Nussbaum, 2011: 18; 2018: 9). What people can actually do and be 
(in the world) is captured in terms of the idea of functionings (Nussbaum, 2011). The “idea of 
functionings refers to beings and doings, that is, various states of human beings and activities that 
a person can undertake” (Robeyns, 2006: 352). Alternatively, in the words of Nussbaum, “A 
functioning is an active realization of one or more capabilities” (2011: 25). Central to this idea of 
functionings is the value placed on people’s ability to choose what they want to do and to be in the 
world. For individuals to be able to achieve what they take to be valuable “doings” or become 
valuable beings, they require “substantial freedoms” (Nussbaum, 2018: 9). “Substantial freedoms” 
are tantamount to capabilities. “Capabilities are a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to 
achieve functionings” (Robeyns, 2016). Nussbaum (2011: 20) captures more clearly the idea of 
capabilities in these terms: “What are capabilities? They are the answers to the question, ‘What is 
this person able to do and to be?’” 
The distinction between functionings and capabilities is important. Capabilities are what makes 
certain lives (or choices of lives) possible. Capabilities refer to “a set of (usually interrelated) 
opportunities to choose and to act … (it) refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that 
are feasible for [a person] to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom” (Nussbaum, 2011: 20). 
In other words, the idea of capabilities captures the real options that people have, to choose and 
pursue the beings and doings they deem valuable. Nussbaum distinguishes three types of 
capabilities: (1) basic capabilities; (2) internal capabilities; and (3) combined capabilities (2011: 
20–24; 2018; 9). She comments as follows on these different types of capabilities: 
I use the term basic capabilities for the untrained capacities, the term internal capabilities 
for the trained capacities, and the term combined capabilities for the combination of trained 
capacities with suitable circumstances for their exercise (2008: 357). 
The important thing to note about these distinct capabilities is that the idea focuses both on factors 
internal to the individual (basic capabilities) and on social conditions (combined capabilities) in 
imagining what is to count as true freedom to pursue who and what individuals want to be in the 
world. Combined capabilities “are the totality of the opportunities (the individual has) for choices 
and action in her specific political, social, and economic situation” (2011: 21). These capabilities 
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frame real freedoms to pursue certain functions an individual may deem necessary for a valuable 
life in the socio-economic and political context he/she is embedded in. “Internal” capabilities refer 
to various capacities or characteristics of the individual, be they intellectual or emotional traits, 
physical states, and so on (2011: 21). “Basic” capabilities refer to “innate faculties of the individual 
that make later development and training possible” (2011: 21). These faculties require 
development for an individual to be able to realise valuable functionings. 
One important distinction to bear in mind concerning this moral approach is that between means 
and ends. The end – that which is good in itself – is freedom, explained in terms of capabilities; 
and functionings are the means. Nussbaum, explains this point as follows (2011: 25): 
But capabilities have value in and of themselves, as spheres of freedom and choice… Thus, 
the capabilities approach departs from a tradition in economics that measures the real value 
of a set of options by the best use that can be made of them. Options are freedoms, and 
freedom has intrinsic value. 
The various options available to the individual in the pursuit of whatever life he/she values most 
– in other words, freedoms – are the highest good, not the actual life that individual pursues or 
ends up living. There is no one specific form of life that is valuable in and of itself because there 
are many ways to exercise one’s agency or freedom. Hence, the most important thing is the 
capabilities (freedoms) the individual has to achieve whatever he/she values. 
In the light of this rough sketch, we can approximate a theory of moral status. Individuals have 
value on this account insofar as they have the capacity to pursue functionings. It is important, 
however, to appreciate that Nussbaum locates dignity in basic capabilities. She points to this view 
in the following way. Firstly, she says “let us try to define the proper role for a notion of ‘basic 
capabilities’ in the articulation of a dignity-based capability approach” (2008: 362).  
She further remarks: 
I believe that the best way to solve this complex problem is to say that full and equal human 
dignity is possessed by any child of human parents who has any of an open-ended 
disjunction of basic capabilities for major human life-activities (2008: 363). 
This account of moral status is suggested by Nussbaum (2006: 349) when she opines that her 
approach “wants to see each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is”. The basic capabilities 
encapsulate all the metaphysical properties that account for the sort of thing some entity is. It is 
these that inform the kind of beings and doings that are possible for such an entity. The primacy 
of basic capabilities informs why they need to be trained (internal capabilities) and why they 
require a particular “basic structure” or social arrangement for a human being to be able to lead a 
decent human existence. Human beings have value – dignity – relative to the basic capacities they 
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possess for certain kinds of (valuable) lives. On this account, moral status is a function of the basic 
capabilities the being in question has that are necessary to pursue functionings. 
If moral status or dignity is a function of basic capabilities it should follow that dead bodies have 
no moral status. This is the case because they have no basic capabilities that need to be developed 
and even if developed can no longer be exercised in the world. In other words, if moral status is 
based on individuals attaining some valuable “beings and doings”, dead people cannot be engaged 
in this manner, and therefore have no moral status. In this sense, dead people, by dying, have lost 
their basic capabilities and freedom is no longer of value to them. 
The fundamental idea of freedom as captured by the notion of capabilities is otiose for the dead 
human body. It is meaningless to talk of dignity when it comes to cadavers because, in this moral 
scheme, dignity is linked to certain goods that constitute a decent life or a just society. This decent 
life, this life of dignity, is captured in terms of the ten central human capabilities, namely: life; 
bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; 
affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2003). These 
central capabilities are quite irrelevant to a human corpse. 
We can appreciate then that the capabilities approach does not grant dead bodies any moral status, 
which implies that medical researchers have no direct duties towards cadavers. However, 
considerations of the WHO and some cultural practices might be used as a guideline on how to 
treat such bodies. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Above, I considered three influential theories of moral status in the Western tradition. 
Utilitarianism accounts for moral status in terms of sentience. Kantian ethics reduces all value to 
rationality. The capabilities approach reduces it to basic capabilities. We argued that all theories 
considered here entail the moral view that dead human bodies have no moral status. This is the 
case because morality is understood in the first place to be concerned with living individuals, or, 
specifically, with characteristics of living individuals – be it their capacity to suffer, their cognitive 
abilities or their capabilities to pursue a valuable life. If morality truly is about the ability to pursue 
a particular kind of life, then it should follow that corpses are outside of the scope or concern of 
the moral community. Hence, in and of themselves, dead human bodies are not owed any direct 
duties.  
In the next chapter, I will explore the question of the moral status of cadavers from an African 




Chapter 4: African Theories of Moral Status and the Dead 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate whether the recent literature in African philosophy focusing on moral 
status, animal ethics and (moral) environmentalism can offer us resources to reflect on the moral 
intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards dead human bodies. There is no scarcity of 
cultural evidence that African societies tend to value dead human bodies. The elaborate rituals 
surrounding the dead body and the respect accorded to the burial of the body is part of this 
evidence. In African cultures, there is a general tendency to attach great respect to the burial of 
loved ones in a dignified manner, and this may extend to the point of suggesting respect owed to 
the body itself (Biasutto et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2013). The family, in all it does, is preoccupied 
with doing right to the person that has passed away. Much of this is focused on his/her body. One 
of the central beliefs of African cultures is (the metaphysical position) that when individuals die 
they become ancestors (Murove, 2009: 165). This belief is pervasive in almost all African cultures 
(Wiredu, 1992). The idea has quasi-theological implications concerning what is generally termed 
the “afterlife”. What is of significance for this study is the relationship between the dead body and 
the transition to ancestorhood. The belief is that the whole body must be intact for one to be an 
ancestor in the afterlife. This metaphysical belief about ancestorhood has direct implications for 
how we think about and treat the body – as if it has moral status. 
So, the metaphysical scheme informing African praxis differs from the Platonic and Cartesian 
metaphysical pictures of human nature, specifically regarding the body. The body, in these 
Western metaphysical views is, in a sense, a hindrance to the spirit or soul. The soul can be thought 
of as enslaved. Upon death, the real self, the soul, is released to the fullness of a spiritual life and 
relieved of the burden of the body. However, on the African view, the body is understood to be 
the centre of spiritual life (Dzobo, 1992). Upon death, one continues to exist as an ancestor in the 
afterlife separated from one’s body. But there is a sense that one’s body is the site where the living 
family and dead ancestor meets if they want to connect. Hence, the body plays an important role 
even when dead. It is for this reason that African people insist on the recovery of the body and its 
burial in the right place.  
Death, in sub-Saharan Africa, is accompanied by rituals that are important to the relatives of the 
deceased, the community and the dead person him/herself (Shah, 2015; Mbiti, 1971). Burial rituals 
play a significant role in different cultures of sub-Saharan Africa as a pointer to the new world of 
the living dead (Mbiti, 1971). The bereaved believe strongly that the dead relative is only making 
a journey to his/her final destination, which is the new world only known to the deceased (Mbiti, 
1991). It is believed that when particular rituals are not done or completed, the dead body is left in 
a liminal or transitional state (Shah, 2015; Mbiti, 1971). In such a state it is not yet part of the 
afterlife, but not part of human life either– the equivalent of the Catholic purgatory (Shah, 2015). 
This liminal period causes much anxiety for the relatives of the deceased who want their loved one 
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to complete their transition to the world of the living dead (Martin et al., 2013; Mbiti, 1971; Shah, 
2015). It is believed that until the dead body is buried and the rituals completed, the person does 
not take the journey to the world of the living dead but lingers on earth (Martin et al., 2013; Mbiti, 
1971). In this light, the issue of donating one’s body to be dissected by students when they are 
dead would be taboo to most Africans (Biasutto et al., 2014). 
Statistically, in sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Zambia and Tanzania, there are no bequests at all with all cadavers supplied to the state hospital 
being the unclaimed bodies of the homeless, accident victims, prisoners or suspected bandits shot 
by police (Osuagwu et al., 2004; Ashiru: 2014; Gangata, 2015: 22). However, other countries such 
as South Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Ghana, make use predominantly of unclaimed cadavers 
and some donated corpses (Gangata, 2015: 22). Statistics reveal that in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, the very few donations made, are mostly from white communities (Gangata et al., 
2010). In one medical school in South Africa, unclaimed bodies sourced from government 
mortuaries provided 77.8% of all bodies used for dissection between 1956 and 1996 (Labuschagne 
& Mathey, 2000). According to Labuschagne and Mathey (2000), almost all the black and coloured 
bodies received during this period were from government mortuaries (99% and 95.8% 
respectively). Only 34.1% of the white bodies received were unclaimed bodies (Labuschagne & 
Mathey, 2000). 
The anthropological evidence demonstrating the respect with which dead bodies are treated in 
most sub-Saharan cultures in preparing them for the afterlife might explain the statistics above. 
The metaphysical and anthropological issues adduced above might suggest that dead bodies are 
treated with respect because they have value. 
Since this project is focused on ethics, the anthropological evidence derived from how cadavers 
are usually treated in, for example Bantu cultures, and the treatment of the dead in conflict- and 
war-ravaged areas, medical schools and research laboratories, will not suffice to account for the 
moral status of the dead. The fact that some cultures below the Sahara or anywhere else in the 
world treat dead bodies with respect does not necessarily provide evidence that indeed dead bodies 
have moral status. This case must be established through proper philosophical argumentation. This 
is not to totally dismiss the anthropological evidence – it is useful in a prima facie sense; but a 
robust ethical discourse requires more than just intuitions and prima facie evidence (Pojman, 
2002). It is one thing for some culture to believe some proposition and quite another to provide 
rational arguments to secure it. 
It is also important that I clarify that I invoked anthropological and metaphysical issues from 
African cultures merely to indicate that different cultures will surely have different anthropological 
and metaphysical views to explain the respect we should have towards dead bodies. I use the 
African tradition because I am most familiar with it, and those from other traditions will observe, 
I assume, different anthropological and metaphysical beliefs to account for the universal 
conviction that we have duties towards dead bodies. Since this is a philosophical project, I will not 
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draw from these cultural facts or views to account for this moral intuition. I will subject this moral 
intuition to an ethical treatment. Ethics, as a branch of philosophy, relies largely on reason or 
rational evidence to establish its propositions (Pojman, 2002; Rachels & Rachels, 2015). Hence, 
below, I proceed to appeal to the ideas and theories of moral status or dignity to look into the 
question of dead bodies from an ethical vantage point. Beyond cultural evidence, one can also 
adduce metaphysical evidence associated with the high prize attached to the ‘living-dead’ 
(ancestors) to explain the respect associated with dead human bodies (Ramose, 2010). The focus 
of this research takes a moral approach to the question of dead human bodies. Specifically, I seek 
to investigate whether they have or do not have moral status. 
To pursue this moral investigation, I will draw on the recent and promising theories of moral status 
in African philosophy by Metz (2012), Behrens (2010; 2011) and Chemhuru (2016; 2017) because 
these three authors focus on articulating comprehensive theories of moral status in the African 
tradition, drawing from indigenous resources. In some sense, this selection can be said to be 
random insofar as there is a dearth of literature that directly elucidates the idea of moral status. 
This does not imply that one may not draw implications for moral status from extant moral theories 
in this field as a whole, say on the discourse on personhood – Wiredu’s sympathetic impartiality, 
Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism and so on – but these theories are not in the final analysis 
interested in the discourse of moral status. I find it useful and prudent to consider these three 
accounts because they are solely dedicated to the discourse of moral status in its own right drawing 
from axiological resources in African cultures.  
It is important to mention that Metz, Behrens and Chemhuru tend to focus on the question of 
animal ethics, the status of the environment (elements of nature such as forests and rivers) and so 
on in their articulation of theories of moral status. Therefore, these scholars do not explicitly direct 
their accounts of moral status to the question of dead human bodies. Nevertheless, I maintain that 
the comprehensive nature of their research on moral status affords us an opportunity to extend 
their ideas to the question of the standing of cadavers. Because I am extending these theories 
beyond their original boundaries, should it turn out that they cannot accommodate the moral status 
of dead human bodies, it should not be assumed that the theories themselves are (necessarily) 
implausible. 
Indeed, in the final analysis, I will argue that these theories of moral status cannot accommodate 
the moral intuition that human corpses have moral status. Regarding Metz, I will argue that 
although he believes that dead bodies should be taken to have moral status, his theory ultimately 
fails to accord them any moral standing since they cannot enter into or be benefitted by 
relationships. In discussing Behrens, it will emerge that the dead do not have moral status because 
he imagines morality to be a function of harmonious relationships among, at the very least, living 
things. And regarding Chemhuru’s work, it will be shown that dead bodies have no moral status 
since they do not have any telos within the African metaphysical system. 
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4.2 Metz’s Theory of Moral Status 
Metz has taken scholarly interest in developing moral insights and intuitions prevalent in sub-
Saharan Africa (usually captured in terms of ubuntu) into a fully-fledged moral theory. He seeks 
to reconstruct African ethics by following methods of analytic philosophy to the point where there 
can be a plausible position to compare against extant and influential Western moral theories like 
egoism, utilitarianism and Kantianism (Metz, 2007a/b). Metz informs us that he has come to 
believe that his version of African ethics at least, is plausible and has something to contribute to 
global ethical discourses (Metz, 2013; 2014). 
It is in this light (the robustness of African moral thought) that Metz (2012: 387) has set himself 
the task of articulating an African theory of moral status, which he refers to in terms of “modal 
relational”. He refers to it as modal relationalism because he believes that “sub-Saharan ethical 
thought… places relationality at the core of morality” (2012: 390). In other words, this theory of 
moral status grounds moral status on “relational properties” (2012: 391). As discussed earlier, a 
theory of moral status can also locate it in some properties internal to the individual (individualism) 
or in the group (holism). Metz is aware that there are other relational theories of moral status, such 
as feminist/care ethics approaches and some under-explored approaches from the African tradition. 
He rejects these relational approaches for excluding beings that we tend to think have moral status 
from the moral community. He states that his theory is to be seriously considered because it is 
more plausible than extant relational theories and does better, in some instances, than influential 
Western theories of moral status like utilitarianism and Kant’s deontology; and, in other instances, 
it does no worse than them. He comments on the promise associated with his modal relational 
perspective to moral status thus: 
Of particular interest is that the theory promises to solve some long-standing conundrums 
that continue to plague Anglo-American discussion of moral status, e.g., of why animals 
and humans might both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree, 
of why even a severely mentally incapacitated human being might have a greater moral 
status than an animal with identical internal abilities, and of why a new born infant might 
have a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus (2012: 391). 
It is evident that Metz believes that his African theory of moral status will make a serious 
contribution insofar as it can solve some of the long-standing conundrums in moral philosophy. 
Metz promises that his theory will be able to accommodate the standing of animals, and will be 
able to accommodate marginal cases, among others. In terms of whether Metz’s theory can also 
accommodate the intuition that the dead have moral status, it should be noted that Metz appears to 
believe that bodies of persons that have since died do warrant some moral respect in their own 
right. 
Such a reading of Metz is revealed by his discussion of how he understands (or will be using the 
concept) of moral status. Metz informs us that he takes the idea of moral status to be one that 
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admits of degrees – it is not an all-or-nothing concept. In other words, there are things in the world 
that have no moral status at all like a grain of sand or a stone (at least insofar as Metz is concerned). 
There are also beings like cats and dogs with partial moral status, while beings like gorillas have 
greater moral status and human beings putatively have full moral status (Toscano, 2011). 
To defend the view that the idea of moral status admits of degrees, Metz invokes the following 
example (2012: 389): 
For one, the existence of degrees of moral status best explains many intuitions about forced 
trade-offs among the urgent interests of different beings … For another, differential moral 
status also accounts best for uncontroversial judgments about how to treat beings that have 
already been killed. If an animal has been killed for whatever reason, many find it 
permissible not to let it go to waste; even many vegetarians would find something 
respectful in the stereotypical Native American practice of using every part of a buffalo. 
Yet such a practice applied to humans would be horrific; consider a Nazi thinking, “Well, 
we have already killed this Jew, and so may as well make the best of it by using his hair to 
stuff pillows, fat to make soap and bones to fashion buttons”. 
I take particular interest in the comparison of a dead animal to a dead human body. I am curious 
to understand why it would be permissible to use the meat of a dead animal without raising any 
moral scruples, while it is horrific to so treat a human cadaver. In context, in this passage, Metz 
proffers an abductive argument to defend the view that the idea of moral status admits of degrees, 
where some things have less moral status than others. To make his argument, he begins by setting 
up a trade-off situation between a normal adult and a mouse. Given this trade-off, Metz argues that 
one must choose to drive over the mouse because it has less moral status than a normal adult human 
being. The second example imagines the case of a dead animal and a dead human being, what 
Metz refers to as a case of beings that have already been killed. Metz believes that using the 
animal’s body does not attract any moral reaction since the dead animal has no moral status. 
Concerning a dead human’s body, however, Metz seems to believe that one cannot treat it with 
disregard without offending our moral sensibilities because (I suppose) it has some moral status. 
The reason for why it would be horrific, according to Metz, to treat a dead human being with 
complete disregard and not so the animal must be their differential standing in terms of moral 
status (even when dead). Hence, if my interpretation of Metz is correct, it follows that he believes 
that dead human bodies have (some) moral status. 
I am aware that some might think that Metz does not take human bodies to have moral status in 
their own right, that his view might rather be that they possess it on an indirect basis. While this 
interpretation of Metz’s view is possible, it cannot be supported by the text under consideration. 
Metz adduces the case of a dead animal and human body in the context of arguing for differential 
moral status among beings. According to him, we are justified in killing the mouse and treating 
the dead animals the way we do precisely because the mouse has less and dead animals have no 
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moral status. It would be logically strange for Metz to invoke human cadavers in making the case 
for degrees of moral status if he did not believe that they had some moral status. It seems that the 
best explanation that could be attached to Metz’s invocation of human bodies that have already 
been killed is to suggest that they do have some moral status. At this stage, we are still discussing 
Metz’s own view, which seems to suggest that we owe some direct duties to human corpses but 
not to animal corpses. Can this view that dead human bodies have moral status be justified in the 
light of Metz’s moral theory? 
Above, I indicated that Metz’s theory of moral status is entirely constituted by certain social 
relationships. In other words, a relational approach to moral status is “constituted by some kind of 
interactive property between one entity and another” (Metz, 2012: 390). The important question 
to consider then is what sorts of relationships the morally relevant ones are. Metz, drawing from 
his theory of right action, identifies the twin relationships of identity and solidarity as morally 
relevant (Metz, 2007a; 2007b; 2013; 2014). The twin relationships of identity and solidarity 
capture the essence of morality. 
In their analysis of ubuntu, Metz and Gaie (2010: 284) typically explain the relationship of identity 
in terms of “sharing a way of life”. To share a way of life involves (1) thinking of one’s personal 
identity in terms of ‘we’; (2) sharing aims, aspirations and goals; and (3) collaborating to achieve 
the shared goals. “Solidarity” involves supportive and caring relationships aimed at promoting 
others’ welfare for their own sakes. These twin relationships combined amount to “friendship” or 
“love” (Metz, 2007a: 337). To be loving or friendly involves sharing a way of life and being caring 
for the sake of promoting others’ welfare. 
In the light of his theory of right action, Metz articulates the following theory of moral status. 
Firstly, he notes that “something has moral status insofar as it is capable of having a certain causal 
or intentional connection with another being” (2012: 393). He also captures it in this way: 
By the present view, a being that is capable of being both the subject and object of such a 
relationship has full moral status, whereas a being that is capable of being merely the object 
of such behaviour has partial moral status (2012: 395). 
It is important to recognise that moral status is a function of being able to enter into friendships or 
loving relationships, as construed here. The more a being is capable of being part of a friendly or 
loving relationship with normal humans, the greater its moral status. Metz draws a distinction 
between beings that can both be subjects and objects of loving relationships and those that can 
only be objects of such relationships. Human beings, for example, can initiate and participate in 
loving relationships and they can also be beneficiaries of such relationships, hence, they are both 
subjects and objects. Those beings that can both be subjects and objects have greater moral status 
or even full moral status, which is tantamount to dignity. Those beings that can only be objects of 
loving relationships i.e., those that can be benefitted by loving relationships have partial moral 
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status. Hence, according to Metz, animals, psychopaths, infants, and marginal cases have partial 
moral status because they can only be objects of loving relationships. 
As far as Metz is concerned, having the capacity to be an object of a relationship is important, and 
does not imply that a being would or even could respond to any friendly engagement by the normal 
human beings. He argues that a being becomes an object of a friendly relationship only if human 
beings can think of it as part of “we”, share its goals, sympathise with it and benefit or harm it. 
Metz acknowledges, however, that things like rocks or a grain of sand lack the ability to be better 
or worse off (they have no prudential value) and because of that they cannot be the objects of 
communal relationships; they therefore they do not have any moral status. 
Another important facet of this theory that should not escape our notice is that it is called a modal 
relational perspective of moral status. It is called modal because it makes moral status not a 
function of being in actual relationships, but merely of having the capacity or the ability to enter 
into them. In other words, even if, for whatever temporary reason I am not in a relationship, I still 
do have moral status. In other words, even when I am asleep or I am temporarily comatose I still 
have moral status because, in principle, I am capable of entering into relationships. Contingent 
obstacles preventing me from entering into relationships like being asleep, drunk, comatose, or in 
solitary confinement, do not render me without moral status (Metz, 2012).  
In the light of this analysis, we may now turn to consider whether Metz’s theory (modal-
relationalism) can accommodate the moral intuition that dead human bodies have moral status, as 
he seems to believe that they do. The litmus test for moral status for Metz is whether the entity in 
question can enter into relationships of love (be the subject of relationships) or can be affected by 
such relationships (as objects). It strikes me that human corpses cannot, in principle, enter into 
relationships and they cannot be affected by such or made better or worse off by relationships. If 
this observation is true, it follows that according to modal relationalism dead human bodies do not 
have moral status at all.  
Motsamai Molefe’s (2017: 204) critical observations of Metz’s position on the dead are instructive:  
[I]t is not enough (though necessary for an object status) that we think of it in terms of 
“we” or sympathise with it. The deal-maker-or-breaker is whether it can be made better or 
worse off by such communion, i.e., does it have a welfarist good? Take a rock for example, 
it utterly lacks the relevant relational capacity for a better- or worse-off life. Thus, a rock 
has no moral status. The important question, in this instance, is not so much of things that 
utterly lack abilities to be better or worse off, but rather those that have utterly lost such 
abilities, like dead people. What is the extent of the “damage” that death imposes on its 
victims? When human beings die, what do they lose in terms of the relevant moral 
capacities that qualify them as objects of communal relations? Animals, at least Metz 
supposes, lose capacities that qualify them as objects of communal relations, but he does 
not seem to think human beings lose their capacities. He does not quite tell us why he 
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thinks so. As things stand, we have no reason to agree or even suppose that dead human 
bodies are objects of communal relations. 
The insight from the above quotation is that the dead have completely lost their abilities to enter 
into relationships. Hence, the dead no longer possess the relevant ontological capabilities 
(relational properties) that would make them morally relevant in terms of having moral status. In 
the light of the above analysis of Metz’s theory of moral status, it follows that the dead have no 
moral status and that we do not owe them any direct duties of respect. The claim that using dead 
human bodies in certain ways would be horrific cannot be justified in the light of Metz’s theory of 
moral status (unless one can secure this view by invoking indirect moral considerations). As things 
stand, Metz’s theory of moral status is clear about the moral difference between a dead animal and 
a dead human being: neither of them seems to occasion any moral concern at least in the context 
of questions relating to moral status. 
4.3 Behrens’ Theory of Moral Status 
At the heart of Behrens’ project is the attempt to articulate an African environmental ethical theory. 
This move is motivated by two important theoretical considerations. Firstly, it is motivated by 
John Baird Callicot’s observation that African cultures and (supposedly) their moral thought, at 
best, can only secure facets of the environment on indirect moral basis (Callicot, 1986). Callicot 
arrives at this conclusion because he believes that African ethical thought is inescapably 
anthropocentric. For example, take the moral categories of personhood and ubuntu prevalent in 
capturing a perfectionist moral theory in the African tradition (Menkiti, 1984; Ramose, 2002). The 
anthropocentric nature of these terms is best revealed by this comment by Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984: 
179): 
The foregoing interpretation would incidentally rule out, I believe, some dangerous 
tendencies currently fashionable in some philosophical circles of ascribing rights to 
animals. The danger as I see it is that such an extension of moral language to the domain 
of animals is bound to undermine, sooner or later, the clearness of our conception of what 
it means to be a person. 
Menkiti believes that the clarity of the concept of personhood would naturally rule out the 
possibility of extending moral language (and functions) to animals. What would be the ground for 
such an exclusion of animals from the domain of morality and justice? The reason offered by 
Menkiti (1984: 179) is that animals lack the “constitutive elements in the definition of human 
personhood”. By implication, personhood as a moral achievement is only available to human 
beings because of their ontological make-up (Gyekye, 1992; Ikuenobe, 2015). The same 
conclusion can be reached on the idea of ubuntu that tends to be captured by the maxim “a person 
is a person through other persons” (Horsthemske, 2015). The idea of ubuntu can be observed to be 
anthropocentric given how it is captured by a maxim centrally concerned with persons (human 
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beings) and personhood (pursuing and achieving moral excellence). Human beings can reach 
moral excellence only by being in relationships with other human beings (Menkiti, 1984). 
Anthropocentrism implies a moral doctrine that locates the ultimate seat of moral value in human 
beings (LenkaBula, 2008). If anthropocentrism is true then it implies that nature, or some facets 
of it, have no intrinsic value (Horsthemke, 2015). If (some) non-human facets of nature or the 
environment have value, they have it only insofar as they are instrumentally useful in the 
advancement of the human good; they are only indirectly valuable. Behrens distinguishes various 
kinds of anthropocentrism. Strong anthropocentrism grants moral status strictly to human beings. 
Weak anthropocentrism assigns superior moral status to human beings and inferior moral status to 
other facets of nature like animals. Enlightened anthropocentrism refers to the prudence human 
beings ought to display towards the environment because failure to do so would threaten human 
well-being. Behrens, on his part, seeks to challenge the view that African ethical thought is entirely 
represented by the view that it is anthropocentric; he appears to reject all forms of 
anthropocentrism. He seeks to demonstrate that there is a way to interpret African ethical thought 
that eschews all forms of anthropocentricism. He explains the African non-anthropocentric theory 
he seeks to articulate thus: 
I propose that this strand of African thought, suitably reconstructed, should be construed 
as providing the basis for a promising non-anthropocentric African environmentalism. I 
name this position African Relational Environmentalism (Behrens, 2010: 465). 
He does not deny that much of African ethical thought is anthropocentric, but he does single out a 
strand of it that he believes promises a non-anthropocentric view. The strand that strikes Behrens 
as promising tends to place emphasis on interrelatedness and interdependence as a defining feature 
of African metaphysical and moral thought. The emphasis on interdependence is typically captured 
in terms of metaphysical and moral holism in African philosophy. “Metaphysical holism” is the 
idea that everything in the world is interrelated and interconnected. For example, Bénézet Bujo 
(2005: 424) informs us that “Africans are traditionally characterised by a holistic type of thinking 
and feeling. For them, there is no dichotomy between the sacred and the secular; they regard 
themselves in close relationship with the entire cosmos”. Here Bujo is informing us about the 
holistic attitude that tends to characterise African people’s approach towards reality. This view is 
also captured thus: “Everything – God, ancestors, humans, animals, plants and inanimate objects 
– is connected, interdependent and interrelated” (Verhoef & Michel, 1997: 395). P. J. Nel also 
observes “that the most common feature of this cosmology is the integration of three 
distinguishable aspects, namely: environment, society, and the spiritual… An act is never 
separated from its environmental, societal and spiritual impact” (2008:37-38). These scholars of 
African metaphysical thought are united by the view that reality is understood to be hanging 
together through relationships that constitute it. All activities are informed by this holistic 
understanding of reality. 
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Metaphysical holism tends to be represented either spherically or hierarchically in the literature 
(Menkiti, 1984; Shutte, 2001). Hierarchically, this metaphysical system places God at the apex, 
followed by ancestors, human beings, animals, and inanimate objects in descending order (Molefe, 
2015). The higher the being’s position in the hierarchy, the more value it possesses. This view is 
well summarised by Laurenti Magesa (1997: 39) an African theologian: 
In the conception of African religion, the universe is a composite of divine, spirit, human, 
animate and inanimate elements, hierarchically perceived, but directly related, and always 
interacting with one another. 
It is this strand of African metaphysical systems, highly accentuating interrelatedness and 
interdependence, that Behrens believes promises a non-anthropocentric African environmental 
ethics. Behrens (2014: 470) brings the following thought to our attention: 
However, the question that remains is how we might best understand this strong emphasis 
on the interconnectedness of nature. All of this talk of interconnectedness, wholeness, 
interdependence and harmony etc., could still prove to be essentially grounded on human 
interests for these authors. 
Behrens is aware that the mere fact that there is a strong emphasis on interdependence between all 
existing things does not necessarily rule out anthropocentrism. It could be that all these 
relationships ultimately serve to secure human interests, and that human beings are the most 
important component of nature. He does not deny that there are scholars that take this reading of 
interdependence to amount to anthropocentrism. Behrens brings to our attention that there is a 
strand of thought that takes a non-anthropocentric reading of this holistic rendition of African 
metaphysics. To bring out this facet of African thought, he cites a number of scholars. He begins 
by drawing from the Ghana-born Kofi Opoku (1993: 77): 
There is a community with nature since man is part of nature and is expected to co-operate 
with it; and this sense of community with nature is often expressed in terms of identity and 
kinship, friendliness and respect. 
 
He also cites Kelbessa (2005: 24) who observes that the Oromo people of Ethiopia: 
reflect deep respect and balance between various things. The Oromo do not just consider 
justice, integrity and respect as human virtues only applicable to human beings, but they 
extend them to non-human species and Mother earth.  
Behrens cites these scholars to reveal that aspect of African thought that is not anthropocentric. 
The outstanding feature of this thought is that it applies moral language to all of nature including 
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human beings. The essence of the point being marshalled by Behrens is that this strand of African 
thought implies that we should understand ourselves as caught up in healthy relationships with all 
of nature. 
This talk of the interdependence of nature imagines a relational or communitarian ethics that 
extends beyond human beings to include all other facets of the world. In other words, talk of 
communitarianism or relationalism tends to limit these relationships to those between humans. 
Behrens’ suggestion is to make the human-to-human relationships the starting point in 
understanding how we ought to relate to the entirety of nature. He brings to our attention the facet 
of African moral thought that prizes harmony as the highest good. The view that social harmony 
is the highest good is defended by scholars like Peter Paris, Desmond Tutu and Metz. Paris (2005: 
43) comments that: 
since the highest good in African societies is the preservation of order and harmony within 
the community, on the one hand, and between the community and its spiritual protectors 
(the divinities and ancestors), on the other hand… all human activity was justifiable only 
insofar as it contributed to the preservation of order and harmony within the community 
and between the realm of divinities and ancestors. 
Another leading scholar of African thought, Nhlanhla Mkhize (2008: 38–39), for example, 
observes that “…the ideal is an ordered or balanced state of affairs; human wrongdoing, unethical 
conduct or social injustice destabilizes this order”. Heidi Verhoef and Claudine Michel (1997: 395) 
comment that African people “place a high value on harmonious human relations which link 
people together in a collective existence through an interconnected web”. The essence of the moral 
system imagined here is one that prizes certain relationships between human beings. Behrens 
(2010: 473), in the light of the above quotations, observes that “the central concern in some African 
ethical thought is that harmonious relationships be fostered”. The best way to make sense of 
harmonious relationships between humans and between humans and nature is in terms of family 
analogies. In this light we are reminded of Shutte’s (1993: 50) comments that: 
Perhaps the best model for human community as understood in African ethical thought is 
the family. The family has no function outside of itself. It is a means of growth for its 
members, and the interaction, the companionship of conversation, between the growing 
and fully grown is also an end in itself. 
We are also told that: 
We hope it is clear that the earth or the world is a kind of a family unit in which members 
of kith and kin relate to each other (Oruka & Juma, 1994: 125–126). 
Behrens brings to our attention that these scholars use analogies of family to make sense of 
harmonious relationships. He thinks of the moral content of harmonious relationships in terms of 
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family analogies that promote being “friendly, caring, mutually supportive and nurturing 
relationships” (Behrens, 2010: 474). Behrens (2010: 475) proceeds to explain the essence of this 
moral theory in this fashion: 
In sum, caring and harmonious relationships in African thought extend beyond simply an 
effective response, (they) have a normative thrust described by Wiredu in terms of 
reciprocal rights and responsibilities, and necessarily include ensuring the physical welfare 
of others, wherever feasible, possibly beyond an individual right or even a utilitarian 
perspective would prescribe. 
Here Behrens specifies the moral content of harmonious relationships. One of the outstanding 
features of harmonious relationships is their overwhelming emphasis on other-regarding duties 
that are aimed at securing the well-being of others beyond the demands imposed on us by others’ 
rights. To be caught up in harmonious relationships with others is to be involved in supportive, 
caring and nurturing relationships. It strikes me as obvious what it means to be caught up in 
harmonious relationships in the context of the human-to-human engagement. Behrens is the first 
one to admit to the difficulty associated with what it might mean to have a harmonious relationship 
with a river or a mountain. The difficulty is significantly reduced, if not totally removed, if one 
imagines the relationship with animals, for example. We can imagine an individual having a 
caring, supportive and nurturing relationship with a dog or some other animal. In fact, Behrens 
applies his relational non-anthropocentric theory to the case of elephants. 
We can now turn to consider whether such a relational moral theory can accommodate dead human 
bodies in the moral community. To be a part of the moral community or to have moral status on 
this theory requires one to be able to be a part of harmonious relationships, either as a subject or 
object. The important question to consider then is whether human dead bodies can be objects or 
subjects of harmonious relationships. On the face of it, the answer appears to be a definite no – 
dead human bodies are not able to be part of harmonious relationships. This interpretation of 
Behrens’ understanding of moral theory is sustained by how he speaks of the kinds of things that 
can form part of harmonious relationships. He imagines these to be living things. When he refers 
to what his non-anthropocentric theory promises he comments that “African scholars are best 
interpreted as holding [that] an ethical approach to nature similarly implies valuing harmonious 
relationships with other living things” (Behrens, 2010: 467, emphasis mine). He also informs us 
that “it is surely possible to conceptualise acting in ways which promote the welfare of other living 
things, such as animals and plants” (2010: 467; emphasis in the original). In another passage, he 
is even more explicit when he comments that “Since the interdependence of everything in nature 
is acknowledged, this community is understood to extend beyond human beings, and to encompass 
at least all living things” (2010: 478). 
One conclusion is inescapable from the above: that Behrens imagines harmonious relationships 
among, at least, all living things to be the basis for some being to be a part of the moral community. 
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He imagines ‘life’ in the broadest terms possible, to include things like animals and plants. The 
implication of this analysis of Behrens’s environmental ethics is that because it makes relationships 
the basis for moral status it excludes dead human bodies from the moral community. The reason 
for this observation is that dead human bodies can no longer be a part of harmonious relationships. 
For this reason, they are beyond the scope of morality7. 
Another reason to think that the bodies of dead people have no moral status is the fact that, in an 
important sense, cadavers do not have interests in the morally relevant sense. Commenting on the 
interests of things in harmonious relationships, Behrens (2010: 479) says that:  
An African sense of relationality respects both the interests of individuals and those of the 
community of nature, giving ultimate primacy to neither, a controversial claim that 
deserves to be taken seriously. 
The important characteristic of living things is the fact that they are embodiments of interests, both 
as individuals and as members of human and natural communities. Some of these interests are of 
the moral kind, which are best fulfilled in harmonious relationships. One such interest has to do 
with each living thing’s welfare goods that must be provided for in the community or harmonious 
relationships. It seems that harmonious relationships have no use or moral relevance for dead 
human bodies. 
One might wonder what the difference between Metz’s modal-relationalism and Behrens’ 
relational environmental ethical theory is. The major difference is that Metz’s theory is 
anthropocentric while Behrens’ is not. As Metz explains: 
The theory might appear to be anthropocentric in that it cashes out moral status in terms of 
certain human capacities. To be able to be an object of a communal relationship, on this 
view, is analyzed in terms of a capacity to relate to normal human beings in a certain way. 
And so, there is an irreducible appeal to humanity in its conception of moral status (2012: 
400). 
Metz is clear that moral status, according to his theory, is a function of being able to enter into 
loving relationships with human beings in the first place. But for Behrens, as we have just noted, 
moral status is a matter of living beings being able to partake and benefit from relationships without 
considering whether they are human or not. Metz’s theory, since it grants inferior moral status to 
other non-human beings like animals, marginal cases and so on is rightly construed in terms of 
weak anthropocentrism. Behrens’ theory is entirely non-anthropocentric, at least as he represents 
                                                 
7 Behrens’ relational view insists that it is harmonious relations among living things that morally matter. Moreover, 
Behrens struggles to explain how we can stand in harmonious relations with mountains. I am convinced my 
interpretation of Behrens and his specification of harmonious relationship among living things overtly excludes 
corpses. It remains to be explored in future research whether a more plausible relational view is possible.  
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it. It imagines morality to be a function of being able to enter into harmonious relationships among 
living things without granting priority to human-to-human relationships.  
4.4 Chemhuru’s Theory of Moral Status 
Like Behrens, Chemhuru seeks to defend a strictly non-anthropocentric theory of moral status. He 
also believes that the African philosophical tradition has promising indigenous moral resources 
that can capture a non-anthropocentric moral theory. In another place, while defending an African 
version of an eco-feminist environmental ethics, he relies on the ideas of African 
communitarianism and ubuntu (Chemhuru, 2018). He reveals those facets of these ideas that are 
compatible with feminism and that have the potency (at least theoretically) to address the moral 
problems of the domination and exploitation of women, nature and other vulnerable groups. For 
the purposes of this analysis, I will focus on Chemhuru’s attempt to articulate an African 
environmental ethics, drawing largely from the argument he makes in his doctoral dissertation. 
The reader should keep in mind that the aim is to give a rough sense of Chemhuru’s theory of 
moral status for the sake of determining the moral standing of dead human bodies. It is for this 
reason that I focus mainly on his article entitled “Using the African Teleological View of Existence 
to Interpret Environmental Ethics”. 
One of the most interesting facets of Chemhuru’s approach to questions of moral status is its 
emphasis on African metaphysical thought. He aims to tease out an environmental ethics or a 
theory of moral status from an African metaphysical conception of reality. He comments thus on 
his approach to questions of value: 
I seek to critically examine the nature, character, and philosophical significance of 
environmental ethics that is salient in the African view of existence. This is a relatively 
novel and underexplored area of African metaphysics that has not received much attention 
in most recent works on African environmental ethics… I intend to offer an attractive 
African ontology-based and teleologically-oriented view of environmental ethics that 
stems from the understanding of being (Chemhuru, 2016: 41). 
The assumption is that a careful analysis and exposition of the African metaphysical system will 
reveal a plausible environmental ethics. He points to specific facets of the African metaphysics 
that he believes embodies an attractive environmental ethics. Firstly, he believes that the 
hierarchical ontology characteristic of African thought embodies such a system. Secondly, he 
believes that this hierarchical ontology is characteristically teleological in its orientation. He 
believes that some combination of this general understanding of being (of the nature of reality) in 
African philosophy is the basis for a non-anthropocentric moral theory. 
He begins by discussing some of the points we observed above relating to metaphysical holism in 
African philosophy. Firstly, he recognises the hierarchy that characterises the African conception 
of being. Secondly, he reminds us that the higher an entity is in the hierarchy the more powerful it 
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is in terms of its standing. The most interesting facet that he brings to our attention about this 
under-explored metaphysical system is the view that this hierarchy has some intrinsic purpose. He 
comments thus on the idea of purpose: 
Notwithstanding the varying degrees of potency in these various levels of existence in 
African ontology [hierarchy], all being or existence is ultimately oriented towards some of 
the fundamental purposes for existence (2016: 42–43). 
The question that is not immediately clear after doing a theoretical exposition of the hierarchical 
structure of African metaphysics is one relating to its purpose. It is one thing to know that things 
stand in a particular order of priority, and it is quite another to understand the overall purpose of 
that structure and order. It is this facet of the hierarchy that Chemhuru aims to clarify and contribute 
to. He offers two arguments to ground the view that being in African thought has purpose. 
In the first instance, he observes that human life and its progression in African philosophy is 
characteristically attended at all points by certain aims or purposes. Chemhuru (2016: 44) 
comments that: 
In this regard, it is meaningful to conclude that existence of the human person in African 
ontology has a deep-seated teleological dimension to which the end of a human being is to 
aim at the good life. In light of what Mbiti observes here, it would be prudent to argue that 
all the stages of human life, from birth to death, have various purposes that form part of 
what Mbiti calls the ontological rhythm of life that helps the life-force to grow and achieve 
its purpose. 
It is important to notice that Chemhuru informs us that all stages of human life, from the cradle to 
the grave, have a deep-seated purpose. The purpose itself is of a moral kind – to aim to achieve a 
good life. The strength of the argument advanced by Chemhuru is that it would be amiss to suppose 
that human life is just arbitrary and meaningless. If human life had no purpose, there would be no 
need for any of us to be committed to nurturing our children or offering them cultural and moral 
guidelines to help them navigate life. Some of these moral purposes have to do with questions of 
happiness and fulfilment. 
The second argument for the teleological structure of African metaphysical systems is gleaned 
from the attitudes of Africans to events in the world. Africans tend to “raise their eyebrows”, 
Chemhuru observes, when lightning kills some person and Africans tend to ask questions 
concerning why some people are rich and others poor. He also observes that Africans’ attitudes 
towards illness, disease, suffering, poverty and death are suggestive of an overall purpose. In this 
light, Chemhuru (2016: 44) comments that: 
The reason why this view is a teleological one is because people think that illness, poverty, 
and death are not purposes for existing. Rather, illness, poverty, and death go against some 
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of the teleological ends for existing such as happiness, well-being, and life. The argument 
seems to be the attitudes of African towards some of the happenings in nature and in society 
are opposed to natural (moral) telos that they attach to being. 
So, from the above discussion, it is clear that Chemhuru believes that the hierarchical order 
characterising African metaphysical systems has some telos. It is important to notice that he 
connects the telos of this metaphysical system to some moral goods or ends. He talks of this 
teleological system in terms of the goals of happiness, well-being, and life. He also speaks of this 
teleological system in terms of the values of “life, vitality, sentience, and well-being” (2016: 43). 
Elsewhere, he is more explicit about the metaphysical system, its teleological orientation and 
connection to a plurality of moral values: 
African thinking and its conception of being is not just metaphysical; it has other normative 
and teleological implications that would help us to meaningfully understand African 
environmental ethics (2016: 43). 
The insight here is that we can derive a theory of moral status by understanding the teleological 
nature of the African metaphysical system because it embodies certain moral ideals. But before 
we delve into the moral status of this metaphysical system, it is important that we understand 
another important aspect of this ontological system. The teleological structure of this system of 
reality is not anthropocentric. The goals of life, vitality, sentience and well-being are not ultimately 
human values, or centred just on human interests. They are values applicable to the whole system 
including, but not exhausted by, human beings. To capture this point about the non-anthropocentric 
nature of this system, Chemhuru (2016: 44) observes that “being qua being, or existence proper, 
is transcendental”. By transcendental he seeks to capture the idea that “I mean that the notion of 
existence itself goes beyond merely denoting human existence” (2016: 44). In other words, each 
existing thing matters in its own right and lives in relation to other things to fulfil its own purpose 
its purpose in relation to the system as a whole. Therefore, human beings, in their engagement with 
reality, should not offhandedly presume their priority. They are part of the metaphysical system 
like all other things and have a duty to contribute to the well-being of nature as a whole. 
In the light of the discussion of the hierarchical nature of being in African philosophy and also the 
teleological structure connected with certain values of this structure, Chemhuru (2016: 45) 
proceeds to a “make a transition from telos to moral status”. In making this transition, he makes 
two important points. Firstly, he cautions us to appreciate a close association between the 
teleological structure of the African metaphysical system and the idea of moral status. We can 
determine the moral status of things by understanding the overall purpose of reality. Secondly, he 
informs us that he takes a pluralist approach to questions of moral status. In this light, he comments 
“This pluralist approach is based on a variety of other additional appeals to moral status, such as 
an appeal to African biocentrism or vitalism, sentience, and beingness” (2016: 45). On the face of 
it, it would seem that everything in the African metaphysical system that appears in the hierarchy 
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has moral status. This is the case because moral status is closely related to this metaphysical system 
and its teleological structure. The specific mention of biocentrism or vitalism might suggest that it 
is only beings that possess the property of life which have moral status. 
But this is an incorrect understanding of Chemhuru given his metaphysical commitments to the 
existence of both animate and inanimate things being recognised as part of the metaphysical 
system and its telos. This comment by Chemhuru (2016: 48) is helpful in showing how he really 
understands moral status: 
Although sentience, vitality, and beingness could be understood in the context of the 
African hierarchy of existence as some criterion for determining moral status in some 
beings, telos is what ultimately confers moral status. Such telos is realized differently in 
different beings. 
Since Chemhuru’s theory is a pluralistic one, and one that he explicitly acknowledges is not 
focused on finding concrete features of its plural values, it is important to appreciate where it 
ultimately locates moral status. Beings that are sentient, rational or possess life may have moral 
status, but to properly appreciate moral status on this view is to appreciate the fact that it is the 
telos that ultimately confers it. In this light, it appears that Chemhuru (2016: 48) believes that 
things “like rocks, water, air, and soil also have a purpose”, which implies that they have moral 
status (since it is conferred by purpose). The fact that we may not know the purpose of some object 
– no matter how trivial by human standards – does not remove the moral status of such things. 
Failure to appreciate and respect everything in the hierarchy is tantamount to undermining the 
overall purpose of this metaphysical system. Human beings, therefore, must understand 
themselves as having duties to respect animate and inanimate facets of nature in their totality, 
without any bias. 
It is unfortunate that Chemhuru does not quite tell us what it means to respect air or a grain of 
sand. It is also unhelpful that he does not tell us what we ought to do in the context of trade-offs 
among various things in nature in a situation of scarcity and competition for resources. He does 
not tell us how to practically carry out our duties to things we do not know the purpose of in the 
hierarchy. The most difficult aspect of this theory is that it is based on a controversial metaphysical 
system, which appears extremely difficult to defend on logical basis (a point that Chemhuru 
admits). Notwithstanding these philosophical challenges to Chemhuru’s theory of moral status, we 
can now proceed to consider whether it would grant moral status to dead human bodies. 
On the face of it, it is possible to argue that this theory would grant human corpses moral status 
since it does not shy away from granting it to pebbles or soil. The difference, however, is that the 
soil and the rock might have a function (a purpose) in the metaphysical system which a dead body 
might not have, in the morally relevant sense. It seems that death signals the end of such a purpose. 
After death, it seems that the remaining purpose of the human body is merely instrumental (it could 
be used for research purposes, organ donation and so on); values attached to it, at best, are indirect 
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– aimed rather at those who benefit from the research or the donated organs. Chemhuru (2016: 
207) himself concedes that things like air, water, rivers, rocks and other inanimate objects have 
indirect moral status only. This status is a function of their instrumentality to human beings and 
animals. He believes that we have indirect moral duties to mountains, water, air, rivers and rocks 
– we should not damage their quality because doing so may have negative consequences for our 
quality of life. But he proceeds to speak of the aesthetic value of inanimate things like rivers, which 
according to him indicates the presence of intrinsic value. On this view, he argues that we have 
direct duties to the mountains, air and water because of their intrinsic aesthetic value and the fact 
that they have purpose. However, things like rivers can dry up, leaving no trace of what Chemhuru 
is arguing for. The purpose of a thing like a river and its aesthetic value may arguably not survive 
the death of it. 
The suggestion that a decomposing human body might have a purpose might be true, but it is not 
a helpful one, morally speaking. This is the case precisely because the very idea of decomposition 
suggests that the dead human body’s aesthetic value is temporary. Appealing to the aesthetic value 
of the body may not lead us anywhere, because once dead, this value intrinsic to the body itself, 
as Chemhuru claims, fades as the corpse crumbles back into the earth. Most important factor to 
consider concerning the aesthetic value of things like rivers, is that it invokes talk of value that is 
distinct to our moral status discourse. There is something valuable about beautiful people, we may 
praise them, but that does not mean we owe them any special duties or that they have greater moral 
status than other human beings. The kind of value that aesthetic value contributes does not seem 
to be directly connected to the nature of value imagined by the idea of moral status. If this 
connection between moral status and aesthetic standing does exist, it is yet to be unfolded and 
defended by Chemhuru. 
One useful way to imagine the usefulness of the dead body is by appeal to the idea of ancestors 
and the fact that they have a function in the African metaphysical system. Mbiti (1971: 132) says 
that: 
whatever technical divisions are used, it is clear that African people have considered here 
to see man in two parts, the physical part which at death is put into the grave or otherwise 
disposed of and the non-physical part which survives and bears the personality traits of the 
individual in the hereafter. Death may separate these two, and destroy the first part but not 
the second. 
What Mbiti is confirming here is that it is firmly believed by most Africans that human beings do 
not die, it is the physical body that dies, but the spirit or soul escapes to some unknown place. It is 
true that ancestors have a function, but what is not clear is whether there is a necessary connection 
between a dead human body and being an ancestor. I am aware that one must die to transition to 
ancestorhood. What is not clear is whether the dead human body plays any important role in the 
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process of this moral transition. If the dead body plays an important role then it follows that a dead 
body has a moral status, but this connection is difficult if not impossible to secure. 
There are good reasons to suppose that the body qua body should not play a decisive role in the 
process of attaining the status of an ancestor. The major reason is the fact that the status of being 
an ancestor is a moral one. It focuses on the quality of the conduct of the human being before they 
meet their demise (Menkiti, 1984). Hence, it occurs to me that the most important requirement for 
the transition is the record of the individual’s behaviour and not so much their corpse. I imagine 
many great African lives lost to rivers and wars; whose bodies could never be recovered. It would 
be morally short-sighted not to grant these human lives safe passage to ancestorhood, simply 
because their bodies were lost. Imagine cremation and its implication for ancestorhood: this 
process may render those who prefer their bodies to be burnt to ashes unqualified for ancestorhood, 
regardless of the quality of the lives they led. Equally, some good people, for altruistic reasons, 
donate their bodies to science for study and research; these bodies are never buried. If this moral 
argument proves anything, it is that the status of being an ancestor ultimately depends on the past 
conduct of the human person and not on their body upon death. To insist on the dead body as one 
of the requirements has the counterintuitive implication of denying ancestorhood to many great 
African people over an issue often beyond their control. It overlooks the fact of their moral control 
and victory in life. Additionally, insofar as it is difficult to demonstrate that cadavers have a telos 
in the African metaphysical system, it is safe to hold the view that dead bodies have no moral 
status. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored three recent theories of moral status in the African philosophical 
tradition. I argued that Metz’s modal-relationalism accounts for moral status by appeal to the 
capacity to enter into loving relationships. Concerning modal relationalism, I observed that it 
considers cadavers as lacking moral status since they cannot enter into loving relationships nor can 
they be positively affected by them in terms of improving their welfare status. I also argued that 
Behrens relational environmental ethics conceives of moral status as a function of things living in 
harmonious relationships. Hence, dead human bodies are excluded precisely because they are not 
living things and cannot be said to have interests in the morally relevant sense. Finally, I argued 
that Chemhuru’s theory of moral status locates it on the basis of an African philosophy of 
existence. Specifically, it takes moral status to be a function of the purpose or telos of a thing in 
the African metaphysical system. We argued that it is difficult to tell what the morally relevant 
function of a dead body might be in this metaphysical system. On first approximation it appears 
that Chemhuru’s theory comes close enough to assigning moral status to dead human bodies. But 
in the final analysis, it can be concluded that none of these African theories can secure the moral 
status of dead bodies. 
As far as the use of cadavers in the context of medical research is concerned, one conclusion is 
inescapable in the light of our exposition of the secular theories of moral status in the African 
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tradition. The unclaimed cadaver, in and of itself, does not warrant direct respect. This is the case 
because: (1) It cannot be a part of social relationships as imagined by the modal relational 
perspective; (2) It cannot be a part of harmonious relationships since, at the very least, to be a part 
of these one needs to be alive; and (3) it cannot be assigned value because it does not seem to have 
a purpose within the hierarchy of being that determines moral status. In this light, we can conclude 
that research on unclaimed cadavers is morally justified in the African philosophical systems under 
consideration. 
There is one possible reading that I have deliberately ignored until this point, and which can be 
raised in relation to the above theories of moral status. The view can be captured in this fashion. It 
is plausible to believe that the fact that one once lived a human life among human beings should 
count for something once one is dead. Showing respect for the fact that one lived a human life 
might make a case for showing respect to one’s corpse. For human beings, this history is important 
given that humans are agents that chose how to lead their lives, unlike most animals. I am 
sympathetic to this life-historical consideration but I am not sure how much it does to secure 
respect for a dead human body. If this respect is traced to a person’s history – the fact that the 
person was an agent (cognitive and conative), living out a life project – it seems that we are 
misplacing the respect we feel is due to the agent by directing it to their cadaver. Maybe we should 
pursue and sustain the legacies of such people without any implication for the treatment of their 
dead bodies. For example, if one was a great soccer player, the best way to show respect to him/her 
is not to be fixated on respecting the body they used to play soccer. It strikes me that the best way 
to respect such a hero/heroine, is to promote soccer by building stadia in his/her memory, or 
identifying future soccer stars and supporting them. 
Another potent possibility is that we respect dead bodies for the sake of the living. Given that most 
people want to be treated with respect when they are dead, it is good for human beings to treat 
those that are dead the way they wish to be treated. This line of reasoning has two avenues. On the 
one hand, it hinges on how this specific dead person wanted to be treated upon their demise. But, 
to base a moral case on contingent features of how each individual wants to be treated will never 
amount to a robust moral theory that can guide our actions towards dead human bodies in general. 
The reason for this is that some people do not want to be treated with respect and some simply do 
not care. The second avenue involves the general consideration that people want the dead bodies 
of those related to them to be treated with respect. Hence, we respect dead bodies for the sake of 
the living, and not for their own sake. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it also builds 
respect for dead bodies on fragile ground. There might just be a group of people that wants to treat 
dead bodies without any respect, and besides, bodies of the unknown will not matter in this case. 
This line of reasoning also fails to secure direct respect for dead human bodies, leaving cadavers 
to be respected not for their own sake. The problem with it, again, is that it bases respect on a 
contingent feature that may vary from one individual to another, and not on some intrinsic features 






Chapter 5: Chinese Philosophy and the Moral Status of Dead Bodies 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider the question of whether the dead human body has value in and of itself 
through the lens of Chinese philosophy. The reference to ‘Chinese thought’ is too broad, diverse 
and complex a philosophical terrain to fit neatly into a single chapter. One could think of 
Confucianism, Mohism, Taoism, Buddhism, among other philosophical orientations (Wong, 
2018). Hence, the view elaborated here, at best, is abridged, with the purpose not to distort but to 
provide a sketch of Chinese moral philosophy. For the sake of focus and due to limited space, I 
single out Confucian ethics as a salient instance and representative of Chinese moral philosophy 
(Tsai, 2005). I take this approach of focusing on Confucianism because most scholars tend to enter 
into Chinese moral philosophy through Confucianism. They do so also because it is a long-
standing and the most influential moral tradition of the Eastern cultures of the world (Kupperman, 
1999; Shun, 2004; Li, 2007). For example, Tsai (2005: 160) observes that “the ethics of 
Confucius… is… the leading Chinese moral philosophy”. 
The same author further remarks that “Confucius is one of the most influential thinkers of Eastern 
Philosophy and a representative of Eastern culture” (2005: 160). Confucius is usually compared 
to other influential sages of the ancient world like Socrates and Jesus, who have had a great 
influence on and impact in the world (2005: 160). Some put Confucius on the same pedestal as 
Socrates as if to suggest that it is plausible to think of his influence in the East as comparable to 
that of Socrates in the West (Murphy & Weber, 2010; Peters, 2014). In what follows, the aim is a 
theoretical construction or even extraction of moral insights from Confucian ethics to the effect of 
developing a view on whether a dead human body has any moral value or moral status. The central 
intellectual inquiry is whether the body, specifically the dead body, can be an object of moral 
concern in its own right in view of a robust interpretation of Confucian ethics. Simply put, this 
chapter offers one way, among many others, to read the literature on Confucian ethics with the 
hope to get an answer on the moral status of the dead body. 
To engage in this philosophical inquiry, one must be cognisant of the following considerations. 
Firstly, this project will rely largely on the strength of secondary literature on Confucius ethics to 
make its moral determinations on the standing of dead human beings. This approach may be 
questionable and objectionable at many levels. The success, however, of this truncated rendering 
of Confucian ethics will depend on whether I can glean the salient features of this moral system 
from the reading and properly apply them to the problem at hand. I rely on the secondary literature, 
at least that which intuitively strikes me as plausible, because I do not have the expertise to enter 
debates on the correct interpretation of the primary literature. Hence, I will tend to rely on those 
facets that are consistent with common sense morality without completely shying away from the 
peculiar facets of Chinese ethics. 
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Secondly, this project should be understood in terms of my being a cultural outsider, trying to 
make sense of the universal problem of the standing of dead bodies for the sake of medical ethics. 
In other words, the central question being pursued here is what Chinese philosophy can teach us 
about the use of cadavers in research and learning, particularly those not claimed by their families. 
In this light, I hope the cultural insiders, particularly experts of this intellectual tradition, would be 
lenient with the possible mistakes I may make as an outsider. It is important that I emphasise that 
I engage in this project with deep respect for the Eastern intellectual traditions, and I enter the 
conversation with a desire to learn as much as possible in ethical matters from these traditions. 
This project comes from a good place and I hope to make sense of an important moral tradition, 
though my attempt will obviously be attended by many limitations. 
In what follows I will reflect on the central features of Confucian moral thought, namely: the idea 
of jen/ren (humaneness, benevolence, virtue), li (rites and rituals), and junzi (the gentleman). In 
the second and third sections of the chapter, I will provide the Confucian view of dignity. Here, I 
will use two strategies to unfold the alienable, meritocratic and inegalitarian view of dignity in 
Confucian moral thought. The first strategy draws directly from the salient moral virtues 
characteristic of Confucian ethics – benevolence, righteousness and integrity. The second strategy 
considers the concept of dignity in the light of how it features in Confucian contributions to ethical 
discourses on the issue of death with dignity. Ultimately, I argue that dead bodies have no value, 
in and of themselves in the Confucian tradition. I do suggest, however, that we can understand 
bodies of individuals that have been morally upstanding in life to be worthy of respect, since they 
symbolise a dignified form of existence. 
5.2 Confucian Ethics [Junzi, Ren and Li] 
There is a consensus among the scholars of Confucian moral thought that such thought is an 
instance of virtue ethics; or at least, one can plausibly interpret Confucian moral thought in this 
fashion (Nuyen, 2011, Wong, 2012). Virtue ethics in the Western tradition is associated with 
leading scholars like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It is Aristotle’s view of virtue ethics, however, 
that has come to dominate Western moral philosophy (Broadie, 1991). Scholars of Confucian 
ethics are at pains to clarify the sense in which this moral system counts as a virtue ethics, and the 
sense in which it does not. In the Western moral system, virtue ethics refers to a system that 
accounts for morality in terms of traits of character. These traits take priority over action, against 
the grain of the focus on action typical of deontological and teleological ethical systems (Wong, 
2018). Confucian ethics is an instance of a virtue ethical system only insofar as it posits some ideal 
character traits as constitutive of the entire gamut of morality. In section 2(2.1) of the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy on Chinese Ethics, David Wong (2018: n.p) makes the following 
comments about Confucian ethics understood as virtue ethics: 
As it will become clear in subsequent discussion here, one can employ virtue language with 
the appropriate qualifiers and at the same time acknowledge much of what the critics claim 
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as insights of Confucian ethics: e.g., that the process of realizing the virtues 
characteristically takes place in relationship to others – those to whom one has 
responsibilities as a son or daughter or mother or father, for example – and that it can be 
part of one’s very identity to be a particular person’s son or daughter, mother or father. 
The idea here is that there is an appropriate and nuanced way that one can still refer to Confucian 
ethics as virtue ethics. One can bring on board the importance of social relationships as the proper 
context for cultivating and exhibiting virtues. In Confucian thought, the individual that is morally 
excelling is referred to as a junzi. The idea of junzi is associated with royal nobility, the high status 
of being a prince or even a “gentle-man” (Wong, 2018). To refer to some individual as a junzi is 
the same as associating his/her conduct with virtue, or to see him/her as a moral achiever (Tsai, 
2005). 
Scholars take ren to be the central or foundational virtue in Confucian ethics (Luo, 2007; Chin, 
2007; Riegel, 2013; Chan, 2014). Tsai (2005 161) informs us that ren is definable as humanness, 
benevolence, love and so on. Luo (2007: 100) construes ren “(humaneness) as an all-inclusive 
virtue” (see Blakeley, 2003; Chan, 2014). Dawson (1993: xxi) opines that ren “refers to the 
practical manifestations of being humane”. The following comments are informative on the 
possession of ren – 
Benevolence (jen[/ren]) is the most important moral quality a man can possess… That it 
is the moral quality of a gentleman (junzi) is clear from the following saying: ‘If the 
gentleman forsakes benevolence, in what way can he make a name for himself? The 
gentleman never deserts benevolence, not even for as long [as it takes] to eat a meal. If he 
hurries and stumbles, one may be sure that, it is in benevolence that he does so’ (Lau, 1979: 
14–15). 
For another, 
The Confucian tradition has always placed primary emphasis upon becoming humane 
(ren). Ethical values and moral sensibilities are inculcated in family life and early 
education. Progress in the cultivation of self and filial conduct expands ideally to embrace 
standards of propriety in social-political affairs, and these, in turn, are set within and 
integral to the wider context of nature and the operation of the greater cosmos, that is, 
‘Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things’. When the boundaries of the ethical expand to 
include all things, the project of cultivating properly the human dao must adapt its 
perspective and range of concerns to that of the greater dao (or tian, Heaven) (Blakeley, 
2003: 137). 
Above, three points emerge that require our special attention. Firstly, the authors emphasise the 
primary or pivotal role of the virtue of ren in Confucian ethics, particularly in conceptualising an 
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ideal person or ‘gentleman’. An individual with ren is one that is humane or benevolent and is 
guided by the dao. 
The second point is the importance of social relationships in which ren is developed and exhibited. 
Social relationships are important in Confucian ethics. The literature points us to five key social 
relationships present in Confucian ethics: parent and child, husband and wife, elder brother and 
younger, ruler and minister, friend and friend (Tsai, 2005; Riegel, 2013). These five relationships 
constitute the essence of the social life in the framework of Confucian moral and political thought. 
The individual is to conceptualise and exercise morality within the various life situations and 
opportunities afforded by the five social relationships. The five relationships within this social 
order are hierarchical in nature within and between them. In other words, the relationship between 
husband and wife is superior to that which holds between siblings. The relationships between the 
husband and wife furthermore gives priority to the husband, and the wife takes a deferential 
position towards him. 
It is important to recognise that the family relationship is pivotal in the Confucian moral and 
political order. In this sense, it should not be surprising, therefore, when Chinese scholars decry 
the individualism that is the hallmark of the moral and political culture of the West. In the 
Confucian moral system, the family sets the tone for the individual and the entire social order as 
represented by the five key social relationships. Hence, it is correct to observe the communitarian 
dimension of the Confucian moral-political system (Bell & Metz, 2011). The point relating to the 
importance of the family relationship is important for moral and political considerations; I will not 
consider the latter in this chapter. Concerning the moral consideration, however, Confucianism 
imagines a meta-ethical worldview that takes partiality as a defining feature of its thought rather 
than impartiality as its point of departure. This translates to the view that that we must first 
demonstrate our ren – our humaneness or benevolence – towards our family or intimate relations 
before scattering it abroad to strangers (Luo, 2007; Bell and Metz, 2011). 
The last point revolves around the duty of the individual to cultivate a virtuous character [junzi]. 
It appears that each individual is born with the capacity to develop and exhibit growing levels of 
ren, which is a central virtue of a junzi. Lau (1979: 12) explains the point on self-cultivation in this 
fashion: 
Behind Confucius’ pursuit of the ideal moral character lies the unspoken, and, therefore, 
the unquestioned, assumption that the only purpose a man can have and the only 
worthwhile thing a man can do is to become as good a man as possible. This is something 
that has to be pursued for its own sake and with complete indifference to success and 
failure. 
The most important task facing the moral agent is the cultivation of a self to be an embodiment of 
ren, which is a supreme virtue that characterises the junzi. Tsai (2005: 161) reports that Confucius 
made the following point about self-cultivation: “From the Son of Heaven down to the masses of 
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the people, the cultivation of the self is the foundation of everything besides”. The acquisition of 
the status of junzi involves self-activation, self-determination, self-reliance and self-cultivation 
(2003: 161). All these activities of the agent engaged in the task of moral-self-cultivation happen 
in the context of healthy social relationships. 
The individual is to develop ren, and thus become a junzi in social relationships. The individual is 
to develop the habits associated with a moral exemplar by being true to his/her roles 
responsibilities emanating from his/her social relationships. Being a father, for example, requires 
that a man provides for his wife, leads his family, and trains and nurtures his children. The idea of 
being a father is not just belonging to a biological category, it is loaded with socio-cultural and 
moral responsibilities that a father ought to fulfil. It is for this reason that some scholars think of 
Confucian ethics as an ethical system that is also role-based, and the roles are specified by the 
position one holds in the five social relationships (Nuyen, 2011). The point about the roles the 
agent plays, which result in self-cultivation, is explained in terms of the rectification of names. 
Nuyen (2011: 556) explains: 
Names such as “father”, “son”, “ruler”, etc., denote specific social roles and indicate 
specific obligations. It is our task to learn the nature of the role that goes under a name and 
to try to live up to what the name specifies. The process of rectifying names… has two 
sides. On the one side, we are to use a name, such as “father”, “son”, “ruler”, etc., that fits 
what is named, i.e. a person with certain qualities. On the other side, we are to rectify 
ourselves to fit the name that one bears, or the role that the name specifies. 
Hence, we notice that the process of self-cultivation can never be divorced from the roles 
associated with the five relationships that are central in the Confucian moral thought. The names 
associated with the various situations are socio-morally loaded insofar as they stipulate the moral 
standard towards which we must strive. To have the name “son” specifies a context within which 
one is to pursue moral excellence, by fitting in and being faithful in fulfilling the roles and 
requirements associated with the name.  
What is required of the moral agent in the acquisition of junzi and the display of ren is not 
exhausted by the roles the agent plays under his/her designation or name. The concept of li, in 
Confucian thought, provides another important platform for exercising social roles and expressing 
ren. The concept of li refers to rites and rituals that encapsulates standards of propriety – acceptable 
social conventions for a good human life (Luo, 2007: 101). Wong (2018) makes the following 
comment on the concept of li: 
One of the most distinctive marks of Confucian ethics is the centrality of ritual performance 
in the ethical cultivation of character. For example, while Aristotelian habituation generally 
corresponds to the Confucian cultivation of character, there is no comparable emphasis in 
Aristotle on the role of ritual performance in this process of character transformation. Yet 
Confucians will say that any complete description of self-cultivation must include a role 
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for the culturally established customs that spell out what it means to express respect for 
another person in various social contexts. (see section 2(2.2) of the Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy on Chinese Ethics). 
The point here seems to be that the goal of the moral agent is to develop ren, but to develop it 
he/she needs to engage in li (rites and rituals). The li provides the context and content for practice, 
development and exhibition of ren. The development of the relevant habits and dispositions of ren 
depends on the various cultural responsibilities found in the performances of certain rites and 
rituals (Ruiping, 2010). The precise relationship that holds between ren and li is complicated and 
open to a variety of competing interpretations (Wong, 2018). It is worth noting, however, that li 
provides an important social context and the content for developing and practising ren, which is 
decisive in becoming a junzi. 
I believe the above, though rough, is sufficient to give us some understanding of Confucian moral 
thought. I must be the first one to admit that I have left out some other important concepts related 
to Confucian ethics like that of yi, which is usually associated with ren and li (Tsai, 2005; Wong, 
2018). I have not spoken about the relational nature of the self, and many other issues. For my 
purpose, I am satisfied that the above view will suffice to give us a decent point of departure to 
reflect on our underlying question on the status of dead human bodies. The component of ren, as 
supreme virtue, seems to entail a promising theory of moral status or dignity. I believe that the 
idea of ren embodies an interesting moral idea which we can borrow to construct a conception of 
moral status. Confucian morality requires the agent to unfold the capacity or potential for ren. 
In what follows, I consider the view of dignity we can associate with the Confucian moral system. 
I will do so in two somewhat related ways. In the first instance, I will draw from recent literature 
to give a picture of the Confucian view of dignity. Secondly, I will draw from Confucian tradition’s 
contribution to the debate on euthanasia in discussing death with dignity. 
5.3 The Confucian View of Dignity 
Above, we noted that the essence of Chinese morality revolves around conduct and character, 
which qualifies it as an instance of virtue ethics. Remember that an individual with a good 
character is called a junzi or a gentleman. Luo An’xian (2014), in the anthology The Cambridge 
Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives contributes a chapter offering a 
philosophical disquisition of the Confucian view of dignity. Below, I will draw from this chapter 
to discuss this view. The major contribution that flows from An’xian’s analysis is that dignity is a 
function of developing and maintaining a virtuous life, ren. At the heart of the Confucian moral 
view are central virtues that account for dignity – the virtues of benevolence, righteousness and 
integrity. These virtues could just be the same as the concept of ren. An’xian (2014: 177) 
comments: “The Confucian concept of human dignity is deeply interwoven with these core 
concepts of Confucianism”. Benevolence is explained in terms of the virtue of care towards others, 
where the agent assists others for their own sakes. The virtue of benevolence is important in the 
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Confucian moral system since it has a relational or communitarian component (Luo 2007). The 
virtue of righteousness refers to the individual being true to his/her responsibilities in the various 
spheres of his/her social existence. The virtue of integrity refers to an individual that is steadfast 
to principle and duty irrespective of the changing circumstances of human existence in the social 
sphere. One conclusion is inevitable concerning the status of these three concepts of virtue – they 
are agent-centred. This view of morality focuses on the agent and his/her exercise of agency in 
developing his/her own character. 
The second important insight that emerges in An’xian’s analysis is that a virtuous character is more 
important than the fact of life or being alive itself. Though life itself is valuable and should be 
appreciated for its own sake, its value is not absolute nor intrinsic. The true value of human 
existence is connected to development of these three virtues. The point is – if one must choose 
between saving one’s own life and dying to preserve the virtues of benevolence, righteousness or 
integrity, then death is to be preferred. Human existence without virtue is meaningless and 
valueless.  
Though life is precious, a life without dignity is meaningless and worthless, and therefore people 
– whether they are of high or low social status – should live with dignity even if that entails 
embracing death in some circumstances (An’xian, 2014: 178). 
The idea of dignity central in the Confucian moral tradition is a virtue-based one. It is the 
development and expression of these virtues through conduct that embody a life of dignity. The 
life of virtue is more important than mere biological human existence. Hence, this comment 
appositely reveals the Confucian view of dignity “I hate death, but there are things that I hate more 
than death, and thus there are certain kinds of suffering that I won’t avoid” (2014: 178). Death is 
a welcome companion if it comes at the expense of sacrificing benevolence, righteousness and 
integrity. True human existence is tied directly to a good character. On this view, dignity is 
something that we cultivate by way of developing our characters. Brennan and Lo’s (2007: 43) 
remarks are instructive on the Confucian view of dignity: 
[I]n the Confucian canon of self-cultivation… dignity amounts to more than just feelings 
and behaviour of a certain kind. Instead, the cultivation of dignity is the cultivation of 
certain abilities and character traits, both involving dispositions to feel, as well as to 
behave, in certain ways under certain circumstances. In particular, dignity is partly 
constituted by the disposition to feel self-esteem and to induce esteem from others. This 
affective disposition is the first component of dignity. It is justified by the second 
component of dignity, namely the behavioural disposition to honour the duties and rules of 
conduct that are rightfully expected of a person of dignity. Without such behavioural 
disposition to act honourably, the affective disposition to induce self-esteem or esteem 
from others would be unjustified.  
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The point that is emerging is that dignity is something the individual cultivates by developing 
certain dispositional and behavioural virtues. In this sense, dignity is not a universal property 
possessed by all human beings. Rather, dignity is performance-based and meritocratic. That is, 
dignity is something one achieves. Dignity “cannot be detached from… the idea that there are 
gradations of human excellence and merits” (Brennan & Lo, 2007: 45). This means that the idea 
of dignity in the Confucian tradition stands in opposition to the one prevalent in the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights (UDHR). For example, Glenn Hughes (2011: 3) informs us that: 
The drafters [of the UDHR] solved this problem by indicating that human beings have 
rights because of their intrinsic dignity – because human beings, due to qualities they 
possess, have a special value or distinctive worth that in each case and without exception 
should be respected and nourished.  
The individual has dignity under the UDHR because he/she possesses certain qualities. The mere 
possession of these qualities – rationality, for example – means that one has dignity. On this 
account, dignity is universal, inalienable and egalitarian. I have dignity because I have the relevant 
ontological equipment of human nature. I am equal to everyone else because we all have the same 
human ontological equipment. Dignity does not come in degrees and I cannot lose it; it is 
inalienable, because it is a function of my nature as a human being. 
The Confucian view of dignity on the other hand considers dignity to be performance- and 
character-based. Dignity is not inherent, rather, it has to be cultivated in social relationships. It 
comes in degrees relative to one’s cultivation and consistency over time. The more virtue develops, 
the more dignity one earns and develops. One can lose dignity; it is, hence, not an inalienable 
property of human nature. Brennan and Lo (2007: 46) inform us that: 
Just as dignity can be acquired via cultivation of virtues, it can be lost via neglect and 
degeneration of character. Just as virtues give rise to honour, vices bring about indignity, 
dishonour, and shame. 
To conclude this section, we notice that the Confucian view of dignity is a virtue-based one. It is 
a view that places an onus on agents to cultivate virtue and allows for the loss of dignity through 
neglect and degeneration of character. To further unfold this view of dignity, I consider the idea 
of death with dignity through the lens of Confucian thought – the aim, still, is to clarify the idea of 
dignity in Confucian thought by taking a different angle. 
5.4 Confucian Thought on Death with Dignity 
For this particular exposition of death with dignity, I will draw largely from Lo’s (1999) essay 
titled Confucian Ethic of Death with Dignity and Its Contemporary Relevance. For other related 
literature dealing with the question of death with dignity in Confucian thought, (see Li & Li, 2017; 
Chen, 2019). The central question under consideration is the place and status of suicide and/or 
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euthanasia in the Confucian moral view8. Lo (1999: 314) begins by pointing us to the early 
Confucian attitude towards suicide: 
For gentleman of purpose and men of ren [benevolence or supreme virtue] while it is 
inconceivable that they should seek to stay alive at the expense of ren, it may happen that 
they have to accept death in order to have ren accomplished. 
This quotation informs us that biological existence – being alive – has no intrinsic value in 
Confucian moral thought. The only standard that determines the moral value of a human existence 
is whether a person cultivates the supreme virtues of character. Life characterised by virtue and 
virtuous choices is valuable, and should be preferred and pursued by all means necessary. The 
point that emerges is clear: that it is immoral to hold on to life by all means possible, particularly 
if continued existence will threaten the supreme value of ren. Alternatively, death is preferable to 
being alive if it will lead to the fulfilment of ren. Hence, a dignified death is to be preferred to a 
life of shame and humiliation. It is for this reason that most Chinese people would rather die, 
commit suicide, than live a life of shame and indignity, where their ren is undermined by others. 
Lo (1999: 316) informs us that when people committed suicide for noble reasons, they were not 
condemned; rather, they were praised for their aspiration and dedication to a dignified form of 
existence. 
On this view, therefore, death in and of itself, is not the worst evil. In addition, life itself is not the 
highest good. The good is associated with a life of supreme value, and the worst evil is associated 
with a life of shame, dishonour and humiliation. If continued existence is not related to a life of 
supreme virtue, then one might as well commit suicide for the sake of preserving one’s virtuous 
character, and if death is the only and best way to fulfil virtue then one ought to proudly embrace 
it. Lo (1999: 318) captures the significance of this point in this fashion: 
In short, according to Confucianism in the early Han Dynasty, biological life is valuable, 
but there are self-regarding states of affairs more valuable than biological life, namely, a 
life with honour and dignity. Although death is undesirable, there are self-regarding states 
of affairs more undesirable than death, namely, to suffer disgrace, dishonour, and 
humiliation in life. One should choose death in order to avoid undergoing undignified 
treatment; and it is honourable, even obligatory, to make such a choice. 
The long and short of it is that on this view suicide is permissible for the sake of preserving a 
virtuous life. To appreciate why this is the case, one may contrast this view with a Catholic 
approach to this question. On the Catholic view, life has value in and of itself. The value of a 
                                                 
8 I am fully aware that the concepts of suicide and euthanasia are not synonymous. The discussion that follows relies 
largely on suicide because the scholar under consideration appeals to intuitions and attitude towards suicide in general 
among Chinese people and Confucian scholars to make conclusions regarding death with dignity or the permissibility 
of euthanasia.   
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human being, which can be explained by appeal to the idea of a soul or the image of God, is taken 
to be a divine bestowment (Rosen, 2012). Moreover, the question of death is entirely within the 
jurisdiction of God. The injunction that forbids killing is premised precisely on the value of human 
life itself and it is absolutely forbidden. Hence, suicide and/or any form of killing for medical 
reasons (euthanasia), in Catholic thought, are considered moral evils because they violate the 
divine principle of life. It follows, therefore that on this view, biological life matters for its own 
sake. The mere fact of being alive is valuable and should be protected and cherished for its own 
sake. On the Confucian view, however, it is the quality of character that bestows dignity to human 
existence. Should human existence be attended by shame or the individual’s noble bearing be 
tainted by disgrace, whether due to unbecoming political or a medical condition, he/she may 
voluntarily commit suicide to protect her integrity. This positive attitude or view towards suicide 
has implications for the moral status of cadavers, as I explore below. 
5.5 Dignity and the Value of Dead Human Bodies 
One of the outstanding features of the Confucian view of dignity is that it does not base dignity on 
the mere possession of ontological qualities of human nature. Dignity, on this view, is a function 
of the use of human abilities to acquire virtue. One interesting implication of this view is that it 
does not quite approach the question of existence through moral status terms. The value associated 
with dignity is based on virtue-cultivating-and-manifesting conduct. The question that is relevant 
to consider is whether a dead human body, in itself, has virtues, and whether, in itself, it has any 
value. On the face of it, it seems that the corpse, in and of itself, has no dignity. This is the case 
because dignity on this view emerges from positive performance in the moral sphere. In the event 
that the moral function of cultivating dignity ceases, it seems we can no longer attach dignity to 
the body since the actions and conduct of the agent do not inhere in it. Remember, on this view 
dignity is property solely of the actions and habits of the agent. 
It could be argued that it is a violation of the dignity of the dead if we leave their bodies unburied, 
to be eaten by vultures – or in our case to be dissected by students – because the dead had dignity 
while they were alive. There are two possible strategies that can be deployed to try to secure the 
value of dead bodies. On the first strategy, we can argue that maybe we can assign moral status to 
individuals whose lives were characteristically dignified and withhold it from those that lived 
miserable and deplorable lives since they were bereft of virtue. On this view, the bodies of those 
human beings that lived well have dignity and of those that failed to do so have none. This 
interpretation is consistent with the view of dignity that assign it relative to performance, except 
that now we further extend it to bodies of those that lived well. This view will obviously be 
consistent with treating the bodies of these individuals with great respect. But on this view not all 
bodies will be associated with dignity. It will only be the bodies of those that conducted themselves 




The second strategy seeks to mirror the metaethics of the idea of moral status. Here, we note that 
if certain virtues are of supreme value – such as benevolence, righteousness and integrity, or, what 
we might call ren – this has important metaphysical implications for human nature. The 
implication is that human beings do have moral qualities that make the acquisition of supreme 
virtue possible. We should be able to attach value to beings that have these capacities over those 
that do not have them. Following this logic, we can posit that the commitment to supreme virtues 
that characterises the life of a gentleman, in part, commits us to a particular view of moral status. 
The view could, in other words, be construed in terms of the capacity for virtue. On this 
interpretation, human beings have moral status because they have the capacity for participating in 
a virtuous form of existence. Here, moral status is not so much associated with the actual use of 
these moral capacities as with the kind of thing that has them. 
Between these two strategies, it seems the first one is much closer to the Confucian view of dignity 
than the second. The second strategy is too Western and would entail that all dead human bodies 
have no moral status since it is a function of the mere possession of certain human features present 
while they are alive. The first strategy is much closer to the Confucian view of dignity since it 
associates value only with bodies of those moral agents that have lived morally well. In a sense, 
the bodies of those that died living virtuous lives will be respected as a form of honouring them. 
To substantiate this view, An’xian (2014: 179) shares this anecdote: 
Wen Tianxiang, the prime minister of the Southern Song Dynasty, was captured by the 
Yuan Dynasty rulers. He was tortured and tempted by the rulers with various means. 
However, Wen Tianxiang refused the high official position and salary offered and 
withstood the cruel torture; he would rather die than surrender. Wen chose to die calmly 
and left behind famous and compelling lines of poetry: “None since the advent of time have 
escaped death, may my loyalty forever illuminate the annals of history”; “I would rather 
sacrifice my life for integrity than to eke an ignoble existence, may the integrity and 
righteousness shine and last forever.” Wen chose benevolence and righteousness over 
survival, died with dignity and lived a glorious life. As such, Wen became an exemplary 
model of a dignified person, his story provides guidance for others in attempting to live a 
dignified life. 
This story reveals that Tianxiang preferred death to sacrificing his integrity. He chose death over 
a false sense of success. The insight one can draw from this moving narrative of Tianxiang’s life 
is that his death, specifically the death of his body, could serve as a symbol of his dignity. His dead 
body represents death with dignity and is a token of his glorious life. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered the Confucian view of dignity in two related ways. Firstly, I considered 
dignity in the light of Confucian ethical thought. In terms of the Confucian moral view, ethics 
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revolves around the cultivation of the supreme virtue of ren, being benevolence, righteousness and 
integrity. Dignity is constituted by living a life that cultivates these virtues of character. Secondly, 
I approached the Confucian view of dignity by considering its implications for the issue of death 
with dignity. Here, we noticed that death is not a necessarily evil. We noted that dying for noble 
reasons such as avoiding the loss of virtue or a life of shame is a welcome moral choice that 
preserves the dignity of a human agent. 
In terms of Confucian ethical thought, dignity is not absolute; it is something that we achieve, and 
we can lose it. It is not inherent. One works continuously to earn and keep it throughout one’s life. 
Dignity is a function of cultivated and maintained virtue. Without moral virtue there is no dignity. 
This brought me to the conclusion that the human body has no value since dignity is a function of 
moral performance. Thus, if dignity is preserved by conduct, and, at death the dead body can no 
longer perform acts of virtue, then it has no dignity. On the other hand, in line with the intuition 
that dead human bodies must be treated with respect, the dead bodies of people that historically 
lived virtuous lives can be respected. Their corpses are associated with and represent the valuable 
lives that they have lived. In this sense, we can attach value to these bodies. The consequence of 
this view is that we have some duty to respect the bodies of dead individuals that lived a virtuous 
and dignified life. But this is not the same as saying that such bodies, in and of themselves, have 
value. The respect owed is indirect: it is based on history. Therefore, it cannot be universal because 
not all people’s histories are known once dead. It simply means that we can treat the bodies of 
those people that lived known virtuous lives with some kind of respect, as a form of recognition 
of their virtue in life. This may explain why bodies of those we know and love are usually treated 
with respect and care, even if they do not have value in themselves. 
But, with specific reference to the issue of unclaimed cadavers, it is difficult to see how this kind 
of moral view will help us. The moral recommendation to treat bodies of those dead people that 
historically were virtuous with some kind of respect will only apply in contexts where there is 
prior knowledge of the deceased. For the most part, when it comes to unclaimed cadavers, such 
knowledge is not available. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that, even from a Confucian 




Chapter 6: Phenomenological Ethics and Responsibility towards Dead Human Bodies 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter again attends to the question whether we have any moral duties towards human 
cadavers. As in the previous chapters, the moral duties I am considering are of a specific kind – 
whether we owe any direct moral duties to dead human bodies. Specifically, I engage in this 
investigation drawing on the phenomenological school of thought – phenomenological ethics. 
Phenomenology, as a movement and approach to philosophy, is a broad and complex area of study. 
It concerns itself primarily with human experience, subjectivity or consciousness and it provides 
a method of investigating it. Some of its leading classical pioneers are Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. All of these scholars, in one way or another, offer their own 
distinct contributions to the phenomenological school of thought. To advance my investigation 
concerning dead human bodies and whether we have duties towards them, I will base my 
investigation on the works of Levinas.  
Before launching into the discussion, it is important to kick-off with a rough discussion of this 
tradition. The aim is to offer a picture of phenomenology as a distinct philosophical approach. 
Phenomenology, as a distinct movement and field of study in philosophy, emerged in the 20th 
century. It originated in the philosophical writings of classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, among others (Silverman, 1980; Smith, 2013. All these scholars 
articulate their own distinct and competing accounts of phenomenology and its various approaches 
to ethics.  
Phenomenology, roughly, has been defined in these terms: 
Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the way things present themselves 
to us in and through such experience (Scanlon & Sokolowski, 2002: 2; see also Svenaeus, 
2016: 3) 
Alternatively, 
Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-
person point of view. (Smith, 2008; see also Smith, 2013). 
Three features stand out as definitive of the philosophical enterprise of phenomenology. Firstly, 
its subject-matter is the “structures of human consciousness” or “human experience”. In the world, 
and as subjects, we passively encounter things throwing themselves at us or actively enter 
particular kinds of experiences like eating, walking, dancing, reading and so forth. The very 
subjectivity or consciousness of the subject is the primary focus of study in phenomenology. 
Secondly, the focus on human subjectivity or consciousness is studied from the position of the 
subject of conscious experience i.e. it prioritises the first-person perspective. Gallagher (2012: 7) 
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comments as follows: “The first-person point of view means that the phenomenologist, the 
investigator of consciousness, studies his or her own experience from the point of view of living 
through that experience”. Finally, phenomenology also reflects on the conditions that make 
experiences possible. Here, our attention is drawn to fact of “conditions of possibility… 
embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social 
background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities” (Smith, 2008: n.p). 
Another way to get a rough sense of the phenomenological approach to philosophy is to highlight 
some of the major contributions from preeminent scholars of this tradition. It is common in the 
literature to think of Husserl. For the sake of brevity and with the aim of giving the reader a 
concrete sense of how phenomenological ethics might approach the question of the value of dead 
bodies, I will limit my philosophical adumbrations to Levinas’ moral system instead. 
In the final analysis, I will argue that my reading of Levinas’ ethics amounts to the view that dead 
human bodies have no intrinsic value. The implication of this argument is that we have no direct 
duties to cadavers. The major reason for this conclusion is Levinas’ view of the significance of the 
human corpse lacking a face or no longer being able to enter into ethical relations. It will emerge 
that for Levinas dignity is a function of the face – the radical exteriority of the ‘Other’, which, at 
once, elevates her to the position of my master (a maker of commands) and, at the same time, 
reveals her nudity – embodying or expressing her vulnerability (which requires my intervention). 
It is this simultaneous elevation and nudity characterising the face of the Other that serves as the 
ground for my ethical responsibility towards her; this is something which a dead person can no 
longer embody. 
Before I pursue my argument, I begin by pointing out certain important issues concerning this 
chapter. Firstly, I do not claim to be an expert on phenomenology, its approach in general or the 
systems of value it embodies. I think, however, that by considering some translated works of 
Levinas and important secondary literature we might come to some understanding of his moral 
views. The aim is not to offer the most accurate interpretation or most exhaustive exposition of 
Levinas’ ethics. Rather, the aim is a limited one: of drawing meaningful insights from Levinas’ 
ethics concerning whether we should consider ourselves to have direct duties towards dead human 
bodies. 
Secondly, I seek to justify why I selected Levinas over other classical scholars of phenomenology. 
In my view, Levinas’ ethics is preferable since, in a sense, it could be taken to be a critique or 
‘renovation’ of the ethical views of Heidegger and Husserl. This is the case precisely because he 
imagines his moral view against the backdrop of these scholars. In other words, just as Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics is more famous than and preferable to that of Plato, I assume that to be the case 
regarding Levinas’ ethics. This argument should not be construed to be asserting that the work of 
latter philosophers is always to be preferred and taken as more plausible than that of earlier ones. 
Rather, I am making the moderate claim that given Levinas’ expertise of Heidegger and Husserl, 
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among others, it is reasonable to assume that his moral system embodies insights from their work 
and eschews some of the devastating weaknesses of them. This view is captured in this fashion: 
[H]is work is an ongoing, critical dialogue with three philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Hegel. Given these targets – as well as philosophical interlocutors like Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty – Levinas’ philosophy begins from an enlarged conception of lived 
embodiment and a powerful extension of Husserl’s technique of suspending 
conceptualisation to reveal experience as it comes to light. He is also indebted to 
Heidegger for his hermeneutics of being-in-the-world (Bergo, 2019n.p.; emphasis mine). 
Levinas’ work gives us a point of entry into the field of phenomenology in general insofar as it is 
continually critically engaged with the leading scholars of the field, like Husserl. I interpret my 
approach to embody the view that Levinas’ work draws inspiration and insights from his teachers, 
predecessors and contemporaries, which makes his philosophical body of work singularly apt to 
represent the field of phenomenology. As a result, I will also take it as a useful way of engaging 
in phenomenological ethics in the quest to pursue the question of the value of dead bodies and 
whether we have any duties to them. My suggestion hinges not so much on the view that Levinas 
is the only way to approach phenomenological ethics, but on the value of the heuristic vantage 
point his work might offer us in our ethical reflections. It is the heuristic value of Levinas’ work, 
therefore, that renders it useful in reflecting on our primary question in the light of a 
phenomenological approach to ethical discourse. 
To unfold Levinas’ ethics and its implications for human cadavers, this chapter will take the 
following form: I begin by considering how Levinas understands the project of ethics in 
philosophy and how his approach differs from standard ethical discourse. Secondly, I delve into 
Levinas’ ethics. Here, I will primarily consider the face-to-face encounter as the embodiment of 
the entire project of ethics. I will proceed to reflect on how the face could ground an under-explored 
view of dignity in moral philosophy. I will conclude the chapter by applying the theory of dignity 
associated with Levinas’ ethical system to the question of the value of dead bodies, which will 
help us to determine whether we have direct duties towards them or not. 
6.2 Levinas’ Approach to Ethics 
Standard approaches to ethics in moral philosophy tend to divide into normative ethics, metaethics 
and applied ethics (see Sober, 2002; Pojman, 2002). Normative ethics is preoccupied with 
specifying a general criterion for the rightness or wrongness of actions. That is, it posits some basic 
norm or fundamental value in order to distinguish permissible and impermissible actions (Pojman, 
2002; Rachels & Rachels, 2015). For example, on Kant’s humanity formulation, the idea of 
dignity, which refers to the intrinsic and superlative worth of a person, directs how we may relate 
to other human beings and how we may not treat them as ‘things’ (Rosen, 2012; Waldrow, 2012). 
It is a fact of human dignity, a property shared by most human beings, which informs the very 
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possibility and actuality of ethics. It is this very fact of dignity – understood as autonomy or 
rationality on Kant’s view – that accounts for the rightness and wrongness of actions (Rachels 
&Rachels, 2015). 
Metaethics, on the other hand, asks primary questions about the project of ethics itself (Sober, 
2002). For example, we noted that normative ethics seeks to account for what actions count as 
right and wrong. Whereas normative ethics assumes the meaning and validity of the categories of 
right and wrong, metaethics does not make this assumption; rather, it makes inquiries into the 
nature of these moral categories and concepts and seeks to give an account of them or to reject 
them altogether (Sober, 2002). Some meta-ethical views account for rightness by appeal to the 
subject (ethical subjectivism or moral individualism) (Mackie, 1977). Others account for rightness 
by appeal to culture (cultural relativism) (Rachels & Rachels, 2015). Still others appeal to some 
supernatural entity like God (ethical supernaturalism or divine command theory) (Harrison, 1978; 
Idziak 1980; Wiredu, 1980). Another way to distinguish meta-ethical approaches is in terms of 
whether they take a naturalist or non-naturalist approach. The naturalist approach appeals to some 
physical property to account for morality, such as rationality, pleasure, sympathy or empathy 
(Kymlicka, 1990; Metz, 2007a). A non-naturalist approach appeals to non-scientific or even 
spiritual properties to account for morality (Moore, 1903; Ball, 1988; Magesa, 1997). 
Applied ethics refers to the branch of ethics that concerns itself with practical problems 
(Beauchamp, 2003). These problems arise in different contexts of human existence. Some occur 
in business (business ethics) (Murove, 2009); some issues pertain to the beginning and end of life 
(bioethics) (Sulmasy, 2008); some arise in the context of non-human life and the environment 
(environmental ethics) (Singer, 1972; 1993). Applied ethics draws from normative ethics and 
metaethics to find answers to these pressing questions. It is interesting to note that the question of 
the value associated with dead human bodies is an applied ethics question that falls under bioethics 
or medical ethics – I will say more on this aspect of the problem in the concluding chapter. 
Until now, I have said nothing about how Levinas approaches ethics or moral philosophy. To begin 
with, it is important to recognise that Levinas rejects the standard approach to ethics. There are 
certain features that characterise this approach in the Western tradition. Firstly, it takes the volition 
and intentions of the moral agent to be definitive or essential for morality. On this view, we cannot 
talk of morality unless we presuppose the primacy of the choice and intentions of the moral agent. 
On Levinas’ view, however, the category of ethics pre-dates choice and intention (Peperzak, 1993; 
Filipovic, 2011). In some sense, we do not choose to be ethical, or our intention on the matter does 
not count for much. The underlying logic of Levinas’ approach to ethics is that we simply gain 
awareness of the (ethical) truth, which remains true whether we are aware of it or not – it is the 
imposing presence of the Other that creates responsibilities for us quite besides the activation of 
our volitions or intentions. Choices and intentions, or lack thereof, do not release us from the 
domain and demands of morality, which is understood as an inescapable responsibility that we 
have towards the Other. The de-prioritisation of choice and intention differs markedly from 
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Husserl’s phenomenology which takes intention to be its essential constituent (Walsh, 1989). In 
this light, choice and intentions are the aftermath of an ethics that is already present in the face of 
the Other towering over me. 
The second facet of ethics in Levinas’ philosophical thinking reveals how it parts ways with the 
standard approach. The standard approach to ethics, in some sense, grounds it on some ontological 
features, typically of human nature. Ethics in the standard approach dominant in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition grounds it on features of human nature that are shared by human beings. For example, 
Kant grounds his ethical system on rationality/autonomy; Singer grounds it on the capacity to 
suffer or enjoy; Nussbaum grounds it on basic capabilities; Mbiti grounds it on certain abilities to 
participate in social relationships; and so on (Kant, 1785/1996; Mbiti, 1969; Singer, 2009; 
Nussbaum, 2011). The ontological features of human nature become central in accounting for 
normative ethics, an account of dignity and applied ethics. Some of these accounts will take either 
a religious or natural orientation, which are also, in an important sense, ontological considerations. 
Levinas’ approach to ethics takes a different orientation altogether: 
His use of the term ‘ethics' is but the most generative example of this rhetorical doubling. 
Here a concept traditionally reserved for philosophically formed discussions of human 
agency and social order is utilized to refer to a non-referential, pre-thetic… event – an event 
prior to, or outside of, the discourse of norms with which the term ethics is traditionally 
associated. This 'ethics' is an ethics of another order, though it remains ethics to Levinas 
(Avram, 1996: 264). 
Here, we are informed that for Levinas the idea of ethics takes a different order altogether from 
the one I explained above. The word ‘ethics’ in Levinas does not refer to norms, which in turn 
relate to some facet of human nature like sentience or rationality or capabilities. It is important to 
notice that ethics is imagined as an event that is prior to and outside of norms that relate to human 
nature. In other words, to fixate ethics on norms (connected with human nature) is to miss what is 
distinctive and definitive about it in the first place. 
It is important to underscore the fact that ethics, in Levinas’ sense, is non-referential or pre-thetic. 
If one associates ethics with norms and some facet of human nature, then it is essentially referential 
since you can point to this and that ontological feature as its basis. An ethics that can so ‘refer’ is 
problematic since it is shallow and reduces the irreducible to the domain of nature, which 
ultimately opens the door for the violation of the Other – I will say more on this below. Ethics is 
pre-thetic insofar, as in some sense, it escapes language. In other words, human language cannot 
sufficiently capture ethics in a fundamental way without violating its essence. 
In fact, we are also informed that “Levinas instructs us that the Other obligates oneself before 
being thematized, and maintains that the capacities of the Other are irrelevant to my obligation to 
give the Other ethical consideration” (Davy, 2007: 41). This quotation brings two points forth in 
relation to the nature of ethics. Firstly, the obligation associated with the Other do not require nor 
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emerge from our thematization of her and her ontological identity. The Other, without 
thematization, is generative of duties towards us. The presence of the Other, just as she is – that is, 
without any ontological analysis of her nature – in some sense generates obligations. Secondly, we 
are informed that the capacities of the Other are irrelevant to the project of ethics. Practically, 
consider an ethical system that takes capacities seriously, like that of Kant, which is based on 
rationality. On this view, the mentally disabled are outside of the scope of ethics. 
The conclusion of this terse analysis of Levinas’ approach to ethics should be clear. Ethics does 
not arise out of or in relation to certain shared ontological features of human nature like the soul, 
rationality, basic capabilities, happiness or pleasure, as is common in Western moral philosophy. 
Ethics is prior to and outside of these ontological features and their thematization. Ethics, properly 
understood, is prior to and beyond all norms. It should follow that Levinas’ approach to ethics is 
anti-thetical to the idea of moral status, which is commonly used in moral philosophy to 
conceptualise the value of things and the duties we owe to them (DeGrazia, 2008; Behrens, 2011). 
We can see then that moral status is a function of certain ontological features that secure 
recognition and respect for the moral patient (Darwall, 1977; Toscano, 2011). It is in virtue of 
possessing these features that the entity in question is one towards which we have responsibilities 
and rights (Toscano, 2011). 
If indeed Levinas refuses to base ethics on norms and human nature, it should follow that he takes 
a different approach than the one common in moral philosophy. Moreover, we can expect a 
different approach to the idea of dignity since here it will not be based on some facet of human 
nature. The question that might arise is why Levinas is opposed to norms as definitive of ethics 
and why he resists attempts to ground it on certain ontological features of human nature, as is 
common in moral philosophy. Levinas expresses this concern: 
A calling into question of the Same – which cannot occur within the egoistic spontaneity 
of the Same – is brought about by the Other. We name this calling into question of my 
spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his 
irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a 
calling into question of my spontaneity as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the 
welcoming of the Other by the Same, of the Other by Me, is concretely produced as the 
calling into question of the Same by the Other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the 
critical essence of knowledge (Levinas, 1969/2002: 43). 
Filipovic (2011: 64) comments on a similar concern: 
A genuine concern that Western philosophy has never done justice to the heterogeneity and 
difference of the other but has privileged the tyranny of the Same that denies the autonomy 
and dignity of the other person takes its most systematic expression in Totality and Infinity. 
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What he is criticising is the assumption that the I and the Other are the same. His concern is that 
Western philosophy builds its moral knowledge on the “imperialism of the same” (Levinas, 
1969/2002: 87). The essence of the criticism is that Western philosophy has the weakness of failing 
to appreciate the radical difference that characterises the Other. This criticism is appropriate if 
ethics as commonly formulated assumes our sameness because we supposedly share the feature of 
the soul, rationality or whatever else the theorist takes to be primary. It is this thematization of 
sameness, of grounding ethics in some ontology, that explains the reductive tendency of under-
appreciating the radical difference of the Other. For Levinas, the project of ethics ought to 
emphasise the distinctness, separateness and superiority of the Other, which will not be possible 
as long as our theorising about ethics is under the imperialism of sameness. Opposed to sameness 
as a premise from which to conceptualise ethics, Levinas is reported to approach ethics as follows: 
Levinas argued that it is ethics that should be so conceived [as first philosophy]. But rather 
than formulating an ethical theory, Levinas developed his philosophy in opposition to both 
these aforementioned approaches [ontology-based approaches]. It takes the form of a 
description and interpretation of the event of encountering another person. Giving rise to 
spontaneous acts of responsibility for others, the encounter unfolds, according to Levinas, 
at a precognitive level, thanks to what he called our embodied “sensibility”. That is why a 
phenomenology of intersubjective responsibility would be ‘first’ philosophy; viz., in the 
sense of interpretively reconstructing a level of experience preclusive to both reflective 
activity and practical interests (Bergo, 2019: n.p). 
Several things are worth noting about how Levinas approaches the discourse on ethics. He believes 
that ethics, and not metaphysics or ontology – as has been claimed by some of the leading 
philosophers like Kant and Heidegger – ought to be the first philosophy. There is also the rejection 
of basing ethics on certain ontological considerations as is common, as noted above, in moral 
philosophy. We are further informed that ethics takes the form of the description and interpretation 
of the event of encountering the Other. This facet points to the experiential nature of ethics – ethics 
takes place in the possible or actual encounter with the Other. Talk of the encounter captures the 
intersubjective nature of ethics. Ethics on Levinas’ approach involves phenomenological analysis 
because it happens at a pre-cognitive level and is not concerned with norms or ontology. Rather, 
it is concerned with constructively interpreting experience related to the encounter with the Other. 
Below, I proceed to further reflect on the Levinas ethics. 
6.3 Levinas’ Ethics: Involuntary Egocentrism 
To begin with, it is important to appreciate that Levinas is totally opposed to the egotism that is a 
characteristic feature of some of the leading approaches to ethics. One such approach is represented 
in the discourse on human rights. At the heart of this discourse is the right of each individual to 
life, survival and even prosperity. The idea that each person counts equally and that should there 
be a conflict between my needs and those of another, I should – given my right to life – prioritise 
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myself, is central. This commitment to the self (egotism) and its life is a serious moral limitation 
for Levinas. To reveal the limitation of this approach to ethics one simply has to remember that 
most introductions to the discourse on ethics ground it on evading the Hobbesian state of nature, 
where each individual only seeks to secure their own life and interests (Pojman, 2002). If we were 
to regress to the state of nature, society (let alone, just society) becomes impossible, as each person 
would be engaged in the relentless pursuit of their own interests at any cost to any other (Wiredu, 
1996).  
For Levinas, the best approach to ethics ought to jettison “… its initial self-absorbed attachment 
to existence” (De Voss, 2006: 2). This self-absorbed-and-concerned approach to ethics is 
characterised by what Rudi Visker refers to as “involuntary egocentrism” (2014: 2): 
This involuntary egocentrism… is what troubles Levinas and motivates him to look for a 
Good beyond being [metaphysics], a God “otherwise than being.” Such a good would not 
be good-for-me; it would break with the law of being and sever the ties that bind me to my 
being by providing me with an orientation that stands perpendicular to the one operative in 
my being – the struggle for my own existence, my own survival, in other words, my effort 
to be, my conatus essendi. 
Common sense morality takes self-concern to be an essential feature of any robust ethical system. 
In fact, most moral systems consider ethical self-concern as so obvious a feature as to require no 
justification. This is because of the supposition that we cannot help others without first helping 
ourselves (Gyekye, 2004). Levinas searches for the good beyond the self and its desires (conatus). 
His ethical approach problematises the laws of my being (ontology) and its driving desires to 
prioritise the self and its so-called human rights. Ethics, at its heart involves severing the chords 
that enslave me to myself (involuntary egocentrism). One of the central tasks of ethics involves 
the idea of escape – escape from this involuntary egocentrism, which, in a sense, represents a 
prison. The duty of ethics is to escape its enslaving power over my own life. This talk of escape 
can be captured in terms of transcendence. We are transcending the self (conatus essendi) towards 
the good. Levinas makes the following comment about escape: 
Escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably 
binding of chains, the fact that the I is oneself (Levinas, 1935/2003:1). 
The central focus of my existence is myself – the ‘I’, or ‘me’. Daily the I reifies itself as the centre 
of my human existence. I am aware and connected to what I need to survive and thrive biologically 
and socially without even thinking about it – this process is spontaneous. It is this connection to 
myself as a needing being or one that has been conceptualised as having certain inalienable rights, 
which serve as the most radical and unalterably binding enslavement that captures the essence of 
my existence as a bio-social being. Ethics, on Levinas view, constitutes a delinking from our 
domination by our needs and places our focus “toward something other [than] ourselves” 
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(1935/2003: 3). The point that emerges seems to be that ethics – the good – is in an important sense 
beyond my desires, needs, preferences and rights. It is in the escape or transcendence that 
humanity, in the ethical sense, is possible. For as long as I am a servant of my needs and desires, 
I remain at the level of animality and oppression of being. 
The good finds its possibility and its expression outside of me. It is ever present in the face of the 
Other. Levinas informs us that the face-to-face relationship or encounter is “straightforwardly 
ethical” (1935/2003: 3). How is the face-to-face encounter ethical? 
Ethics, for Levinas, begins in a “face to face” encounter with the other person that cannot 
be reduced to a symmetrical relationship or to a totality of shared concepts, such as the 
attachments of racial, ethnic, cultural or other belonging. I am obligated to the other person 
not because we are alike but precisely and insofar the other is infinitely heterogeneous to 
me. If ethics, as Levinas sees it, begins in the encounter with the other person who is always 
beyond and more than I can conceive, then any attempt at ‘totalization’ is inevitably 
reductive and unethical because it strips the other of the very thing that makes them unique. 
Furthermore, the other person as the source of my moral obligations is due my concern 
without considering any reciprocity on their behalf (Filipovic, 2011: 65). 
This quotation encapsulates various facets that constitutes Levinas’ ethics, which need unfolding. 
In Levinas’ ethics, emphasis is placed on the face-to-face encounter with the Other. That is, ethics 
is located outside of the individual in the fullest sense of the term. Ethics is totally outside and 
beyond the self; the Other is outside of the individual. The Other is not another me – she is not like 
me. The Other is her own person completely separate and different from me. The emphasis on 
difference is important as it problematises the tendency to reduce the Other to the “imperialism of 
the same”. Yes, I may share certain features with the Other, like belonging to the same race or 
ethnic group. But these shared categories do not begin to erode the radical difference that attaches 
to the Other. The problem that Levinas’ ethics is unfolding is what he calls totality. Human beings 
have a tendency to lose the essential difference of the Other by reducing the Other to sameness. 
The search for totality is a feature of Greek philosophy, that sought to understand how all things 
hang together, and to find the common essence defining them all (De Voss, 2006). 
It is in the discourse of totality that the violation of the other takes place, where her radical 
difference or alterity is buried under the sand of sameness. The aim of ethics, according to Levinas, 
is the “breach of totality”, which is important for underscoring the radical heterogeneity of 
individuals (2003: 35). That is, the fact that each individual is unlike another means that they each 
is characterised by radical difference. However, if each individual is left all him/herself, he/she 
will tend to see the world in totalising ways that will violate the humanity and difference of the 
Other. It is for this reason that the face-to-face encounter is the essence of ethics. Ethics begins 
when we look beyond the self into the face of the Other.  
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The relationship with the Other is characterised by several important features. Firstly, the face-to-
face encounter with the Other is not symmetrical. There is no thought of equality in Levinas’ ethics 
– that concept so germane and dominant in the discourse of rights (see Rosen, 2012). The aim of 
this ethical system is not social egalitarianism at all. The Other enjoys a superior status – she is 
beyond and more than I can ever conceive. 
All of the above sounds abstract; what does it mean in simple terms? Simply put, the individual is 
caught up in what he/she is. He/she sees the world and interprets it from his/her own gaze, and has 
no other. This is the problem of egotism. The tendency has been to reduce the Other or thematise 
her to sameness. The goal of ethics is to resist this kind of reduction – to appreciate the Other in 
her radical difference. The goal of the moral agent is to transcend him/herself, to go out of 
him/herself, and discover the good in the Other. The Other – her face – creates obligations for the 
moral agent. The act of escape from the self, the struggle to transcend involuntary egocentrism, is 
important in ethics as it ushers the individual into true humanity. True humanity begins when we 
leave behind what we may call animality – a state where we are controlled by our own survival 
and rights. Humanity begins when we behold the radical difference of the Other as the source of 
the good. Visker (2014: 6) captures the point about true humanity in this fashion: 
Humanity only starts when that spontaneity is thrown into question, and when, instead of 
a natural inclination to whatever is necessary for one’s survival, there is no room for a 
hesitation: why me and not him? Levinas often refers to the story of Cain and Abel: the 
natural response of Cain to a question that he took to be rhetorical – “Am I my brother’s 
keeper?” – is invalidated by the voice of his Creator. For this is indeed what creation is 
about: the orientation of nature, its detachment from its natural self-orientation, the loss of 
innocence. 
Ethics begins when we start doubting the importance and force of the natural inclination to 
prioritise our own survival and existence – when we fundamentally question or hesitate to make 
the self the centre of focus. Ethics begins at this point of self-detachment and self-absorption. A 
genuine human existence, in the ethical sense, “… means I am tied to and vowed to the other 
before I am tied to and vowed to myself” (Visker, 2014: 15). The ethical system imagined here 
seems to be characterised by some kind of self-sacrifice. One commentator makes this observation 
about sacrifice in relation to Levinas ethics in this way: 
To be ethical exceeds even the concept of sacrifice, strictly speaking, which still implies 
economy: one sacrifices in order to appease the gods, to get in their good graces and ensure 
a future of plenty, for instance. Self-sacrifice that the rigour of the ethical relation requires 
is shorn of any hope of martyrdom for the Ego, it is beyond “hope for self”. a pure being-




The idea of sacrifice fails to capture the ideals of ethics associated with Levinas’ ethics. Usually, 
in religious and political spaces, individuals sacrifice themselves for the sake of some hope or 
change in society. There is some good and even good for the one doing the sacrificing. The self 
and some personal good is residual even in the gesture of sacrifice. In Levinas ethics, there is a 
total abandonment of the self and what is ‘good’ for it. The preoccupation is entirely invested in 
the good – a pure being-for-the-other. The Other is treated as the most-high that requires ethical 
devotion insofar as the responsibilities we have towards her are inescapable. My humanity is 
revealed in my detaching from myself to exercise my responsibility towards the Other. She is not 
my equal, she is above and beyond me. I have unlimited responsibilities towards her. 
6.4 Levinas’ Ethics: The Face of the Other 
I have not yet directly made any comment about the idea of the face itself. I have not reflected on 
what it represents and its implications for ethics. To unfold the idea of the face, I begin by drawing 
our attention to these words by Levinas: 
Whereas a phenomenon is already, in whatever respect, an image, a captive manifestation 
of its plastic and mute form, the epiphany of a face is alive. Its life consists in undoing the 
form... The Other who manifests himself in a face as it breaks through his own plastic 
essence, like a being who opens the window on which its own image was already taking 
form. His presence consists in divesting himself of the form which does already manifest 
him. His manifestation is a surplus over the inevitable paralysis of manifestation. This is 
what the formulation ‘the face speaks’ expresses. (Levinas et al., 1996: 53).  
Levinas draws a distinction between form and face. The form or visage is what we see when we 
encounter and behold another person. In the light of the distinction between form and face, it is 
important to recognise that the face is “irreducible to its physiognomy or morphological features, 
its colour or physical properties. The significance of the face transcends any of these things” 
(Gallagher, 2012: 1). The face is beyond what we see with our eyes – what we see is its form only. 
What we know is that the face is associated with being alive, it undoes the form (visage); the form 
is a plastic essence or a window through which the face reveals itself and speaks. Even the 
revelation through the visage is not adequate to capture the face. The face represents infinity – that 
beyond the capture of perception and vision. The face refuses to be thematised in any form. In fact, 
it is often reported to interrupt thematization as a this or that. It is uncontainable and unknowable; 
we only see traces of it as it reveals itself through the form or window or plastic essence of the 
form (visage). The face represents the total rejection of sameness or totality, it represents the 
radical difference of the other that requires absolute attention and responsibility. 
Another important feature associated with the face is captured in terms of the expression “the face 
speaks”. In fact, the idea that the face speaks calls to mind the distinction between saying and said 
(De Voss, 2006: 13). It is for this reason that Levinas states that “‘There is a commandment in the 
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appearance of the face [of the Other], as if a master spoke to me…” (Levinas, 1982: 89). Levinas 
likens the voice (the saying) of the face to the commandment of the “Most-High” (1982: 89). This 
is why he speaks of the saying of the face in terms of the authority of the voice of the master. Its 
authority is peremptory; it is disruptive and requires absolute responsiveness and responsibility. It 
is an unbreakable responsibility that it commands. Levinas informs us that “The face is what 
forbids us to kill – “thou shall not kill”’ (1982: 86). The face says something to us, it demands 
something of us – the expression ‘thou shall not kill’ calls us to responsibility and service to the 
Other. Hence, we are informed: 
What is important in ethical relations is that the Other expresses infinity, that the Other 
teaches, and that the Other can provoke oneself to ethics… ethics be given through the 
speech of a human face (Davy, 2007: 40). 
The face of the Other represents infinity, which serves as the basis for why I owe her unending 
and inescapable responsibility. 
In sum, above we noted that ethics revolves around the responsibilities owed to the Other due to 
her infinity. The relation to the Other, her face, embodies demands or commands that impose 
responsibility to me. I must respond to the Other because she embodies the Good and the only way 
to realise the ethical.  
6.5 Levinas’ Conception of Dignity 
Below, I aim to uncover Levinas’ conception of dignity. To do so, I will rely on the essay by Visker 
(2014) “The Inhuman Core of Human Dignity: Levinas and Beyond”. I draw from this specific 
essay because it is one of the few that attempts to extract a conception of dignity from Levinas’ 
ethics. This consideration is important for two major reasons. The writings of Levinas are 
committed to the idea of and ideals associated with the discourse on rights and seek to make a 
theoretical intervention and contribution to this discourse. Given that most scholars of rights 
associate the idea of dignity with that of rights, it is not far-fetched to assume that the idea of 
dignity can be extracted from Levinas’ ethics (Habermas, 2010). Secondly, the essay in question 
aims to perform such a theoretical extraction or reconstruction, which I believe will be useful in 
assisting me to reach a conclusion on the ethical condition, or lack thereof, of the dead human 
body. 
To begin with, Visker points out that the idea of dignity does not appear in Levinas’ ethics. Visker 
observes that since Levinas is concerned with the poor, vulnerable and marginalised in society, we 
can infer that dignity is its unspecified focus. She hastens to point out, however, that the idea of 
dignity operative in Levinas’ ethics will not be the same as that which is dominant in Western 
moral philosophy. Remember, the tendency in this tradition of philosophy is to account for it by 
appeal to “certain characteristics, like intelligence or the ability to suffer” (Visker, 2014: 7).  
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Accounting for dignity in this way might open up the discourse on dignity and rights to the 
accusation of speciesism, which she seems to believe is one that ought to be avoided if we seek to 
offer a robust account of rights. In her view, the central question in the discourse on rights centres 
around what it means to be human in the morally loaded and relevant sense. This question, as 
suggested above, cannot be answered by selecting this or that feature of human nature – which 
amounts to the imperialism of sameness. This is the problem for Levinas for two reasons. Firstly, 
it falls victim to the charge of speciesism and it also fails to grasp the infinity associated with the 
Other. The essence of Levinas’ ethics on dignity is that it “refuses to derive human dignity from 
the presence of certain generic characteristics” (Visker, 2014: 3). Dignity must be accounted for 
differently. 
Visker believes that Levinas accounts for humanity or dignity by looking beyond the self: 
The concrete way in which the Good announces itself to me is through what Levinas calls 
the “face of the other.” That other is the bearer of a dignity more important than my own. 
He or she demands my respect and, by that demand, lifts me out of nature and quite literally 
humanizes me. The other’s appeal somehow seems to have the power to detach me from 
my being and to interrupt my conatus (2014: 9). 
Humanity in the sense relevant and important in the discourse of dignity is a function of detaching 
from myself in a way that my desire to survive and serve myself no longer controls me. My 
ontology is no longer in charge. Something external and more powerful is the force that draws me 
out of myself: another’s dignity. Her dignity is more important than my own. The idea of another’s 
dignity being more important than my own is important because it disrupts the natural association 
of dignity with the equalisation of moral patients. The idea of dignity in Levinas’ ethics is 
asymmetrical – the Other is higher, superior, my master. As I attend to the Other in her infinity, I 
am humanised, that is, I ‘gain’ dignity. My dignity (humanity) is subservient to the Other. 
In this sense, my own humanity/dignity is external to me; I derive it from the Other. Hence, Visker 
(2014: 9) informs us that “The answer lies in Levinas’ version of human dignity – the dignity of 
the other to whom I owe my own dignity, my becoming human”. I owe my humanity/dignity to 
the Other by becoming human, which requires that I detach from myself. What is the source of the 
dignity of the Other in Levinas’ ethics? Visker (2014: 8) informs us that “[t]he name for that 
dignity of the other is the face, which Levinas distinguishes from the other’s visage, perceptible 
form, role, and function”. The face captures the idea of dignity. Visker (2014: 11) makes this 
discussion of dignity concrete: 
The opposition between the face and the form rests on a theory of transcendence, itself 
founded on an exclusive alternative between transcendence and immanence. Racism or 
sexism, for example, are attempts to immanentize the other, by reducing the other’s face to 
his or her form and debasing the other to a mere exemplar in a species. They disrespect the 
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other by figuring him, mistaking the window for the one behind it. This disrespect is an 
attack on the other’s dignity, a denial of the “height that ordains being”. 
The idea of dignity stands in complete opposition to totalisation or “the imperialism of the same”. 
The face operates on the logic of the infinite. The Other is essentially mysterious and irreducible, 
she is her own self in a way that is not completely accessible or knowable. Scholars of dignity and 
rights agree that racism and sexism embody the egregious violation of human rights because they 
tend to dehumanise individuals. In the common discourse of dignity, these attitudes are 
dehumanising since they fail to respect those features of human nature that are essential for the 
humanity and thriving of others. Levinas would reject this explanation for why sexism and racism 
are dehumanising and unethical. The reason for that rejection resides in the fact that these kinds of 
explanation fall within the logic of the imperialism of the same, which refuses to realise that no 
other individual is ever the same as the Other. Levinas insists that I am this human being, I am 
incomparable or assimilable to my own species. 
He would account for the dehumanisation of racism and sexism by appeal to the fact that it reduces 
a human being to her mere form – her race or gender. It totalises her, and it fails to appreciate the 
radical alterity and unknowable status of her humanity – those aspects of her that inspire and 
engender inescapability responsibility for the moral agent. Visker (2014: 12) captures this point as 
follows: 
Their dignity is linked to their who-ness, and their corollary status of exceeding their form 
(their what-ness). It is this who-ness that ethically forbids my treating them as if they were 
things—though such a reduction remains possible, it is a reduction and as such a failure to 
respond to humans in a way appropriate to their status. It is an injustice. Further, it belongs 
to the structure of this ethical resistance by the other to only be able to appeal to my help 
and, thereby, to situate me in an ethical horizon where my willingly ignoring that appeal 
remains, to be sure, possible but will nonetheless be qualified in the terms of that horizon: 
it will be an irresponsibility, a failure on my part to respond. 
The distinction that captures the essence of dignity is that of who-ness as opposed to the ontological 
idea of what-ness. In other words, the what-ness of being black, female or homosexual is irrelevant 
in the ethical discourse since it is reductive in its nature – it conflates the infinity of the face with 
its form. It is the who-ness that sets ethical limits over how we may or may not treat the Other. 
The who-ness of the other forbids the reduction of the Other to her form and it imposes 
responsibilities towards her. 
In sum, the view of dignity found in Levinas’ work differs significantly from the standard 
conception of dignity found in the literature. In the Western tradition, dignity is based on certain 
ontological features. Theories of dignity are also grounded on its equalising function, where they 
account for it by the mere possession of certain ontological features with no consideration placed 
on their use. On the contrary, on Levinas’ view, dignity is in the face of the Other that resists 
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thematization and disrupts all efforts of totalisation. The face of the Other reveals her height, her 
“Most-High” status as that which cannot be exhausted and is unknowable. The face of Other 
commands and demands respect. The humanity of the moral agent is dependent on or even derived 
from the Other, which requires that I respond and be responsible to the Other as my master. Her 
dignity is greater than my own. 
This account of dignity might sound mightily abstract and strange to those that are familiar with 
the common ontology-based accounts of dignity and rights in the Western tradition. I believe that 
an essay by Hughes (2011) entitled ‘The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’ offers us a useful way to make sense of Levinas’ conception of dignity. Hughes 
invokes two important concepts to account for the idea of dignity. The first idea is that we should 
understand dignity as intrinsically heuristic concept (2011: 8). 
To say that a given word functions as an intrinsically heuristic concept means that it refers 
to an intelligible reality of which we have some understanding, but whose full or complete 
content remains, and will always remain to some degree, unknown to us. 
Some concept or symbol is heuristic insofar as “it invites, and serves in, the effort of discovery” 
(2011: 8). We have some sense of the meaning of the concept of dignity but we are always 
conscious of the fact that our knowledge of it is incomplete. The more we encounter this concept, 
the more we gain new dimensions of knowledge of it, but we will never get to a point where we 
can say that we have exhausted it. One useful way to make sense of Levinas’ talk of the face in 
terms of it being intrinsically heuristic is to acknowledge that we have a sense of the Other, but 
that it is not and can never be complete. It has both a knowable and unknowable dimension. 
The second idea is also connected to the denial that dignity is not to be accounted for by appeal to 
some capacities or properties. In fact, it invokes the dimension of transcendence to account for 
dignity. The idea of transcendence is not here understood as a religious or a theological term, it 
resonates with the refusal to totalise or submerge the Other under the imperialism of the same. 
This comment is informative in its explanation of the idea of transcendence connected with 
dignity: 
[T]he concept of transcendence is in fact open-ended; its meaning-content is scarcely filled 
in; it is an intrinsically heuristic concept par excellence. It is non-doctrinal and non-religion 
specific; properly understood, it is acceptable even to the agnostic, since it "enables us to 
acknowledge the mystery of our origins without involving ourselves in [any] doctrinal or 
ecclesiastical commitments (Hughes 2011: 17). 
The idea of transcendence thus captures another important facet of the idea of an intrinsically 
heuristic concept. It allows us to accept the mystery associated with the fact of being human 
without falling into the trap of seeking theological or secular recourse. Through theological 
recourse we would reduce a human being to the image of God – explaining a mystery by appealing 
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to a superstitious speculation, which leads us nowhere in terms of comprehending human beings. 
Secularly we might understand a human as a completely material object, which would open up a 
path of totalisation. The idea of transcendence associated with being human and human dignity is 
ultimately unknowable. It is the mysterious aspect of human existence that allows us to see its 
“incalculable and irreplaceable worth” (2011: 14). From these considerations, Hughes (2011: 20) 
makes the following observation: 
[The idea of transcendence] serves a politically protective function by grounding human 
dignity in a reality beyond all differences of race, class, gender, and ethnicity. It guards the 
“unconditionality” of personal dignity and thus “stands in the way of the crime human 
beings have committed in countless forms throughout history – the crime underlying all 
crime – that of reducing the essential human being to an accidental manifestation: to the 
slave, the barbarian, the heretic, the worker, the capitalist, the Jew, the black.” It reveals 
the immorality of scapegoating and dehumanization of every kind, by indicating that the 
essential worth of any person lies beyond all distinguishing biological and social 
characteristic. 
Appreciating the idea of transcendence and idea of intrinsically heuristic concepts secures the 
unconditionality of human dignity and rights in the truest sense. If one grounds dignity in 
rationality as a feature of human nature, then dignity is conditional. If one however admits the 
essentially unknowable nature of human beings, then one accepts that there is a mystery that 
attends the fact of being and can thus truly appreciate the unconditional status of dignity. I believe 
this unconditional status can also secure a different account of human equality. I hope this has 
provided a useful means of grasping Levinas’ conception of dignity as embodying the knowable 
and unknowable. Below, I apply this conception of dignity to the question of dead human bodies. 
6.6 Levinas’ Ethics and Dead Human Bodies 
Here, I aim to answer the primary question of this chapter – do dead human bodies have moral 
status in the light of Levinas’ conception of dignity? The important question revolves around the 
possibility of entering into a face-to-face encounter or relationship with a dead human body. In my 
view, death is an event that reduces the dead human body to a form, in Levinas’ sense. One 
becomes a mere window, a visage with no possibility of communicating or embodying the infinite 
in its unknowable status. Death precludes all possibilities of transcendence since the one who is 
dead has been reduced to a status of what-ness with no possibility of unknowable who-ness. The 
dead person can no longer be a commander of responsibility – it cannot be the Other. 
If the above analysis on the form status of the cadaver is true, it implies that we should never 
consider ourselves to have any direct responsibilities towards human corpses. The dead body may 
retain interests perhaps only to the student of pathological anatomy as Heidegger (1962: 282) puts 
it, “who may address it as the cobbler does to the shoe or the butcher does to a slab of meat”. 
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Against this view, however, dead human bodies are usually treated differently, not simply as tools. 
In his ‘Clinical Anatomy’ paper, Jones (2016: 46) observes that: 
The dead human body, with its reminder of what we will one day become, and memories 
it enshrines of loved ones who are no longer with us, is inevitably an object of fascination. 
Whether it is considered as an object of veneration or pity, whether forbidding or macabre, 
a reminder of death or an educational tool, the dead human body invites attention. 
Drew Dalton (2018: 68), agrees that very few of us encounter the dead human body as if it were 
simply an object no different from a pen. In reality, even the student of anatomy takes a while to 
get used to the appearance of a human corpse – to be able to see it as a corporeal thing like a pen 
or table (Dalton, 2018: 68). According to Dalton (2018: 68), the response that most of us have to 
the presence of a cadaver is anxiety, disgust, revulsion and dread, and – unlike the pen or table – 
it does not relinquish our attention but demands it. 
Naturally, most people are inclined to think that there is something fundamentally different about 
the nature of the dead human body which distinguishes it from other simple objects like a pen. We 
believe this to the extent of suggesting that we have some direct duty to the dead body. But if such 
a duty would arise it would be based on remembrance of the past state of the infinity of the dead 
human being. It is possibly in respect of this history that one can ‘respect’ the dead human body – 
which is now just a form lacking mystery and possibility. However, this kind of respect is a weak 
one since it does not impose inescapable obligations on us. Death reduces the individual to a form 
and, once dead, the individual is permanently silenced. In this light, we can conclude that we do 
not have any responsibility, in the strictest ethical sense, towards dead human bodies. Any 
responsibility would be a function of memory, it would be weak, rather than the force of a towering 
face of the “Most-High” making demands of us. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored one influential account of phenomenological ethics to reflect on the 
question whether we have any duties towards dead human bodies. I began the chapter by clarifying 
how Levinas understands the project and nature of ethics in a way that is distinct from standard 
Western parlance. Levinas’ ethics is engendered in the face-to-face encounter with the Other. In 
this fashion, ethics is a description and interpretation of this encounter. I elaborated on the 
importance of escape or transcendence as the beginning of ethics, or humanity. Ethics begins when 
the individual detaches from him/herself by making the Other his/her responsibility and focus. I 
proceeded to give an account of dignity by appeal to the face, where dignity is found in the Other 
insofar as her face embodies infinity. In the final analysis, I concluded that dead human bodies are 
nothing but form. Since being dead implies being reduced to form it should follow that dead human 




Chapter 7: The Ethics of Care and the Moral Status of Dead Bodies 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I seek to explore whether the ethical resources and approaches characteristic of care 
ethics can provide us with some vital insights about our putative moral duties towards dead human 
bodies. We should remember that the most important resource we use to determine our moral 
duties towards cadavers – direct or indirect – is the concept of moral status or dignity. In this 
chapter, I will be exploring and expounding the conception of dignity inherent in care ethics or, at 
least, plausible forms of it. In the final analysis, roughly, care ethics grounds dignity in our ability 
or distinctive power to care for and receive care from others. The ability to care is understood in 
an ontological and normative context that is essentially relational. The conclusion I will reach will 
point to the view that dead human bodies have no moral status or dignity; hence, we do not owe 
them any direct duties. 
The question one might pose at this juncture might be why I include the ethics of care as part of 
the moral investigation into dead human bodies. I include it because it has been associated with 
certain contingent features that usually escape the philosophical gaze or the interest of most 
dominant philosophical moral views. Dominant moral views in African, Western and Oriental 
traditions of philosophy tend to represent male-centred moral constructions of the world (Ruddick, 
1980; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Tronto, 1993). I believe that the fact that care ethics 
emerges largely from female scholars and is generally associated with women, either essentially 
or contingently, promises an often-neglected moral perspective that might be both revealing and 
rewarding in relation to the question facing us in this chapter and research project (Burton and 
Dunn, 2013).  
At least two general features characterise the ethics of care as a moral view. Firstly, it calls our 
attention to the centrality of social relationships in moral discourse and practice (Gilligan, 1982; 
Noddings, 1984). Dominant moral ethical views, particularly in the West, generally do not 
consider social relationships as a vital component of a moral life. One of the highly prized values 
in these moral systems is that of independence, which implies or requires distance from others – 
the idea of negative freedom. On the contrary, the ethics of care calls our attention to dependence 
and interdependence as important moral feature of human existence (Kittay, 1999). Secondly, care 
ethics tends not to function within the moral framework that relies on abstractions and 
universalism. For instance, it is common for leading moral scholars to invoke a “view from 
nowhere” or from “God’s moral perspective” or to approach morality from “behind the veil of 
ignorance” or from the moral stance of “an impartial spectator” (Rawls, 1972; Nagel, 1986; Wolf, 
1999). Instead, the ethics of care prioritises the particularity of the human situation and frames 
reality as it is found in the human condition (Burton and Dunn, 2013). Another scholar of care 
ethics, in the context of discussing care, morality and needs says this: 
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Philosophers have called man the political animal, the language animals, the tool maker, 
rational animal, even the laughing animal. To define man in this way is to define what it 
means to be human in terms of the best in us. And the worst? … To define what it means 
to be human in terms of needs is to begin, neither with the best nor the worst, but only with 
the body and what it lacks (Miller, 2012: 1). 
The starting point, Miller insists, must not be from the perspective of what is best in us, like 
rationality; nor must it be by framing morality in terms of an imaginary “state of nature” or the so-
called “veil of ignorance”. Instead, she suggests that the fact that we are bodily beings and that our 
bodies are needy should be the starting point of morality. In the same vein, she calls on us to start 
our moral theorising from the “often disregarded undesirable aspects of the human condition” like 
the body, its needs and its location in particular relationships (Miller, 2012: 2). The body of a 
human being, with both its desirable and undesirable aspects, is particular and situated in a 
particular set of social and economic relationships in which human existence is experienced and 
negotiated (Burton and Dunn, 2013). 
The second feature of this moral theory is the fact that emotions should have a place in our moral 
systems. Typically, moral accounts that emphasise independence, impartiality and rationality as 
important components tend to slight and side-line emotions as irrelevant to a moral life. Care 
ethicists, on the other hand, tend to believe that emotions are important aspects of robust human 
agency. Annette Baier (1987) urges the nurturing of moral emotions or sentimental character 
dispositions like compassion, sympathy, empathy, trust, as she considers these to be primary 
components of a moral life. Even the value of care, though not entirely emotional, must take into 
cognisance its emotion-related components (Kittay, 2005). According to Kittay (2005), the 
development of moral emotions is important because they are an important element of “dignifying 
care” or the work accompanying the idea of being “some mother’s child”. This necessarily 
involves an appropriate response for those in need of care, in terms both of actions and emotions 
– though emphasis tends to be placed on actions (Ruddick, 1980; Kittay, 2005; Miller, 2012). 
It is important to be cognisant of the limitation that attends this chapter. Since its inception in the 
1980s, care ethics is now a broad, heterogeneous and complex body of work in moral philosophy. 
I have highlighted general features of it above, but there are sharp differences in position and 
contradictions within the field. What is important is that my aim is to highlight key features of the 
ethics of care that will suffice for my goal to facilitate a conversation relating to the dignity of dead 
human beings. What follows will not be exhaustive or attempt to offer the most plausible account 
of care ethics. It will, at best, provide some important dimensions of this moral view. 
I structure the chapter as follows: In the first section, I will discuss the ethics of care. This section 
will have two components. The first component will give a sketch of the history of the emergence 
of care ethics as a moral school of thought. The second component will proceed to expound it as a 
moral account. In that section, I will discuss the view of dignity associated with care ethics. For 
the sake of giving the reader a clearer view, I will draw on the writings of Sarah Clarke Miller and 
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Eva Feder Kittay. I will conclude the chapter by applying the ethics of care view of dignity to the 
question whether it is permissible to use unclaimed cadavers in bio-medical research. 
7.2 Care Ethics as a Moral Theory 
Care ethics can be understood as emerging from general feminist concerns and movements over a 
long stretch of history dating back to the 16th century. The major concern and driving motivation 
behind the feminist movement is explained as follows: 
More specifically, the feminist… aims to understand, criticize, and correct: (1) the binary 
view of gender, (2) the privilege historically available to men, and/or (3) the ways that 
views about gender maintain oppressive social orders or practices that harm others, 
especially girls and women who historically have been subordinated, along gendered 
dimensions including sexuality and gender-identity. Since oppression often involves 
ignoring the perspectives of the marginalized, different approaches to feminist ethics have 
in common a commitment to better understand the experiences of persons oppressed in 
gendered ways (Norlock, 2019). 
Feminism as a moral and political movement emerged as a result of the oppression of women on 
the arbitrary basis of their sex and gender. The majority of moral and political views generally 
developed by men tended to privilege the male perspective and assume it as the only valid point 
of view. The established culture in society, the academy, and specifically in moral philosophy, 
ignored the experiences and voices of women. Care ethics, emerged, in part, as a response to this 
situation, and with the aim of understanding, criticising and correcting the way in which being 
“gendered” could engender biased moral views. Being gendered in this way has long been 
associated with the privilege attached to being a man and the simultaneous oppression of women 
in different spheres of society. 
The voices associated with the feminist movements can be traced at least as far back as the 17th 
century. One will notice that in the 17th century, for example, leading thinkers like Mary Astell 
and Mary Wollstonecraft raised serious issues relating to the moral and social conditions of 
women. For example, Astell challenged the society of her time concerning the question of (equal) 
access to education for women. Wollstonecraft considered questions about whether women have 
the same capacity as men to be moral agents. She is famous for raising questions concerning 
women’s rights in general, and, more specifically, the issue of universal suffrage. In subsequent 
generations, questions relating to inequity and unequal access to “income, property, sexual 
freedom, full citizenship, and enfranchisement …” were raised (Norlock, 2019). 
Scholars of the ethics of care, locate its emergence as a moral view in the 1970s and 1980s. For 
example, Virginia Held (2006), one of the leading scholars of care ethics, locates its emergence in 
the essay by Sarah Ruddick titled “Maternal Thinking”. In this essay, Ruddick associates the work 
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of the mother with a particular kind of thinking, which has not been taken into cognisance. Ruddick 
(1980: 342) makes this comment: 
The passions of maternity are so sudden, intense, and confusing that we ourselves often 
remain ignorant of the perspective, the thought that has developed from our mothering. 
Lacking pride, we have failed to deepen or articulate that thought. This paper is about the 
head of the mother. 
The suggestion here is that the role of mothering is characterised by a particular kind of thinking, 
which has not been given proper philosophical attention. We notice that the common view in the 
literature on care ethics tends to locate the history of the emergence of care ethics in works of the 
psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982) and the philosopher Nel Noddings (1984). In fact, even 
Ruddick (2009), in a footnote to one of her later articles where she reflects on “Maternal Thinking”, 
acknowledges that, among others, Gilligan and Noddings had a strong influence on the ideas she 
advanced and defended in that seminal essay. Gilligan’s (1982) views emerged as a response to 
the psychological research by Lawrence Kohlberg that focused on moral development among 
teenagers. One of the observations that emerged from Kohlberg’s research is that there is a 
difference between the moral development of boys and girls (see Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987). 
Kohlberg claimed that boys seem to develop the ability to think in terms of abstract universal rules 
and girls seem not to be able to develop this abstract universal way of approaching questions of 
morality. 
On Kohlberg’s view, this observation in relation to females’ moral development suggested an 
“aberration” and took males as the “paradigm case” of moral development (Pojman, 2002: 682). 
Gilligan’s (2002: 683) seminal and ground-breaking work “In a Different Voice” moves away 
from seeing one case as normal and another as abnormal. Rather, she insists that we should be 
observing “two moral perspectives that organise thinking in different ways” (Gilligan, 1982; 
1987). The moral perspective associated with boys is the “justice perspective” and the one 
associated with girls the “care perspective” (Gilligan, 2002: 685). The care perspective is 
associated with females that use a different frame to conceptualise and approach moral problems. 
Noddings’ major insight and contribution has been to place emphasis on the importance of caring 
relationships as essential to human existence and she has applied her moral view largely in the 
context of education (Noddings, 1984; 2002). 
Beyond Ruddick, Gilligan and Noddings, the literature also identifies the following scholars – 
Virginia Held, Eva Feder Kittay, Joan Tronto, Annette Baier and Nancy Hartsock – as among the 
pioneering contributors to the emergence and diversity of thought in the moral discourse of care 
ethics. Below, I will draw on these and other thinkers to give the reader a broad picture of care 
ethics. 
Care ethics, as the name suggests, posits care as the intrinsic or final good (Burton and Dunn, 
2013). To identify some item as intrinsically good is to locate its goodness in itself and, as a final 
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good, points us to the fact that we should value it for its own sake. Kittay (2011: 54) refers to care 
as “an indispensable, and even a central good” in morality. Raja Halwani (2003: 161) observes 
“that caring does constitute an important and essential component of moral thinking, attitude, and 
behaviour”. If care is so pivotal in this moral scheme, it means that we should be able to define it. 
However, the idea of care is an essentially contested notion, which means that there is no 
convergence on a single definition in the literature. Each scholar, depending on their project and 
view, will work with a vision of the value of care that they find to be plausible. This means that 
there are as many definitions of care as there are scholars of it. 
One useful way to approach the value of care and care ethics is to frame it in terms of what scholars 
take to be the distinctive feature of human existence that requires a caring response (Miller, 2017). 
Some scholars put emphasis on the neediness of the human condition, which involves all 
dimensions associated with and emerging as a consequence of our bodily form of existence 
(Tronto, 1993; Miller, 2012). Other scholars point us to the inevitable vulnerability of human 
existence (Ruddick, 1990). Some point us to the centrality of dependence and interdependence in 
human existence (Noddings, 1984; Kittay, 1999). Care ethics can roughly be understood as the 
positing of care and caring relationships as a response to the “tripartite characterisation” of the 
human condition of need, vulnerability and dependence (Miller, 2017: 115). Different theorists of 
care ethics will emphasise any of the three dimensions of the human condition as essential to care 
ethics, for which moral intervention is required. 
Consider also that Kittay (2011: 53) observes that the idea of care “can denote a labour, an attitude, 
or a virtue.” As a labour, care refers to the work and skills we must acquire in order to be able to 
nurture those in a situation of need. Care as an attitude refers to “a positive, affective bond and 
investment in another’s well-being” (2011: 53). Care as a virtue refers to the psychological 
disposition in which we make the interests and well-being of another a point of focus. Kittay (2011: 
53) proceeds to define care ethics in this way: “An ethic of care develops and refines the normative 
characteristics in the labour, the attitude, and the disposition”. On this view, care ethics focuses on 
the work of care that the moral agent must do for the needy. The most important component of this 
work requires that we conceive of the one doing the work (the moral agent) as a self-in-relation, 
where relationships partly constitute his/her identity (Kittay, 2011; Gilligan, 1982). The good is a 
function of positive caring relationships that nurture and secure the well-being of those in need. 
Moral harm, on this view, is generally not interpreted using the deontological framework of rights, 
which is dominant in the justice perspective. Thus, moral harm is “more the consequence of 
failures in responsibility and responsiveness” in the context of wholesome and caring relationships 
(Kittay, 2011: 53). 
As a final point on care ethics, it is important to remember that it usually takes the mother-to-child 
relationship as a model for morality (Ruddick, 1980; Kittay, 2011). This relationship has the 
following aspects. Firstly, it is a relationship of inequality – the mother is more powerful and 
empowered than the child. Care ethicists point to the fact that all human relations in fact also take 
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this unequal form. They argue that the equality contained in the perspective of justice is nothing 
but “virtual equality” (Baier, 1995: 52). The dependence relationship between the mother and child 
is taken to be a feature of human existence in all of its dimensions. As we grow through different 
stages of human development, we participate in all sorts of dynamic and complex unequal 
relationships with individuals with differing levels of empowerment, neediness and vulnerability. 
The second dimension of the mother-to-child model is the fact that the mother has a responsibility 
to care for the needs of the child and ensure that she secures the well-being of the child. The 
mother-to-child relationship is maternalistic, but when it comes to adults, care ethics emphasises 
a cooperative and empathetic model for responding to moral issues (Kittay, 2011). The third aspect 
is the intimate, particular and partial character of caring relationships (Rachels & Rachels, 2010). 
This third dimension also has implications for the kinds of values that tend to characterise this 
moral view – values that are emphasised are those related to the fact of interdependence such as 
compassion, empathy and so on. It is for this reason that some scholars associate care ethics with 
virtue ethics (Halwani, 2003). Finally: 
The moral theory known as “the ethics of care” implies that there is moral significance in 
the fundamental elements of relationships and dependencies in human life. Normatively, 
care ethics seeks to maintain relationships by contextualizing and promoting the well-being 
of caregivers and care-receivers in a network of social relations (Sander-Staudt, 2020: n.p). 
Below, I discuss a conception of dignity associated with care ethics. 
7.3 The Ethics of Care and Dignity 
What intervention or contribution can the ethics of care make in the discourse of dignity in moral 
philosophy? To provide an answer to this question, I draw on the philosophical works of two 
scholars of the ethics of care: Miller and Kittay. I draw on these scholars because they have 
extensively contributed to the concept of dignity in their own philosophical works. I also draw on 
them because they invoke a relational ontology in the service of rethinking the idea of dignity. I 
will begin my philosophical analysis and expansion of the ethics of care’s conception of dignity 
with Miller’s adumbrations. Before I do so, however, I will make two general remarks. 
Scholars of care ethics enter the discourse on dignity motivated by their dissatisfaction with an 
account of it that grounds it entirely on rationality or autonomy. This dissatisfaction takes two 
forms. From one angle, the concern is that accounts of dignity that draw entirely on rationality 
leave out of the moral community many individuals that we tend to think should be part of it. The 
rationality-based conception of dignity is often accused of leaving out infants, many seriously 
cognitively impaired individuals and animals, all of whom are characterized as lacking moral 
status and dignity (Singer, 2009; Nussbaum, 2009 Kittay, 2011). By implication, on the rationality-
based view of morality or dignity we have no direct duties of respect or rights towards infants, 
mentally impaired individuals or animals. Looked at from another angle, care ethics suggests that 
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rationality-based views of dignity miss something significant about human existence that is 
essential for a plausible conception of dignity (Gilligan, 1978; Kittay, 2005). It is in this context 
that care ethicists tend to insist on the importance of caring relationships as an essential aspect of 
human existence, which escapes the attention of rationality-based moral views (Gilligan, 2002). 
I should also emphasise that most of the scholars in the moral tradition of care ethics suggest a 
marriage between it and the rationality-based morality. They propose this marriage because they 
believe it might yield a plausible account of dignity, or go beyond the parochial and non-inclusive 
tendencies of a rationality-based view (Baier, 1987; Dillon, 1992; Engster, 2004; Kittay, 2005; 
2011; Miller, 2012; 2017). It is for this reason that Carlo Leget (2013: 952) concludes: 
It is clear however that from the perspective of an ethics of care, rationality alone – whether 
in actuality or potentiality – is a criterion far too narrow. 
As a result, Leget proposes an “integrative framework” to expound a plausible conception of 
dignity. Robin Dillon (1992: 105) reminds us of the proposal made by Baier when she urges us to 
consider “a marriage of the old male and newly articulated female… moral wisdom to produce a 
new cooperative moral theory that harmonizes care and justice”. Ultimately, Dillon (1992: 108) 
argues for a “more integrative approach to moral theory and moral practice”, which operates on 
the moral logic of the “union of respect and care resources”. The integrative approach is 
propounded for the reason that it will provide us with a moral view that is both adequate and 
plausible. The adequacy of this view is that it will facilitate a healthy marriage between the care 
perspective and justice perspective, which will hopefully entail a plausible conception of dignity. 
I know that reference to the marriage between care ethics and rationality-based morality may raise 
questions about whether we have not through this proposal effaced either of the two, especially 
care ethics. This concern is both valid and complicated, and the limitation of space will not quite 
afford me an exhaustive response, let alone a convincing engagement. It suffices for now to point 
out that this union of the two approaches happens in the corrective hermeneutical frame of care 
ethics, which locates normativity ultimately in relationality, as will be seen in what follows, rather 
than merely on capacities themselves. Consider Miller’s (2012: 5) comment: 
While it may seem that Kant and care ethicists make for strange bedfellows, I develop a 
beneficial, symbiotic relationship between them. The result is the compelling features of 
the duty to care: its firm foundation, reasonable scope, and rich content. 
According to Miller, the marriage between the two results in a more robust moral account of care. 
It will have a firm foundation, reasonable scope and rich content. The point, in my view, is simple. 
Though the marriage, if we go along with this analogy, is symbiotic; its consequence is a robust 
interpretation of ethics of care that entails an attractive view of dignity. I now turn directly to 
Miller’s (2017) account of dignity. 
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7.4 Miller’s Account of Dignity 
Miller begins her articulation of a care ethics conception of dignity in her book The Ethics of Need: 
Agency, Dignity and Obligation (2012). In Reconsidering Dignity Relationally (2017), Miller 
clarifies and elaborates this conception. To clarify the intention of her contribution to the discourse 
on dignity, she makes the following remark: 
My primary aim is to move dignity in a more relational direction, drawing on care ethics 
to do so. I discuss three interventions that care ethics can make into the dignity discourse. 
The first intervention involves an understanding of the ways in which care can be 
dignifying. The second intervention examines whether the capacity to care should be 
considered a distinguishing moral power – as rationality often is – in light of which humans 
have dignity. In the third intervention, I cast dignity as a fundamentally relational concept 
and argue that relationality is constitutive not only of dignity but also of the wider 
enterprise of normativity (2017: 108). 
There are three vital points we should notice in Miller’s quotation above. Firstly, she promises a 
shift in the discourse of dignity. She proposes that dignity should be interpreted within a relational 
frame. Secondly, she proposes that care ethics will provide us with the ethical tools for a relational 
interpretation of dignity. Finally, she dares us to rethink the entire project of morality as a relational 
one. In what follows, to shed light on Miller view of dignity, I will begin by explaining how Miller 
understands the concept(s) of dignity. I will proceed to give a sense, conceptually, of the 
significance of the shift to a relational concept of dignity. I will then consider Miller’s (proposed) 
view of dignity and its meta-ethical relational grounding. 
To begin with, Miller draws a distinction between two concepts (two abstract ideas) of dignity – 
status and performative dignity. By status dignity Miller (2017: 112) is referring to the kind of 
worth associated with human beings that is not “earned”. She also refers to it as “intrinsic moral 
worth” (2017: 112). It is the kind of worth that is attributed to a human being because he/she 
possesses particular kinds of ontological capacities. Performative dignity, on the other hand, refers 
to dignity that is “recognized through moral other- and self-regard, that is, a quality that can be 
acknowledged through how others treat us morally and also through how we treat ourselves”. 
Though her intervention covers both forms of dignity, the major contribution care ethics makes 
pivots on status dignity, which she understands as a “foundational or meta-ethical concept” (2017: 
112). Status dignity is foundational or meta-ethical as it illuminates the grounds of dignity. To 
clarify what she means when she refers to status dignity as foundational or meta-ethical, she 
borrows from Stephen Darwall’s (1977) famous distinction between recognition and appraisal 
respect. She informs us that status dignity is more appreciable when we look at it in relation to 
recognition respect. Recognition respect grounds respect towards a human being, for example, in 
the light of certain distinctive ontological features of his/her nature like rationality. It is the 
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recognition of this ontological feature of a human being that imposes the demand of respect from 
moral agents. In this context, Miller (2017: 112) comments: 
What I, following others, am calling status dignity would be the proper object of the 
disposition of recognition respect. Status dignity, as essentially inherent moral worth, is 
that which one recognizes through recognition respect. 
Miller is clarifying the view that status dignity is based on ontological facts whose 
acknowledgement, on the part of the observer or moral agent, is appropriately expressed through 
recognition respect.  
The second thing I highlight is the distinction between individualist and relational conceptions of 
dignity. Roughly, the distinction between individualism and relationalism is a function of where a 
moral view locates ultimate moral value. Moral theories that operate on the moral logic of moral 
individualism locate ultimate moral value in some facts of the individual. Relational accounts, on 
the other hand, locate it in some connection between and among individuals. Kant’s account of 
dignity, for example, is a paradigm example of an individualist account because it requires us to 
respect the individual’s capacity for rationality. A relational account of dignity, on the other hand, 
will push us in the direction of grounding dignity on relationships or the ability to enter into them. 
Below, I consider how relationships might ground dignity in care ethics. 
In accounting for dignity, Miller suggests that her view “will add an emphasis on relational 
capacities and relational ontology” in accounting for dignity and morality in general (2017: 112). 
She grounds status dignity on some relational capacity – the capacity for care – and she grounds 
the entire moral landscape, normativity, in a relational ontology. She proposes care as a distinctive 
moral power that grounds human dignity. The human ability to enter, participate in and benefit 
from caring relationships should form part of a plausible conception of dignity. She defines care 
as “the distinctive capacity that humans have to perceive, understand, adopt, and advance another 
person’s self-determined ends as their own” (2017: 116). On this view, care is the distinctive 
human ability to respond to the natural neediness accompanying human existence (Miller, 2012). 
She understands fear to encompass two important aspects. On the one hand, care must involve 
making the well-being of another the focus of a caring attitude and caring actions. On the other, 
care must proceed from a psychological and moral framework that “prioritizes their (the care-
receiver’s) own self-understanding” (2017: 115). The vital point to take home is that care is to be 
invested in the well-being of others for their own sakes in ways consistent with and affirming of 
their own point of view of what is good for them. That is, a caring relationship is not ultimately 
about the carer – not about what he/she deems important for the beneficiary of his/her moral 
actions. Rather, genuine caring relationships must be absent of all forms of unnecessary 
paternalism, and must be properly other-oriented for them to be wholesome and effective. 
Two points about this view of dignity are important to notice before we deal with the last statement 
above. Miller (2017: 111) defends a deontological care ethics, which aims, as I explained above, 
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to incorporate positive elements of Kant’s ethics into care ethics. Hence, she is quick to make this 
comment: 
Rendering the moral power of care as the key to a capacity-based account of dignity may 
be an improvement on rationality – or at least an interesting expansion (2017: 116). 
The aim is not to entirely dismiss rationality as an important aspect of human existence. Rather, it 
is to supplement it with another vital component of human nature – care – that will give us a fuller 
and, hopefully, more plausible view of human dignity. It is important, therefore, to appreciate that 
this view of dignity grounds it both on the relational capacity to care and on rationality. Even then, 
care ethicists might argue, following MacIntyre’s (1999), that care and caring relationships are 
prior to or more primary than autonomy, given the fact that we must first be beneficiaries of care 
before we can develop the ability to reason or autonomy. This is a profound observation, the 
capacity to determine our selves emerges after caring social relationships with other human beings. 
Without this nurturing it becomes impossible for one to be autonomous – think of cases of feral 
children, abandoned after birth to be raised by animals (see Jarman, 2019).  
The second point, which Miller brings to our attention is the limitation of her own view of dignity 
as a function of our ability to enter, participate in and benefit from caring relationships. Notice that 
she insists that her view of dignity is a capacity-based one, and as such it will ordinarily exclude 
those human beings that do not have the said capacity from the moral community. The 
consequence of Miller’s (2017: 116) view of dignity is that it “potentially excludes some human 
beings from the circle of full moral consideration” since those “…with severe cognitive and 
affective impairments may never evidence the moral power of care...” The point is not hard to 
comprehend, whatever capacity a moral view will propose to account for dignity will exclude some 
forms of human lives that, for one reason or another, lack that capacity. It is this objection against 
her view of dignity that leads Miller to propose the ground-breaking intervention that care ethics 
can make to the conversations surrounding dignity by extolling the primacy of relationships. 
Her suggestion is that we need to conceptualise care within a relational rather than an 
individualistic framework. In other words, she is directing us to the conditions of human existence 
– that relationships are decisive for the very possibility of human development and functioning. 
Relationships permeate all aspects of our existence. She invokes this relational ontology, as 
manifested in caring relationships, to move “dignity away from an implicitly individualist 
foundation towards something more decidedly relational” (2017: 117). On this ontological 
framework, everything about human beings points to the fact that “we are formed and sustained in 
and through modes of human connection” (2017: 117.). Without relationality no human life is 
possible and sustainable in any meaningful form. To clarify and justify a relational ontology that 




She asks us to imagine the last human being overtaken by an accident that causes her a special 
kind of amnesia. The extent of the damage involves the wiping away of all information about 
herself, all social relationships and everything on planet earth. Given the state of amnesia of the 
last human being, Miller argues that there is no possibility of her attaining self-understanding 
because it is intersubjective by nature. She also observes that the absence of relationships 
practically and psychologically means that the last human being has no dignity, and that there can 
be no morality said to exist in any meaningful sense. Socialisation and personal identity require 
social relationships, and morality and dignity require caring relationships. On dignity, Miller 
(2017: 119) concludes: 
Finally, absent relations with others, we cannot be said to have dignity. Relationality is the 
condition of the possibility of our fundamental worth as human beings. We are, in essence, 
dependent upon the presence of and interactions with others for our dignity. 
What is profound to appreciate here is that our fundamental worth as human beings is premised on 
relationality as the ontological condition of the possibility of human existence. The difference 
between the care-based view above and the relational view of dignity, is that on the care-based 
view, one locates dignity in the actual ability or capacity to care, whereas on the latter view, though 
not explicitly stated by Miller in the article, we locate our fundamental worth in caring 
relationships with others – whether we are aware of them or not, I suspect. Drawing on the 
relational ontology seems to bring something distinctive and substantive to the discourse on 
dignity, but Miller does not in the essay under consideration neatly conclude by clarifying its 
implications for the objections she raised about seriously impaired individuals. This discussion 
finds a supplement and augmentation in Kittay’s work on dignity, which is what we turn to 
immediately. 
7.5 Kittay’s Account of Dignity 
To kick off Kittay’s contribution to the discourse on dignity, it is important to understand how she 
positions herself in these discussions. The first important thing to notice is that she is not just 
writing as an armchair philosopher; her philosophical views are those of the mother of a seriously 
mentally impaired individual. It is common in her writings on care ethics, disability and dignity to 
bring this fact to our attention. She describes her own daughter Sesha’s condition in this way: 
The young woman in question has severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy, cannot 
speak, walk on her own, or care for herself in even minimal ways. Now at the age of 33 
she remains entirely dependent. This very social and affectionate young woman is a great 
hit at her new residence. She loves music and water play and has, in most ways, a wonderful 
life. This is Sesha, my daughter, about whom I’ve already written much, and will no doubt 
write much more before I stop writing altogether (Kittay, 2005: 96). 
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The second point to notice is that Kittay is in a search for an inclusive ethical perspective, which 
will include mentally impaired individuals like Sesha in the moral community. Her search for an 
inclusive moral theory is motivated by the inadequacy and exclusion engendered by dominant 
moral views of dignity, which finds expression in Kant’s rationality view of dignity and its leading 
modern proponent, John Rawls. On her interpretation, Kant’s view of dignity grounded on 
rationality and Rawls’s view grounded on the ability to “function reciprocally in a scheme of social 
co-operation” entails the conclusion that disabled individuals are excluded from the comity of 
equality and dignity (Rawls, 1972: 302). The urgent question that she considers is whether care 
ethics can include disabled individual in the moral community as bearers of dignity. 
To appreciate her account, we must begin by understanding the sense of dignity she wants to 
associate with or attach to the disabled. Kittay (2005) draws a distinction between what she calls 
equal dignity and group dignity. Equal dignity is similar to Miller’s status dignity in that it is 
assigned relative to a possession of a certain capacity of human nature. It is equal dignity because 
all those that have the capacity have dignity equally, since dignity is not connected with the use of 
the capacity. This kind of dignity “inheres in each and every human being to the same degree” 
(Kittay, 2005: 101). Group dignity, on the other hand, is a function of belonging to the human 
family, without consideration as to whether a specific human individual has capacities associated 
with normal human beings. The fact of belonging is necessary and sufficient for human dignity. 
Kittay informs us that group dignity is associated with the constraint view of dignity and that the 
equal dignity view is associated with the empowerment view of dignity (Kittay, 2005: 101; see also 
Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001: 129–146). 
Kittay wants to defend the view that mentally impaired individuals also have equal dignity 
although they lack requisite capacities. This goal should not be surprising because the goal is to 
advance an inclusive ethical perspective. She is aware, as I pointed above, of the obstacles 
associated with dominant capacity-based views of dignity. She remarks: 
I want to redirect that insight and say that it is not in the human capacity of rational practical 
reasoning that we find the ultimate source of our dignity but in a distinctly moral capacity 
to care — a capacity so beautifully symbolized by St Kevin’s refusal to abandon the 
nurturing of life in his fellow creature. Our dignity I want to argue now is bound both to 
our capacity to care for one another and in our being cared for by another who is herself 
worthy of care (Kittay, 2005: 111; emphasis mine). 
Like Miller, she identifies the distinctive ability to care for another and to be cared for as the source 
of our human dignity. Her argument for why we must take the capacity for care as a distinctive 
feature of human nature and existence is quite convincing. She points to the fact that all the features 
that we tend to valorise as distinctive of human existence, such as rationality, emerge only in 
contexts of care, and that without caring relationships rationality or autonomy is rendered a 
chimera. She goes further to elaborate that much of our existence is actually characterised by 
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vulnerability and dependence. If we think of the different stages of human existence, we notice 
that from pregnancy, infancy, childhood and adolescence we are dependent on caring relationships. 
Moreover, in old age we revert to vulnerability and dependence on others. The significant 
argument that Kittay (2011: 51) is making is that we have developed the wrong attitude towards 
disability and dependence because of the “mere fiction” of independence. 
She believes that societies that tend to valorise independence operate on the illusion of it being an 
important feature of human existence. In fact, disability in its various manifestations is a feature 
of human existence. In one way or another, human beings require and depend on all sorts of caring 
relationships to be able to live a normal existence. Even so-called “normal” or “temporally abled” 
individuals still depend on direct and indirect relationships, and they are ever vulnerable to the 
possibility of impairing disability. It is a fact of our human nature or existence to be always open 
to vulnerability and dependency because of aging, disease or mishap (2011: 50). Disability and 
dependency are inevitable feature of human existence. 
Two points emerge from the above analysis. In valorising independence as a feature of our society, 
we have constructed societies that diminish the worth and dignity of other human beings by not 
creating extensive networks of care and support which would enable different forms of human 
existence. Without these enabling dependencies we have effectively threatened the possibility of 
a truly human existence. The second point is that human dignity is possible only through being in 
caring relationships. Here, Kittay still makes the profound point about the relational ontology that 
grounds human worth. She exemplifies the relational ontology that accounts for human worth or 
dignity in terms of the idea of being “some mother’s child”. In her view, the mothering relationship 
is universal and essential to the very project of being and human dignity. The universality of the 
fact of being a mother is explained by the fact that she is the one that gives birth to the child. 
Mothering is essential because the caring work associated with it creates conditions under which 
we can be human and realise our dignity. The daring claim is that outside of these ‘mothering 
relationships’ human dignity is impossible. She expresses this view thus: 
In the case of an infant who has not yet been taken into the human community, and no 
human within the community would have been prepared to take care of that infant, I think 
it is appropriate to say that the infant was not yet a bearer of equal dignity, the strong sort 
of dignity for which I am arguing, although we still may wish to say that the infant 
possesses the group dignity of which I spoke earlier (Kittay, 2005: 115). 
The point is important to take into consideration. An abandoned infant outside of any mothering 
relationship is considered not to have equal dignity, though he/she might be granted group dignity 
because he/she belongs to the human community. Equal dignity is possible and emerges only in 
the context of human connection. Kittay (2005: 116) continues: 
112 
 
This [caring] relationship is ubiquitous in human society and is as fundamental to our 
humanity and our dignity as any property philosophers have invoked as distinctly human, 
and thereby the basis of a distinctly human dignity. 
The caring relationship is ubiquitous, and it is the fundamental basis for our humanity and dignity. 
Even the severely disabled can enjoy a human life, one of equal dignity, in caring relationships 
that allow for all forms of “normal” lives attending human existence. In the light of the above, we 
can conclude that relationships in general and the caring relationship in particular simultaneously 
create and recognise equality in all forms of human existence. It is only when existing in caring 
relationships that we can explore and enjoy human worth. 
7.6 Care Ethics, Human Dead Bodies and Dignity 
We are now in a position to revert to our primary question concerning the moral status or dignity 
of dead human bodies. Do we owe these bodies any moral duties of respect? The requirement for 
moral status or dignity according to care ethics is being able to be a part of caring relationships 
either as a beneficiary or benefactor. The last human outside of social relationships, as we 
discussed above, has no dignity. The abandoned infant outside of social relationships has none 
either. Caring relationships are the source of our equal dignity and it is obvious that a dead human 
body cannot be accessed or affected by caring relationships. Remember, caring relationships are 
important for developing personal identity, which is an intersubjective process. They are also 
important for the emergence and exercise of our rationality. We learn, appreciate and reciprocate 
our personal worth and dignity in the same relational context. The dead person is, in a way, in the 
same position as the last human being and the abandoned infant since he/she is deprived of the 
vital aspect of human existence – caring relationships. 
The conclusion that we can draw from this is that dead human bodies do not have equal dignity 
since they can no longer be benefitted by caring relationships. Cadavers lack the equal dignity that 
is owed to each and every individual and which is associated with the empowerment view of 
dignity. In the state of death, one can no longer be empowered by caring relationships. Human 
corpses, moreover, can no longer be assigned group dignity, which imposes constraints on moral 
agents and limits to degrading and humiliating treatment. Dead human bodies, in a fundamental 
sense, can no longer be objects of humiliation or degrading treatment. In other words, although it 
is true that certain ways of treating a dead body may be damaging to it physically, this physical 
damage does not amount to humiliation. This is because the dead are no longer open to the damage 
of uncaring relationships. 
If the above discussion is true, it implies that we have no duties of care to cadavers. This conclusion 
does not imply that we should not care for a dead human body as most human cultures do, but it 
points to the fact that we do not have direct duties towards corpses. Furthermore, it implies that it 
is permissible to use unclaimed cadavers for research and learning-related matters. By so doing 
we would not be harming anyone – family, friends and so on – let alone the fact that a dead human 
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being is no longer open to the moral harm associated with the lack of care and responsibility. In 
fact, to state the position positively, doing research on cadavers might be a gesture of care insofar 
as it might be a way of adding to our scientific knowledge to learn more about the human body 
and its needs. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the moral status of dead human bodies through the ethical lens of care 
ethics. The chapter had two major objectives: The first was to give the reader a sense of care ethics 
as a moral perspective. In the chapter I offered a sense of the history of the emergence of this moral 
school of thought and then highlighted some of the defining features of care ethics. The second 
objective was to discuss the view of dignity associated with care ethics. Drawing from the writings 
of Miller and Kittay, we observed that these scholars account for dignity in terms of caring 
relationships. We concluded that caring relationships are the source of what we called moral status 
or equal dignity. The centrality of caring relationships as the essential feature of human dignity 
was demonstrated by appeal to the hypothetical case of the last human being, on the part of Miller, 
and through the idea of being “some mother’s child” on Kittay’s part. A disabled individual, just 
like a temporally able individual, is “some mother’s child”. It is being enveloped in and nurtured 
through these relationships that is the source of human dignity. 
Concerning the question whether dead human bodies have moral status or not, I observed that 
since they can no longer be enveloped in caring relationships, they have no moral status or dignity. 
The implication of this view of dignity for dead human beings is that it is permissible to use 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
In this research, I set myself the task of investigating the prevailing intuition that dead human 
bodies have moral value. It is the universal moral presumption that human corpses have moral 
value that explains the expected requirement that we treat dead human bodies with dignity or 
provide them with a dignified send off. Remember, in instances where individuals did not receive 
a proper burial, as with the bodies of those trapped in a cage at Lily mine in Mpumalanga or those 
killed by apartheid operatives in South Africa or in wars, societies and states would expend 
economic resources to exhume them and give them dignified funerals. The research approached 
and interpreted the moral value associated with dead human bodies philosophically, in terms of 
the language of moral status or dignity. Thus, another way to refer to the moral value of dead 
human bodies would be to conceive of them as having moral status or dignity. The central question 
animating this project then was whether dead human bodies have dignity or not. That is an inquiry 
concerning whether we can extend the moral language of dignity to cadavers. 
I raised the question because it is an important one in its own right – to assess the moral intuition 
that is central in our day-to-day decision-making in relation to the passing away of our loved ones 
and even strangers. This research, however, further raised the question of the moral standing of 
human corpses because it is important in bio-medical contexts, particularly in the area of medical 
research and teaching. The challenge that emerges in bio-medical research and training is whether 
it is permissible to use unclaimed cadavers for the purposes of teaching and research at all. The 
permissibility or lack thereof, primarily, will be the result of whether we consider dead human 
bodies to have moral status or not – assuming that we have ensured that these bodies pose no 
medical threat to the users of them. If it turns out to be the case that dead human bodies do have 
moral status, it should then follow that, all things being equal, we may not use them for medical 
research without violating their dignity. If not, it may be permissible to use them in our efforts to 
promote public health through education and research in medical areas of training like anatomy. 
I limited my focus only to unclaimed cadavers. In my investigation, I set aside even the question 
of individuals that may have voluntarily elected to hand over their dead bodies to the laboratories 
of science for medical research. Two reasons explain why I limited my focus in this way. The first 
is the practical consideration that worldwide there are a large number of unclaimed cadavers that 
governments bury, or medical institutions use in their medical training and research. If these 
unclaimed cadavers are already available as a resource in teaching, without raising other socio-
political and moral issues, it seems it presents an opportunity to advance human issues relating to 
public health without appearing to harm anyone. The second reason relates to the fact that the use 
of cadavers for research and learning might be objected to based on indirect moral concerns about 
family and close friends. The fact that the members of the family might take themselves to have a 
special duty to offer their loved ones a dignified funeral might create duties on us to respect their 
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wishes without considering whether we do, as a matter of moral fact, owe dead bodies these kinds 
of duties of respect. Unclaimed cadavers do not invite any moral controversies or raise questions 
of the indirect concerns associated with relatives or close friends and are therefore a more apt 
object of study in a work like this. In what follows I reflect on how I responded to the question 
whether we owe direct duties of respect these unclaimed bodies, or not. 
8.2 Theories of Moral Status and Dead Human Bodies 
To determine, philosophically, the moral status of dead human bodies, I appealed to prominent 
moral theories from various cultures in the world. I drew from eminent theories in the Western, 
African and Oriental traditions of philosophy. I considered both supernatural (religious) and 
secular moral views. Western (Judeo-Christian) and Islamic religious views ground moral status 
or dignity in the fact that human beings are created in God’s image. To be created in the image of 
God is commonly interpreted to refer to the value of the creative capacities that human beings 
share in common with God, albeit to a limited degree. To be a part of imago dei means that a 
human being has the ability to reason, plan, contemplate and execute grand plans. In the African 
tradition, dignity is usually explained by appeal to a spiritual energy comparable to a soul, which, 
however, is possessed by both animate and inanimate objects. The mere possession of high 
quantities of vital force – as is the case with human beings – secures preeminent dignity, whereas 
its dissipation in other things diminishes their moral status. Both theories ultimately do not 
consider dead human bodies to have moral status or dignity. The reason for this is that, upon death, 
the image of God perishes (on the Judeo-Christian account) or the divine energy is lost (on the 
African account), which amounts to the loss of dignity. 
I then considered secular views, starting with Western moral theories – utilitarianism, Kant’s 
deontology, and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. These theories, respectively, ground moral 
status on the capacity for sentience (the ability to suffer and to enjoy), autonomy (the ability to 
make choices and determine oneself) and basic capabilities (innate abilities for ‘beings and doings’ 
essential to being human). What emerged from these three Western theories is that they do not 
ultimately secure the view that dead human bodies, in and of themselves, have moral value. At 
best, these theories promise to secure the moral status of cadavers by appeal to indirect moral facts. 
I continued in my investigation by considering secular African moral theories. I considered African 
relational theories advocated by Behrens, Metz and Chemhuru. According to these three theories, 
some fact relating to living human beings, specifically their capacity to participate in social 
relationships of a certain kind or their actual participation in them is essential for moral status or 
dignity. It is obvious that dead human bodies cannot participate in actual relationships and that 
they have lost the capacity to participate in social relationships of love or friendship. In 
Chemhuru’s case, moral status or dignity is a function of the position and purpose (or telos) of the 
entity in the metaphysical hierarchy. Following this way of thinking of moral status and dignity, it 
is difficult to demonstrate that human dead bodies have a telos in the African metaphysical system. 
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It is equally difficult to tell what the morally relevant function of the dead body might be in this 
metaphysical system. Hence, according to these secular African moral theories, it follows that dead 
human bodies do not have moral status or dignity. 
I also considered moral theories from the Oriental traditions, focusing on Chinese moral 
philosophy. I discussed a Confucian moral outlook, where we noticed that it espouses a 
meritocratic view of dignity that depends on whether the individual leads a virtuous life or not, 
and where the virtues of benevolence or integrity, for example, are highly prized. On this view, 
dignity is something that is acquired over time and depends on conduct. It can, for this reason, be 
lost if the agent’s moral conduct deteriorates. It seems then, on the Confucian view, that dead 
bodies lose the dignity of those that inhabited them since virtue depends on moral performance. 
However, here I also found that the dead body of a virtuous human being could come to symbolise 
dignity and respect. Despite this, symbolising respect is not the same as claiming that the body 
itself has dignity. I noticed that respect for the dead body stemmed from the desire to reward 
someone who lived a virtuous life, and is based on the history the dead individual and knowledge 
of his/her deeds. It amounts to remembering a dignified and virtuous life. Therefore, even on this 
view, dead human bodies do not have moral status.  
Lastly, I also considered both the phenomenological view and care ethics to evaluate the moral 
standing of dead human bodies. Levinas grounds dignity on the Other – on the encounter of the I 
with the face of another. The face of the Other, as the infinite and unknowable, instantiates the 
duties we owe to her, being as she is in a commanding and high position. On this view, dignity is 
not a function of some ontological capacity of human nature. Dignity, in a sense, is a function of 
the perpetual transcendental mystery that attends what it means to be human. Upon death, however, 
human beings lose dignity as encapsulated in the mystery that attends their humanity – they revert 
to the mere form of the humans they once were. Care ethics, on the other hand, conceptualises 
dignity in terms of caring relationships. It is only in the context of mothering relationships that 
humanity is possible. Outside of these relationships, humanity and dignity is impossible. Equal 
dignity emerges only in the context of a caring relationships. For this reason, dead human bodies 
are without dignity; they can simply no longer be enmeshed in caring human relationships. 
In the final analysis, it is clear that all these moral theories entail the conclusion that dignity is only 
associated with human beings as long as they are alive. Dignity, stated positively as a moral 
property that explains the intrinsic worth of human beings within these ethical systems, has to do 
with the proper attitude we ought to have towards human beings in their own right as living beings 
(Bieri, 2017). Dignity, stated negatively as the evasion of humiliating and degrading forms of 
existence, involves removing affronts to human existence as living beings (Kaufmann et al., 2011). 
It does not seem that dignity, conceived either positively or negatively, arises in relation to dead 
human bodies. The insight that emerges in this analysis is that the ethical humanism associated 
with the idea of human dignity points us to the core association between it and ideas of human 
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need, well-being and flourishing, which are core values. The association between dignity and these 
core values, at the very least, presuppose a living human being. 
The important point that emerges here is that morality within all human cultures has been focused 
on living human beings. In contemporary moral philosophy, it tends to be inclusive even of non-
human (but living) animals (see Singer, 2009; Horsthemke, 2015). When Socrates conceived of 
morality as concerned with how the moral agent ought to live, it signalled that ethics is concerned 
with the part of human existence that precedes death. Its focus is the virtue of existing as a human 
being (dignity) and the virtue associated with being the best kind of a human being (dignified 
human existence). Beyond the scope of the living, the question of dignity does not arise. It is a fact 
that ethical humanism focuses on living beings. All the moral theories we have considered 
consistently rule out extending dignity to dead human bodies. An ethical humanism divorced from 
the core concerns of human needs, well-being and flourishing is simply not plausible. 
8.3 Unclaimed Cadavers and Bio-Medical Ethics  
Given the above summary of the prominent theories of moral status and dignity in relation to dead 
human bodies, I concluded that cadavers have no moral status. The consequence of the conclusion 
that human corpses have no moral status is that we do not owe them any direct moral duties. Thus, 
dead bodies, in and of themselves, do not occasion any moral concerns or issues. If this conclusion 
is true, it points to the permissibility of the use of unclaimed cadavers for medical research and 
training – using dead human bodies is permissible since dead human bodies have no moral status. 
Therefore, this research lends credence to the use of unclaimed cadavers for the purpose of 
healthcare, specifically in branches of medical research and training. 
The above conclusion has important implications for biomedical ethics. As Gangata et al. (2010: 
174) remark, “The study of gross anatomy through the use of cadaveric dissections in medical 
schools is an essential part of the comprehensive learning of human anatomy”. They continue to 
observe that: 
Because the sources of cadavers used in Africa are not clearly known, a questionnaire to 
gather information on cadavers used at medical schools was designed from the relevant 
literature and was sent by electronic mail to 123 anatomy lecturers in 23 African countries 
(48 medical schools). Fourteen lecturers from 14 medical schools in ten countries 
responded to the questionnaires. The results indicate that, in most countries, the cadavers 
are unclaimed bodies from the hospitals and prisons, and the bodies of dead bandits 
(Gangata et al., 2010: 174). 
The conclusion of this study supports the use of unclaimed cadavers in the training of anatomy. 
The study offers a moral and theoretical justification by pointing out that we have no moral duties 
towards unclaimed cadavers. It is also important to observe that if the dead bodies have no moral 
status, it would mean that we may need to encourage institutions and people in various cultures to 
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consider donating their bodies for research and training in medical schools. This point emerges 
when Gangata et al. (2010: 174) observe that: 
In South Africa and Zimbabwe, the donations are mostly from the white community, and 
medical school[s] in the Islamic country of Libya [are] importing cadavers from India. The 
lack of knowledge about body donation programs and firmly held cultural and religious 
burial traditions may explain the lack of bequests from black communities. 
Now that we have moral certainty, if the above theories are the best we have, we may conclude 
that we have no duties to dead bodies, and, we, ourselves, when we die, can actually donate our 
dead bodies to succour healthcare. The challenge that emerges in the light of the moral conclusion 
we have reached is that it further urges us to encourage healthy members of our societies to donate 
their bodies to medical schools for the sake of medical research and learning. 
This study urges robust interventions that should encourage the donation of cadavers by 
individuals and families in South Africa and other parts of Africa. This is urgently needed given 
the challenge of securing cadavers faced by academic institutions in this part of the world due to 
scant donations. Unclaimed cadavers are still the main source of dissection in anatomy 
laboratories, and donations could greatly alleviate this problem. 
Kramer et al. (2019: 264) opine that:  
While dissection remains the method of choice for teaching human anatomy, ethical 
requirements for obtaining cadavers [have] made the process of acquiring human bodies 
more strenuous for institutions. In Africa and at the Schools of Anatomical Sciences in 
South Africa, dependence on unclaimed bodies has been prevalent. 
It is important to recognise two points in relation to the above quotation. The authors first point us 
to the ethical requirement related to the process of acquiring cadavers – that of autonomy. The 
conclusion of this research eases the difficulty added by this ethical requirement by pointing to the 
important fact that dead bodies have no moral status in their own right, which implies that we have 
no direct duties towards them. The major hurdle in obtaining cadavers should now only be the 
consent of the family. But, with proper ethical education concerning the status of dead bodies, and 
the importance of medical research and training using dead bodies, the considerations canvassed 
in this research should be of assistance in convincing families who wish to act ethically. 
The second point directs us to actively encouraging African people in particular to receive 
education concerning the importance of donating cadavers. If the moral conclusion on dead bodies 
reached through in this research is true, we should have a strong moral basis to motivate African 
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